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Preface
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, provided the first major health 
care reform in 45 years. The so-called Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted 
to provide high-quality, affordable health care for all Americans. Once all of 
its provisions become effective, circa 2014, the goal is to ensure that all U.S. 
citizens receive coverage for essential health benefits. The reform retains the 
basic structure of our current health care system and assigns shared respon-
sibilities for achieving its goal among employers, insurers, government, and 
individuals. Employers gain additional responsibilities in providing insurance 
to workers, with additions ranging from minimum coverage and payment 
requirements (for large firms) to additional informational requirements. Health 
insurance providers gain new responsibilities that include new required ser-
vice provisions, taxes, fees, and reporting obligations. Expanded government 
responsibilities include creating a new market for insurance—the American 
Health Benefit Exchanges (referred to henceforth simply as “exchanges”)—
and making premium subsidies available to some firms and individuals. 
Individuals acquire the responsibility of carrying essential health coverage or 
facing penalties.
It is far too soon to assess the impacts of such sweeping legislation. We 
can, however, examine the potential for change in one area—employment—
by examining how firms behaved with respect to employment-based health 
insurance before ACA deliberations and by using that behavior to predict 
the changes that might occur once the legislative requirements become fully 
implemented. It is within this context that the research in this book unfolds. 
No man is an island, and this research upholds the axiom, for it took a 
small army of individuals to administer the survey, execute the research, and 
shape the investigation that produced this study. Funding for the study came 
primarily from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and the 
University of California’s California Program on Access to Care. Much of the 
research and writing was done while I was the executive director of the Human 
Investment Research and Education (HIRE) Center and a professor and chair 
of the Department of Economics at California State University, East Bay. Early 
revisions were undertaken, in part, while I was a visiting researcher at the 
Public Policy Institute of California, and final revisions were completed while 
I was employed at Mathematica Policy Research. All institutions provided sup-
portive research environments. 
The research springs from discussions and joint work with colleagues 
from many parts of my life. The survey upon which the study is grounded 
xwas initiated because I and Lynn Paringer, a health economist, took different 
approaches to the study of how firms compensate workers. In the course of our 
discussions, we structured the design of the survey and the subsequent research 
agenda. That line of inquiry was abruptly altered in 2010 when the ACA was 
signed, for it will dramatically change the landscape in which firms offer health 
insurance. Kevin Hollenbeck and Susan Houseman refocused the research and, 
in the process, helped produce a more interesting and relevant monograph. I 
am eternally grateful for their vision and their patience as I struggled with the 
shift. The early work also benefited greatly from discussions or comments on 
drafts from Ron D’Amico, Jed DeVaro, Debbie Reed, Steve Woodbury, and 
anonymous referees. Gary McBride worked with me to ensure the discussions 
of the tax code were accurate. I only hope I interpreted the information he pro-
vided correctly. Finally, Benjamin Jones enhanced the readability of the book 
with his meticulous editing, and Erika Jackson typeset the manuscript, tables, 
and figures.
A legion of Cal State East Bay students called 2,190 firms to obtain the 
1,427 surveys used in this study. Nathan Benedict, Teresa Hoang, Sung Kim, 
and Mark Sawkar spent a summer piloting the survey and, in the process, 
helped develop a finely tuned instrument and build processes to support sus-
tained survey efforts. Benedict, Kim, and Sawkar spent the following year 
surveying firms, training other surveyors, structuring databases, and building 
and implementing quality assurance processes for data integrity. They were 
joined in surveying by Helene Bauer, Jens Eichler, Fei Fan, Sandra Filius, 
Rhoda Freelon, Dawn Guenthardt, Eva Hegemer, Natalie Laqua, Esther Prenzel, 
Denise Rabe, Ulrike Ruemer, Bilijana Serafemovska, José Luis Spahr, and 
Danielle Talsma. Ryan Hoadwonic often served as the on-the-spot problem 
solver while the surveys were in the field and data were being processed. 
It was only because of the painstaking work of another group of students 
that the data collected were able to serve as a springboard for the research: 
Ralf Maywald and Damir Fekovic entered data with such care that they also 
provided quality assurance. Rhoda Freelon spent countless hours identifying 
inconsistencies in the database, verifying information, and following up on 
incomplete information. Freelon led the team of students that helped build the 
initial rounds of tables and charts: Deepa Iyer, Michelle Hilliard, and Tiffany 
Roberts. Tammy Soo verified later rounds of tables. 
As always, my biggest debt and eternal gratitude go to my husband and 
daughter, Ronald and Abigail D’Amico. They challenge my thinking at every 
opportunity and provide the critical support that allows me to endure. Together 
we conquered the trials and tribulations of my own struggles with surveying, 
analyzing, and writing about firms and health care coverage and of my family’s 
personal struggles with the prereform health care system. There is something 
xi
poignant about analyzing data for a study on health care while awaiting results 
of your daughter’s transplant surgery. My work is better and I am stronger 
because they are my life.
While the study would not have been possible without these individu-
als, they bear no responsibility for any remaining errors in analytics or logic. 
That responsibility lies with me alone. Some of the individuals involved in 
the research are ardent proponents of nationalized health care, and some are 
ardent proponents of free markets. I’d like to think that the approach taken 
in this research benefits from both perspectives. My desired outcome for the 
research might be best summed up with an anecdote from a voir dire process I 
was called for at the Superior Court of California some years ago. When asked 
by a prosecuting attorney about my views on drunk-driving laws, I responded, 
“There are costs and benefits to all legislation.” I was promptly dismissed from 
jury selection. Undaunted by this rejection, I continue to strive for a balanced 
perspective in assessing policy, including the ACA. I only hope not to be dis-
missed because of it. 
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Health Care Coverage 
in the United States
One of the major social policy issues of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century was access to quality health care. Only 4 percent 
of the population in 2009 said the health care system worked well and 
did not need to be changed, whereas 14 percent said the system needed 
a complete overhaul (Blakely 2010). Consider that about 41 percent of 
Americans in 2006 were very worried about having to pay more for their 
health care or insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007). This exceeds 
the percentage that worried about paying their rent or mortgage, being 
the victim of a terrorist attack or violent crime, or losing their savings in 
the stock market. Nearly 30 percent of Americans polled in April 2008 
said that they had serious problems paying for health care and health 
insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008a).1 Between 2003 and 2008, 
medical bills created financial problems for over half (55 percent) of 
households with annual incomes of less than $30,000 and for 21 percent 
of households with annual incomes above $75,000. During that period, 
medical bill payments caused 17 percent of Americans to use all or 
most of their savings, 12 percent to be unable to pay for basic necessi-
ties, 10 percent to borrow money or get a loan, and 3 percent to declare 
bankruptcy. About 20 percent of adults had been contacted by a collec-
tion agency or had had difficulty paying (nonmedical) bills because of 
medical expenses. 
Access to high-quality health care was eroding, in part, because 
health care costs were increasing rapidly. Insurers and firms shifted part 
of these increasing costs to individuals in the form of premium and cost-
sharing expenses. Premiums for employment-based plans increased 8.6 
percent annually between 1999 and 2005 and exceeded the increase in 
earnings and prices in each of those years (Figure 1.1). Between 2000 
and 2007 the compound growth in health insurance premiums stood at 
114.1 percent, as compared to a 29 percent growth in earnings and a 
24.3 percent growth in prices (Claxton et al. 2007). By the end of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, the average worker contributed 
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18 percent of the premium for single coverage and 29 percent for fam-
ily coverage to an employment-based insurance premium (Figure 1.2). 
Insured individuals also faced increasing deductibles (payments of the 
full cost of medical expenses up to a certain limit), copayments (a fixed 
payment upon receipt of a medical good or service), and coinsurance 
(payments of a percentage of each medical bill), in addition to premium 
payments (Robinson 2002). 
The uninsured were among those hardest hit by rising health care 
costs, in part because they often lacked access to both health care and 
income. Over half of the uninsured had no usual source of health care, 
slightly over one-third had income at or below the federal poverty 
level, and another third had income at one to two times the federal pov-
erty level (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). The health consequences 
of being uninsured were severe: about 20 percent of adults who were 
uninsured for at least one year reported they were in fair or poor health, 
compared to about 11 percent with continuous health coverage (Insti-
Figure 1.1  Annual Increases in Premiums, Prices, and Earnings, 1988–
2007 (%)
SOURCE: Claxton et al. (2007).
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tute of Medicine 2001). The uninsured used, on average, one-half to 
two-thirds the services of those with private insurance and were more 
likely not to use health services at all (Institute of Medicine 2001). The 
lack of use was not necessarily due to a lack of need. About one-quarter 
of these uninsured adults had postponed seeking needed health care, 
and another one-quarter lacked the funds for prescription drugs (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2011). About 18,000 uninsured individuals under 
age 65 died in 2001, which is about the same number that died from 
diabetes and from strokes (Institute of Medicine 2001).
But although the uninsured were most directly affected by the prob-
lem, the general public, too, faced economic consequences from rela-
tively high rates of uninsurance. When the uninsured use health care 
services, they are more likely to use high-priced emergency care ser-
vices or become hospitalized for reasons that could have been avoided 
with preventive care (Institute of Medicine 2001). This cost the United 
States about $35 billion in services in 2001; about $23.6 billion of those 
tax dollars—two-thirds—were used to reimburse hospitals that had a 
Figure 1.2  Worker Premium Payments between 1999 and 2010 ($000s)
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disproportionate share of uninsured patients. The uninsured under age 
65 cost the United States between $65 and $130 billion in lost produc-
tivity in 2003 (Institute of Medicine 2004). 
In 2010, the state of health care and access to it in the first years 
of the twenty-first century provided a powerful impetus for passage of 
the first major piece of health care reform legislation in 45 years, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known simply 
as the Affordable Care Act, or ACA), as amended by the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act. My research links the past and the 
future of health care by examining the behavior of firms with respect to 
offering health insurance in the years prior to the reform and using my 
findings to inform the potential for change in the years after the ACA 
is implemented. My general line of inquiry focuses on the question, 
“How might the ACA alter a firm’s offer of insurance, and how might 
these changes affect the disparities in employment-based insurance 
coverage between low-wage and high-wage workers?” My research is 
grounded in the analysis of the California Health and Employment Sur-
veys (CHES) data. The CHES surveyed a cross section of 1,427 private 
sector firms that had five or more workers.2 It telephoned firms from 
June 2005 through December 2006 about their benefits, the characteris-
tics of their typical health plans, and the nature of their workforce; the 
survey received a 67 percent response rate.3 I go into more detail about 
the methodology of the CHES survey at the end of this chapter.
THREE BEHAVIORS OF FIRMS BEFORE THE ACA 
My research examines employment-based health insurance offers 
in the years prior to the ACA being actively debated. It provides three 
key insights about firms’ behaviors before the ACA that provide a basis 
upon which we can assess change. 
1. The offer of employment-based health insurance differed 
between firms with a majority of low-skilled workers and those 
with a majority of high-skilled workers. My analysis indicates that 
firms with a majority of low-skilled workers were less likely to offer 
insurance than other firms in 2005–2006. (In this book I use “2005–
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2006” as shorthand for the 19-month duration of the survey, as well as 
simply to refer to the general time period.) About 68 percent of firms 
with a majority of low-skilled positions and 84 percent of those with a 
majority of high-skilled positions offered health insurance. Even if a 
low-skilled firm offered insurance, its offer generally had more restric-
tive access and was of lower quality. Low-skilled firms made employ-
ees work, on average, 33.3 hours per week and wait nearly 3.6 months 
before an offer was extended, while high-skilled firms made employees 
work, on average, about two hours less per week and wait about three 
weeks less before offering insurance to them. Fewer than 4 percent of 
low-skilled firms—but about 19 percent of high-skilled firms—did not 
make workers wait before benefits began. Low-skilled firms paid, on 
average, 87 percent of the premium for health insurance, about 5 per-
centage points less than high-skilled firms. Only 44 percent of low-
skilled firms offered workers a choice in plans, which is about 14 per-
centage points less than for high-skilled firms. 
These differences produce striking disparities when differences in 
the offer by workforce skills are superimposed on those by firm size. A 
36-percentage-point difference exists between small, low-skilled firms 
and large firms: about 61 percent of small, low-skilled firms offered 
insurance, compared to 97 percent of large firms (irrespective of work-
force skills). Access to the offer is equally as disparate: a 16-percentage- 
point differential existed between the 70.5 percent of small, low-skilled 
firms that made employees work more than 30 hours a week before 
extending to them an employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) 
offer and the 54.6 percent of large, high-skilled firms that did so. Even 
greater differences existed in the time a worker must wait before receiv-
ing an offer. Virtually no small, low-skilled firms offered workers insur-
ance immediately upon employment, and over 30 percent made work-
ers wait more than three months. In contrast, over 35 percent of large, 
high-skilled firms extended an ESI offer immediately, and fewer than 5 
percent made workers wait for more than three months before making 
them an offer.
2. When health care costs increased, the vast majority of firms 
that offered health insurance responded by taking actions that 
affected workers’ compensation. The increases in health care costs that 
occurred in the three to five years preceding 2005–2006 caused about 
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70 percent of firms to change their workers’ compensation in some way, 
typically by reducing the quality of the health insurance offer. A sizable 
proportion of firms also said they had reduced other forms of compen-
sation. When health care costs increased, about 45 percent of firms said 
they raised the worker’s price for health insurance by increasing pre-
mium payments or copayments, about 30 percent reduced the choice 
in employment-sponsored plans, about 16 percent gave workers fewer 
raises or reduced wages, and about 13 percent reduced other benefits.
3. Most small firms that did not offer health insurance felt its 
cost was too high for the firm or its workers. About 74 percent of 
small firms—those with fewer than 50 workers—offered health insur-
ance. About 83 percent of those that did not offer insurance felt its cost 
was too high for it to be offered, about 60 percent felt the firm was too 
small or new to offer it, and over 50 percent did not offer it because they 
thought their workers could not afford it.
FOUR WAYS IN WHICH THE ACA MAY INFLUENCE FIRMS 
These behaviors provide a basis for assessing how firms’ behavior 
might change after the ACA is implemented and how those changes 
might affect disparities in who receives health insurance from an 
employer. My analysis provides four key insights about the potential 
influence of the ACA. 
1. The ACA will likely influence the behavior of virtually all 
firms that offered insurance at the time of its passage. My research 
suggests that about 56.5 percent of large firms did not meet the ACA 
requirements for covering workers in 2005–2006. These firms will 
either alter their offer to meet the requirements of the legislation or 
face potential financial penalties. Furthermore, at least 95 percent of 
the employment-based health insurance plans with the largest enroll-
ments did not meet the ACA requirements for services covered, which 
suggests that virtually all the plans firms offered might change with the 
ACA. 
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2. The ACA is unlikely to incentivize small firms to offer insur-
ance if they did not already offer it when the bill was passed. 
Although the ACA makes no specific requirements of small firms to 
offer insurance, it provides tax credits for premiums for some firms if 
they offer it. My research suggests that small firms that did not offer 
insurance before the ACA might not use the credit as an incentive to 
offer it for three reasons: 1) relatively few small firms (about 17 per-
cent) are likely to be eligible for the tax credit for premiums, 2) the typi-
cal reasons small firms dropped insurance were that it was too expen-
sive and that the ACA has the potential to increase premiums, and 3) 
only about 16 percent of small firms not offering insurance perceived 
negative ramifications to not offering it.
3. The differences in employment-based health insurance cover-
age and in the quality of the offer made to low-wage and high-wage 
workers is likely to converge when the ACA is fully implemented. 
My research suggests that the ACA might reduce differences in the 
offer of health insurance that low-skilled and high-skilled large firms 
make to workers. This reduction would reduce the prereform dispari-
ties in employment-based insurance coverage and offers between low-
wage and high-wage workers. The coverage might converge for at least 
two reasons. First, a greater percentage of low-skilled than high-skilled 
large firms did not meet the ACA requirements for coverage and will 
therefore be required to increase their coverage or face potential finan-
cial penalties. Second, low-skilled firms that did not offer insurance 
were more likely than high-skilled firms to see negative consequences 
from not offering it and to express an interest in offering it in the future, 
which might make them more willing to change their behavior if they 
could benefit from the ACA tax credits for premiums.
Convergence might also occur in the quality of the offer by firms, as 
defined by its cost to workers and the choice in plans offered to work-
ers. Firms with a majority of low-skilled workers that offered health 
insurance prior to the ACA made lower-quality offers than firms with a 
majority of high-skilled workers. Large firms with a majority of high-
skilled workers were more likely than comparable low-skilled firms 
to reduce the quality of the offer in the past when health care costs 
increased, and they generally made a higher-quality offer in the pre-
ACA period. As a result, low-wage and high-wage workers in large 
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firms are likely to see the quality of their offers converge as high-wage 
workers see lower-quality offers. 
4. Disparities in the offer of benefits other than health insurance 
might increase between low-wage and high-wage workers.  Prior 
to the ACA, workers in low-skilled firms received fewer benefits than 
workers in high-skilled firms, particularly in the area of paid time (vaca-
tion, holidays, and sick leave), supplemental health (dental, life, long-
term disability, and vision insurance), and pensions. High-skilled firms 
were less likely than other firms to decrease the offer of these benefits 
when health care costs rose. Because high-skilled firms offered more 
benefits prior to the ACA and were less likely to alter their offer when 
health care costs increased, my analysis suggests the benefits offered 
between low- and high-skilled firms might diverge after the ACA, as 
workers in low-skilled firms might be offered fewer benefits if the ACA 
increases health care costs. 
A Proviso to the Predictions of Firm Behavior in This Book
Of course, using past behavior to predict future change is always 
risky, and it is especially risky in predicting the impact of the ACA 
when we do not know what aspects of the legislation are going to be 
binding or not binding on employers. Nor do we know the structural 
changes in the economic environment that the Great Recession might 
bring. Still, because the ACA retains employment-based health insur-
ance as the cornerstone of health care coverage for the nonelderly popu-
lation, health policymakers might take notice of the potential for behav-
ioral changes in firms, as revealed by this study.
The remaining sections of this chapter provide a backdrop for this 
research. I describe health care coverage prior to the ACA reform and 
the nature of the health care structures affecting employment that are 
designed to unfold once the ACA is fully implemented. I then broadly 
describe my research and the content of each of the following chapters. 
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HEALTH CARE COVERAGE PRIOR TO REFORM
At the turn of the twenty-first century, three Americans might enter 
a discussion about their health care and talk about very different experi-
ences if each had different types of health care coverage. Health insur-
ance was strictly classified as either private or government-funded. Pri-
vate coverage funded 52.7 percent of the expenditures on health care in 
2008, a decline from 56 percent in 2000 and 75.3 percent in 1960.4 Pri-
vate coverage was split into two distinct components: individuals could 
1) purchase insurance from a private company in the nongroup market 
or could 2) receive coverage from an employer or union in the group 
market. The division in the private markets combined with government 
coverage and made for a tripartite system of health care: government, 
nongroup, and employment-based coverage. (Gruber [2008] provides a 
good discussion.) 
Each segment of the tripartite system served a different population. 
The government served primarily the elderly and indigent. About 61 
percent (in 2001) of the elderly and about half (48.3 percent in 2005) 
of the nonelderly below the poverty line received coverage from the 
government. The nonelderly, nonindigent primarily received coverage 
from private sources. About 6–7 percent had coverage from private, 
nongroup sources and another 61 percent had it from their employment 
in 2008 (Fronstin 2009). About one-third were uninsured (Fronstin 
2009). 
Each of the three segments had its own set of requirements for 
obtaining coverage and its own standards for determining services 
and coverage levels. Government health insurance included federal 
programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, military health care, the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and programs targeted 
at those with specific health problems (e.g., the Ryan White Care Act), 
as well as individual state health plans.5 Medicare, financed primarily 
through a payroll tax, provided health insurance for individuals over age 
65 and disabled persons under age 65 after a two-year waiting period. 
Medicaid, financed with general tax revenue at both federal and state 
levels, provided health care for low-income people, particularly those 
who qualified for cash welfare payments, children in poor families, 
poor pregnant women, and the low-income elderly and disabled.6 Chil-
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dren and some adults (mostly parents) could receive coverage through 
CHIP.7 
Provisions and coverage in private markets were governed by insur-
ers who sought to minimize adverse selection in the pools of individuals 
to whom they provided coverage. The potential for adverse selection 
occurred because an individual’s propensity to buy insurance was posi-
tively correlated with his or her expected use of health care coverage. 
Individuals with higher risks for using health care bought more insur-
ance. The primary way insurers managed the risk of adverse selection 
was by providing coverage to large groups that were not formed for 
the purpose of obtaining health insurance. By pooling the risk of high 
health care costs across a large number of individuals, the health care 
costs become predictable and manageable and, as a result, insurers 
brought down the price of premiums. Adverse selection created incen-
tives for insurance providers in the nongroup market to manage the 
risk of obtaining an undesirable pool of individuals by setting premium 
levels to cover expected levels of use. Insurers used factors associated 
with expected health care costs (e.g., age, gender, health status, occupa-
tion, and geographic location) to set premiums, and they disqualified 
individuals in poor health from purchasing a plan. 
The dynamics of adverse selection meant that individuals purchas-
ing nongroup private coverage typically paid higher premiums for an 
equivalent amount of coverage than those purchasing group coverage or 
had less comprehensive coverage. In 2007, the actuarial value (average 
percentage of covered health care expenses for the typical beneficiary 
population) of nongroup plans stood at between 64 and 78, compared 
to a range of 79 to 88 for group plans (McDevitt et al. 2010). Of course, 
not all individuals saw higher premiums in the nongroup market. The 
typical 25-year-old paid about half as much for nongroup coverage as 
the average premium for group plans cost, while 55-year-olds paid 33.4 
percent more than it cost. 
The dynamics also created incentives for insurers to search for large 
groups to insure—groups that were formed for reasons far afield from 
health care. During the latter half of the twentieth century and the very 
early years of the twenty-first century, the predominant grouping was 
employees of a large firm who were provided group coverage through 
employment-based health insurance. 
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Historically, private plans—for both group and nongroup cov-
erage—were fashioned in one of two categories: 1) indemnity and 
2) managed care.8 Indemnity plans originally provided consumers with 
a greater choice in providers than managed care plans, while managed 
care plans generally were more cost-effective. But by the twenty-first 
century, the distinctions between indemnity and managed care plans 
had diminished. Many indemnity plans offered coverage through the 
managed-care type of networks, and many managed care plans included 
provisions for patients to use an indemnity-type option known as a point 
of service (POS) plan (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008b). 
Under an indemnity plan (sometimes called a fee-for-service or 
conventional plan),9 the insurer paid for part of the physician or medi-
cal bills in exchange for a monthly premium. The policyholder could 
choose any doctor, change doctors at any time, and go to any hospi-
tal in any location, but paid a specified deductible for specified health 
expenses (each year) before the insurance payments began. The deduct-
ible might be $250 for each person in a family, with a family deductible 
of $500 kicking in when at least two family members reached the indi-
vidual deductible. Once the per-year deductibles were met, the insurer 
and the policyholder shared the bill (i.e., coinsurance) until expenses 
reached their prespecified yearly or lifetime maximum. 
Managed care plans involved an arrangement between the insurer 
and a selected network of health care providers (e.g., doctors, hospi-
tals), and policyholders usually had significant financial incentives to 
use the providers in that network, who typically met standards for par-
ticipation and provision of care. The health maintenance organization 
(HMO) managed care delivery system offered comprehensive health 
coverage for a prepaid fixed fee, regardless of how much medical care 
was needed. HMOs contracted with or directly employed health care 
providers (e.g., hospitals, physicians, laboratories). With only a few 
exceptions, policyholders chose from those providers for all health care 
services.10 Patients typically had one primary care physician who moni-
tored and provided most medical care and made referrals to a special-
ist or other health care professionals when needed. HMO plans tended 
to be very restrictive but to have lower costs than other health care 
arrangements. The POS option within an HMO provided more flex-
ibility by allowing primary care physicians to refer patients outside the 
plan’s network, although generally at an increased cost to the patient. 
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Services within the network generally were subject to a minimal copay-
ment, while services outside the network generally were subject to a 
deductible and a copayment that represented a substantial percentage of 
the service (e.g., 30 to 40 percent). 
A preferred provider organization (PPO) managed-care delivery 
system combined traditional fee-for-service and an HMO by having 
policyholders pay for services received (in contrast to the prepaid ser-
vice plan in an HMO). Patients had “preferred” or “network” providers 
that made up the PPO, and the price for each type of service was nego-
tiated in advance by the health care providers and the PPO sponsor or 
sponsors. Generally, a small copayment was required for use of services 
in the network. Patients could use services outside the preferred net-
work, but they generally paid a higher deductible and coinsurance for 
doing so. The additional flexibility afforded by a PPO over the HMO 
increased its cost to the consumer. 
The proportion of individuals enrolled in each type of plan shifted 
over time (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006). In 1988, 73 percent of 
total enrollment in private plans was in indemnity service plans, 19 
percent in HMOs, and 11 percent in PPOs. By 2005, indemnity plans 
captured only 3 percent of enrollment while HMO plans captured 21 
percent, PPO plans captured 61 percent, and POS plans captured about 
15 percent.
NEED FOR REFORM
The tripartite system of health care delivery was unique to the United 
States and was generally not considered a model of efficiency, pub-
lic health, or fairness. In 2005, per capita spending on health care was 
about 13 percent higher in the United States than in the next-highest- 
spending country and about 90 percent higher than in many other devel-
oped countries (Anderson et al. 2006). Increased expenditures did not 
translate into improved health outcomes, however. The United States 
ranked twenty-fifth in male life expectancy and nineteenth in female 
life expectancy among 29 developed countries in 2003. Public health 
concerns arose from relatively high rates of uninsurance—about 16.7 
percent of the U.S. population in 2003. Underimmunization, which 
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often exists in uninsured populations, increases the vulnerability of 
communities to outbreaks of measles and influenza, for example (Insti-
tute of Medicine 2004). 
Fairness issues arose from the systematic exclusion of some indi-
viduals from health care. Figure 1.3 visually highlights the myriad of 
ways in which an individual might have slipped through the cracks and 
become uninsured. Eligibility for coverage in any of the three segments 
was a necessary but not sufficient condition for coverage. Eligibility 
for employment-based coverage required being employed in a firm that 
offered coverage and being eligible for that offer or being a dependent 
of such a worker. Individuals not eligible for employment-based cover-
age might have been ineligible for coverage in the nongroup market if 
they were too old, in poor health, or employed in a hazardous occupa-
tion (for example), and they might not qualify for government cover-
age unless they met the age, health, family status, or income eligibility 
requirements. 
Individuals eligible for coverage in any of the segments faced 
administrative, knowledge, and financial hurdles to overcome before 
they gained coverage. Some individuals faced seemingly large admin-
istrative hurdles for enrollment (e.g., multistep applications and verifi-
cations for government programs or short open-enrollment periods for 
private coverage), while others were unaware of their eligibility or of 
the administrative steps necessary to receive coverage. For example, 
about 25 percent of the uninsured were eligible for public coverage but 
did not participate in it in 2006 (Dubay, Holahan, and Cook 2007) for 
reasons that included administrative barriers, a lack of knowledge about 
eligibility for coverage, and a lack of effort to obtain coverage (Kenney, 
Haley, and Tebay 2003). 
Still other individuals faced fiduciary hurdles in obtaining health 
care coverage in the private markets. In the nongroup market, the pre-
mium for a family health insurance policy stood at about 25 percent of 
pretax family income for a family of four with an income at 200 percent 
of the federal poverty level in 2003. Individuals with health problems 
faced even higher fiduciary hurdles, as they often were quoted a pre-
mium price that was nearly 40 percent higher than those without health 
problems (Institute of Medicine 2004). In the group market, 56 percent 
of the employed but uninsured who had access to employment-based 
insurance believed the coverage was too costly for their income, despite 
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Figure 1.3  Health Care Coverage Prior to Reform
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in a firm offering 
health insurance
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Age, family 
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Eligibility 
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“Can I afford it?”
Nongroup coverage—
“Can I afford it?”
Government coverage
Covered
Knowledge 
of eligibility
Administrative 
barriers
NOTE: Dashed boxes highlight key factors intervening on the path from entities’ offering insurance to individuals’ gaining coverage.
SOURCE: Author’s construction.
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their income being above eligibility levels for government coverage 
(Dubay, Holahan, and Cook 2007). 
Employment-Based Health Insurance: Disparities in Access  
and Coverage
Employment-based health insurance provides an excellent illustra-
tion of the coverage and access problems that existed during the prere-
form period. Although over 70 percent of the uninsured were in families 
with at least one full-time worker (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011), 
only about 61 percent of the nonelderly in 2008 had employment-based 
health coverage (Fronstin 2009). The disjuncture arose because three 
distinct factors needed to be in place for workers and their dependents to 
be covered by employment-based health insurance (Clemans-Cope and 
Garrett 2006; Fronstin 2007a): 1) the worker’s firm must offer insur-
ance, 2) the worker must be eligible to receive the offer, and 3) the qual-
ity of the offer must entice the worker to accept it. In 2005, about half 
of the workers that were not covered by their own employer’s health 
plan were not covered because their employer did not offer coverage, 
and about 18 percent were not covered because they were ineligible for 
coverage. About 32 percent were not covered because they declined the 
offer (Fronstin 2007a). Why would workers not take coverage when 
offered it?11 Most declined because they felt they did not need it. Over 
60 percent stated they declined the offer because they were covered 
by someone else’s health plan. About 23 percent stated they did not 
take the employer’s offer because it was too costly. About 5 percent 
remained uninsured rather than take the offer.
The proportion of individuals covered by employment-based health 
insurance stood at 69.2 percent in 1987 (Enthoven and Fuchs 2006; 
Fronstin 1998); then, from 1987 to 2004, the percentage fell by 6.3 
percentage points.12 Increasing health care costs might have contributed 
to the decline in coverage (Holahan and Cook 2008) as firms tightened 
their requirements for workers’ gaining coverage (Fronstin 2007a). In 
2005, about 57 percent of workers were ineligible for insurance because 
they were employed part-time, about 18 percent were ineligible because 
they had not completed the required waiting period, and about 9 percent 
were ineligible because they were employed on a contract or temporary 
basis.13 
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Firms differed in their employment-based health insurance offers, 
eligibility, and acceptance, and these differences led to large dispari-
ties in coverage between low-wage and high-wage workers. Only 21.9 
percent of households in the bottom fifth of household incomes had 
employment-based coverage, as compared to 86.4 percent of house-
holds in the top fifth in 2007 (Gould 2008). About 61 percent of workers 
in all firms were enrolled in the firm’s insurance plan in 2009, com-
pared to about 38 percent of workers in firms with a majority of low-
wage workers—those earning at or below the twenty-fifth percentile 
of wages (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2011). Cover-
age rates stood 34 percent higher for college-educated workers than for 
school-educated workers in 2007 (Gould 2008) and 47 percent higher 
for workers earning more than $15 per hour than for those earning less 
than $10 per hour (Collins et al. 2004). Even if both low-wage and 
high-wage workers received employment-based health insurance cov-
erage, disparities existed in the quality of coverage received (Gabel et 
al. 2006). 
Piecemeal Responses 
Inefficiencies, the state of public health, and lack of health care 
access for all Americans periodically sparked heated policy debates, 
which culminated in the passage of the ACA. The debates were decades 
old, however. Both Congress and each president since Nixon attempted 
to curb health care expenditures and streamline coverage, albeit using 
different means to achieve the goals. Changing health care policy at 
the federal level, however, proved complicated. Complications arose 
in part because much of the regulation of health insurance fell under 
the jurisdiction of states, albeit within a system of overlapping state 
and federal requirements for health care coverage arrangements. Three 
pieces of legislation—the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) of 1974, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) of 1996, and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1986—
were the most prominent laws to regulate health care at the federal level. 
ERISA applied to virtually all private-sector, non-church-based 
employment benefit plans (Copeland and Pierron 1998; Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2008b)14 and structured the regulation of such plans into 
a two-tiered system in which federal and state laws played important 
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roles.15 The federal level regulated reporting and information disclo-
sure, claims appeal procedures, fiduciary standards, and remedies for 
wrongfully denied benefits. This federal regulation included an amend-
ment by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
(COBRA), which addressed discontinuity in health care coverage that 
occurred with job loss. Prior to COBRA, a job loss often meant a loss 
of insurance because of insurance being tied to employment in the firm. 
The lack of portability of insurance from job to job often left workers 
locked into their jobs for fear of losing insurance. COBRA generally 
allowed workers and their families the opportunity to continue their 
health benefits for limited periods of time (18 months for workers and 
36 months for dependents in certain situations in 2010) if they lost their 
group health benefits; however, it generally required recipients to pay up 
to 102 percent of the cost of the plan, after tax, to continue coverage.16 
States regulated the content of insurance contracts, licensed enti-
ties that offered private health coverage, and established laws that con-
trolled the legal structure of insurers as well as their finances and their 
obligations to those covered under the policy. States set standards for 
managed care and network arrangements, regulated the adequacy of the 
services under these arrangements, reviewed practices, oversaw the cre-
dentialing of participating health care providers, and set quality assess-
ment and improvement measures.
In addition, most states enacted laws that did four things: 1) 
required the state-licensed organizations insuring health to provide 
coverage to small employers, 2) placed limits on the rates that could 
be charged (e.g., restrictions on the characteristics—such as age and 
health status—upon which premiums can vary), 3) addressed the abil-
ity to restrict coverage to people with preexisting health problems, and 
4) required coverage for certain “mandated” benefits or services (e.g., 
mental health services, substance abuse treatment, and breast recon-
struction following mastectomy). 
HIPAA and related standards addressed the issues of access to cov-
erage, renewability, nondiscrimination, and mandated benefits. HIPAA 
is best known for requiring insurers to limit preexisting-condition 
exclusions for workers changing jobs and for prohibiting discrimina-
tion against employees and dependents based on their health status. 
Perhaps the best-known IRC regulation governing health care is 
the provision for preferential tax treatment of health benefits (Fronstin 
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2006). By requiring employers to pay payroll taxes on wages and sala-
ries but not health (and other) benefits, and by requiring individuals to 
pay income taxes on wages but not health benefits received as com-
pensation, this provision gave both firms and workers an incentive to 
structure compensation with health benefits. 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA)
Such was the environment when the final revisions to the ACA were 
signed into law on March 30, 2010. The 14-month deliberations on the 
legislation saw discussions frequently focusing on whether the United 
States should adopt a government-operated or government-funded 
health care system. The ACA ended this debate by firmly grounding 
reform in the existing tripartite system, albeit a version of the system 
in which existing health insurance programs will likely be substantially 
modified and integrated into newly created programs. Furthermore, 
because the ACA addressed many issues set at the state level, states 
must analyze how their laws fit with the new federal requirements and 
decide whether to continue, add to, or eliminate their state requirements. 
The ACA built structures to achieve three goals: 1) increase access 
to health care and reduce the number of uninsured, 2) increase the qual-
ity of health care, and 3) fight rising health care costs. Some provisions 
took effect immediately, while others unfolded (or are yet unfolding) 
over time.17 Most, but not all, provisions will be put into place by 2014. 
Table 1.1 provides a timeline for implementing key provisions in each 
category and is more inclusive of the bill’s various provisions than 
the discussion that follows. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
placed the net cost of the ACA at $938 billion over 10 years, as noted 
in a March 20, 2010, letter from CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf to 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.18 It will be financed through the projected 
savings from Medicaid and Medicare (discussed below) and new taxes 
and fees, including an excise tax on high-cost insurance. 
The structures conceived to achieve these goals were designed to 
allow individuals to access different sources of coverage at different 
life-cycle stages or at different levels of income. One important piece of 
reform of the private market consists of the new state-established enti-
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ties called American Health Benefit Exchanges (exchanges). (Jost 2010 
provides discussion.) The exchanges are structured to allow individu-
als and businesses—primarily small businesses—to select coverage 
through a variety of plans within one of the state-run exchanges.19 Pri-
vate insurance companies will be able to administer both managed care 
and fee-for-services plans at one of four levels of cost-sharing in the 
exchange. Bronze-level plans are defined to cover at least 60 percent 
of the actuarial value of the covered benefits, silver-level ones to cover 
at least 70 percent, gold-level plans to cover 80 percent, and platinum-
level plans to cover 90 percent. The exchanges were also structured to 
serve as the mechanism by which small firms receive tax credits for 
premiums, large firms are assessed penalties for not meeting the ACA 
requirements, and individuals obtain premium or cost-sharing credits. 
Access
The ACA designed provisions for firms, the government, individu-
als, and insurers to share responsibility for expanding access to health 
care. Large employers are required to provide full-time workers and their 
dependents with affordable insurance within 90 days of their employ-
ment or face potential financial penalties. In addition, firms must auto-
matically enroll employees into their lowest-cost premium plan unless 
the workers opt out of coverage, which makes it easier for individuals 
to enroll in employment-based health insurance. The government role 
will likely expand Medicaid by creating a uniform minimum eligibility 
threshold and covering all individuals under age 65 with incomes up to 
133 percent of the federal poverty level. Most U.S. citizens and legal 
residents will be required to have coverage from one of three sources—
a government plan, one of the exchanges, or an employer (Clarke, 
Keckley, and Kraus 2010)—or pay a financial penalty.20 Insurers gener-
ally must provide coverage to those that apply for insurance. Insurers 
will not be allowed to charge higher premiums based on health status 
and gender; to deny coverage to people for any reason, including health 
status; or to rescind coverage, except in cases of fraud. Furthermore, 
young adults will be able to remain on their parents’ health insurance 
until age 26.
The ACA designed the exchanges to be the vehicle that increases 
access to health care to low- and moderate-income individuals and 
20   Maxwell
Table 1.1  Timeline for ACA Implementation
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Beyond
Access • Young adults on parents’ 
plan
• No exclusion on preexisting 
conditions for children
• No rescissions
• Preexisting condition 
insurance plan (PCIP)
• State potential to expand 
Medicaid eligibility
• Community health centers 
and National Health Service 
Corps
• Small business tax credits
• Rebates for Medicare Part D 
coverage gap
• Reinsurance for early retiree 
health benefits
• Discounts for Medicare Part D 
coverage gap
• No major 
changes 
implemented 
in 2012
• No exclusion on health 
status or preexisting 
conditions
• Guaranteed availability 
and renewability of 
coverage
• New insurance rating rules
• Limits on wait periods
• American Health Benefit 
Exchanges
• Medicaid expansion
• Individual requirement for 
insurance
• Large-employer 
requirement to offer 
insurance or face penalties
• CHIP reauthorization
• Increase small-business 
tax credits
• Cost-sharing assistance 
and out-of-pocket limits
• Free-choice vouchers
• Phase-in of 
penalties for 
individuals 
not having 
insurance 
(2014–2016)
• Phase-out 
of Medicare 
Part D 
coverage 
gap (2020)
Quality • Coverage of preventive care 
without cost-sharing 
• No limits on lifetime 
benefits
• Restrictions on annual 
benefits
• Annual limits on benefits 
banned
• Medical home plans
• Market-based incentives
• Essential health benefits 
package
Cost      
    containment
• Premium increase review • Limits on share of nonmedical 
costs in premiums
• Charges to Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation
• Administrative 
simplification 
• Health 
care choice 
compacts
• Multistate plans
• Independent payment  
advisory board
• Premium credits
• Health care 
compacts 
(2016)
Other • Employers report value of health 
benefits on W-2
• Increased tax on nonmedical 
distributions from health savings 
accounts (HSAs)
• Pharmaceutical manufacturer fee
• Reimbursement restrictions on 
over-the-counter drugs
• Limits on 
contributions 
to flexible 
spending 
accounts 
(FSAs)
• Insurance industry fee • Tax on high-
cost plans 
(2018)
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NOTE: Commonwealth Fund (2010) provides an excellent abbreviated summary of 
most provisions included in the table. Not all changes are presented in the table. See 
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/ for a more complete listing.
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families. Workers in large firms with incomes below 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level and with premium costs for employment-based 
health insurance above 8.0 to 9.8 percent of their income will receive a 
voucher from their firm for an exchange plan. Workers who are offered 
employment-based health insurance, but with a premium contribution 
that exceeds 9.5 percent of their household income or with an actuarial 
value of less than 60 percent, will receive premium and cost-sharing 
credits in the exchange.21 Individuals without access to employment-
based health insurance will likely receive cost-sharing payments for 
deductibles and copayments if their income is below 250 percent of 
the federal poverty level and will likely receive premium credits in the 
exchanges and if their income lies between 133 and 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level.22
The CBO estimates that the ACA will reduce the number of unin-
sured by 32 million by 2019 (CBO 2009). It projects that about 24 mil-
lion people will obtain coverage in the exchanges, some of whom will 
move from the individual market. It estimates that about 16 million 
more people will enroll in Medicaid and CHIP through expanded eligi-
bility. Beyond the CBO, a wide variation exists in estimates, however. 
For example, predictions range from a decrease of 22.3 percent (Holtz-
Eakin and Smith 2010) to an increase of 8.7 percent (Eibner, Hussey, 
and Girosi 2010) in employment-based coverage.
Quality of the Plan
Several provisions of the ACA are designed to improve the quality 
of the insurance plan. Some provisions require plans to increase their 
quality while containing costs. All health plans sold in the exchanges 
and the individual and small-group markets are required to offer an 
essential benefit package of services, which will be determined by a 
benefits committee headed by the surgeon general.23 All new health 
plans must provide comprehensive coverage, including a minimum set 
of services, caps on annual out-of-pocket spending, no cost-sharing for 
preventive services, and no annual or lifetime limits on the dollar value 
of essential health benefits coverage. Furthermore, the ACA restricts 
the use of catastrophic, high-deductible policies—plans that have low 
premiums but high deductibles for incurring health care expenses. Such 
plans will only be available for persons under age 30 who cannot other-
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wise find affordable coverage, or those who would suffer a hardship in 
buying other coverage. 
Cost Containment
The ACA designed several provisions to contain costs and increase 
efficiency in delivering health care in private markets. These include 
the following four: 1) an annual review of premium increases that 
requires plans to justify increases; 2) state reporting on trends in pre-
mium increases, with potential exclusion from the exchanges for unjus-
tified premium increases; 3) rebates to enrollees if a firm’s health plan 
spends less than 80 (small-group market) or 85 (large-group market) 
percent of the premium on medical care; and 4) competition in private 
markets as states form health-care-choice compacts to enable insurers 
to sell policies in any state that participates in the compact. 
Costs are designed to be contained in government health care plans 
in several ways. First, the ACA targets waste, fraud, and abuse in pub-
lic programs with provider screening and enhanced oversight for new 
providers and suppliers, enrollment moratoriums in public programs 
identified as being at elevated risk of fraud, and compliance programs 
for Medicare and Medicaid. Second, the ACA charges the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation with testing new payment methods 
and health care delivery systems that reduce cost and improve the qual-
ity of care delivered under Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP. Finally, the 
legislation requires an Independent Payment Advisory Board to submit 
legislative proposals to reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare 
spending should spending exceed a target growth rate.24 
How likely are these provisions to contain costs for receiving health 
care? The CBO (2009) examined changes in both premiums and admin-
istrative costs when it addressed this question. Its estimates suggest that 
small-firm premiums might remain the same in 2016 as under current 
law, although the small-business tax credit might reduce premiums 
by 8 to 11 percent for eligible firms. Premiums for individuals in the 
exchanges might increase by 10 to 13 percent with the more compre-
hensive coverage in the essential benefit package and mandated lower 
out-of-pocket costs. Premium subsidies might reduce the prereform 
premium payments by 56 to 59 percent for up to 57 percent of individu-
als in the exchange. Estimates of premium changes do not consider the 
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possibility for adverse selection in the exchanges. The CBO estimates 
suggest that administrative costs might reduce premiums between 1 and 
4 percent for small firms but provide no savings for large ones. Health 
care leaders and health care policy experts believe provisions like those 
in the ACA could substantially reduce administrative costs (Stremikis, 
Davis, and Audet 2010)—by about $27 billion—resulting in a slowing 
in national health expenditures from 6.3 percent to 5.7 percent annually 
(Cutler, Davis, and Stremikis 2010).
MY RESEARCH AND DATA
It will be well into the 21st century before the ACA can be assessed. 
Until then, its potential influence can only be predicted by making 
assumptions about behavior. This research examines the behaviors of 
firms with respect to their provision of health care prior to the ACA 
deliberations and uses those behaviors to assess changes in employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) that might occur once the ACA is 
fully implemented. I focus on ESI because the ACA retained it as the 
cornerstone of health care coverage for individuals under age 65. As a 
result, a change in firms’ behavior with respect to health care provision 
could have a dramatic impact on coverage after reforms are in place. 
My analysis focuses on potential changes in the ESI offer with 
respect to its access and quality after the ACA is implemented. My dis-
cussion highlights changes to the disparities in ESI that might occur 
after the ACA is fully implemented. Because the ACA structured provi-
sions to narrow gaps in the ESI offer, my research can shed light on the 
extent to which the ACA provisions might change the ESI offer, and 
whether the changes are likely to reduce disparities between low-wage 
and high-wage workers. 
My research is grounded in the analysis of the California Health and 
Employment Survey (CHES) data. The CHES surveyed a cross section 
of 1,427 private sector firms with five or more workers and a 67 percent 
response rate. It telephoned firms from June 2005 through December 
2006 about their benefits, characteristics of the typical health plan, and 
the workforce. The CHES used proportionate random sampling of firms 
within the 27 northern Californian counties selected for surveying and 
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oversampled large firms so as to allow stratification in analysis by firm 
size. A large firm was defined as one with 51 or more employees in the 
entity that set health benefits, which is consistent with the ACA defini-
tion of a large firm as one with 50 or more full-time employees.
Of primary importance for this research was the timing of its field-
ing. Active discussions on the ACA had not yet begun. The economy 
was relatively stable, and it was well before the Great Recession, 
which started in December 2007. Health insurance premiums had far 
outstripped workers’ earnings and inflation prior to its fielding (Figure 
1.1). During the five-year period before the fielding of the CHES, health 
insurance premiums had increased about 8 to 10 percent per year, com-
pared to a 3 to 4 percent annual increase in prices and earnings. The 
period was therefore one in which firms were highly focused on health 
care and health care costs. Such an environment is likely to approxi-
mate the environment that exists during the period in which the major 
provisions of the ACA are implemented. 
The CHES sample was designed to approximate the distribution of 
firms throughout the United States. The counties in which the CHES 
was fielded were selected to approximate the mix of urban and rural 
counties in the United States (ERS 2004), and weights were developed 
to apportion CHES firms to the distribution of U.S. firms with respect 
to size and industry. Still, California is more urban than the rest of the 
United States, leaving the distribution of CHES counties with a greater 
percentage of metropolitan population (89.5) than that of the United 
States (82.6) (Table 1.2). 
The oversampling of large firms and the sampling frame that 
excludes firms with fewer than five employees leaves the distribution 
of U.S. firms more heavily weighted with firms of fewer than 10 work-
ers than the distribution of CHES firms. It also leaves the distribution of 
CHES firms more heavily weighted toward firms of more than 50 work-
ers than the distribution of U.S. firms, although the firm-based weights 
better apportion the CHES firms (Table 1.3) and the weighted sample of 
CHES firms closely approximates the industrial and size distribution of 
U.S. firms (Table 1.4).25 Weighted analysis better allows for study find-
ings to be extrapolated to the 90 percent of U.S. firms with five or more 
workers (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).26 
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Table 1.2  Distribution of Population in the United States and in the California Health and Employment Surveys 
(CHES)
Percent population 
distribution, 2000
Numeric population 
distribution, 2000
U.S. CHES U.S. CHES
Metropolitan county in a metropolitan area of:
1 million population or more 53.0 65.5 149,224,067 4,123,740
250,000 to 1 million population 19.7 16.1 55,514,159 1,010,595
Fewer than 250,000 population 9.9 7.9 27,841,714 496,919
Total metropolitan 82.6 89.5 232,579,940 5,631,254
Nonmetropolitan county with an urban population of:
20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area 5.1 4.1 14,442,161 255,114
20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metropolitan area 2.0 2.0 5,573,273 126,518
2,500–19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area 5.4 2.6 15,134,357 164,188
2,500–19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan area 3.0 1.3 8,463,700 84,661
Fewer than 2,500, adjacent to a metropolitan area 0.9 0.5 2,425,743 31,360
Fewer than 2,500, not adjacent to a metropolitan area 1.0 0.0 2,802,732 0
Total nonmetropolitan 17.4 10.5 48,841,966 661,841
Total, metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 100.0 100.0 281,421,906 6,293,095
NOTE: Population estimates are as of April 1, 2000. Santa Cruz County was not included as a CHES county even though one survey was 
completed for a firm with a mailing address in that county.
SOURCE: ERS (2004) for the construction of counties into “metropolitan” and “nonmetropolitan”; U.S. Census Bureau (2006b) for the 
population distributions. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
Each of the remaining chapters in the book tackles a particular 
aspect of ESI and the ACA, and each chapter is structured to build evi-
dence in answering questions about how the ACA might alter ESI and 
affect the disparities in it between low-wage and high-wage workers. 
Chapter 2 provides a backdrop for the study by mapping the histori-
cal link between health coverage and firms and presenting a framework 
for a firm’s decision making in offering ESI. This framework structures 
my analysis of the incentives for a firm to offer ESI when changes occur 
in the health care market, as they will under the ACA. The chapter also 
describes how the CHES data are used to examine firm behavior and 
answer the research questions that guide this study. 
Chapter 3 focuses on access to and quality of the ESI offer in the 
years prior to ACA deliberations. By examining which workers had 
access to ESI and the quality of the ESI offer (types of plans offered 
and premiums the workers pay), the chapter highlights the disparities in 
access to and quality of the ESI offer. Analysis presented in the chapter 
shows that workers in low-skilled firms have a lower probability of 
receiving an ESI offer than workers in high-skilled firms. Their lowered 
probability stems from two sources: 1) the firm is less likely to make an 
offer, and 2) the firm is more likely to put tighter eligibility restrictions 
on an offer if one is made. Analysis also shows a lower quality of offer 
extended in low-skilled firms than in high-skilled firms with respect to 
the proportion of the premium the firm pays and the choices offered to 
workers in types of plans. 
Chapter 4 focuses on how large firms might respond to the ACA’s 
requirement to offer ESI or face potential penalties and its potential to 
increase ESI costs. Analysis of CHES data suggests that the prereform 
disparities in ESI coverage and quality of the offer between low- and 
high-skilled firms might lessen with implementation of the ACA but 
disparities in access to other benefits might become larger. ESI cover-
age and access might converge as a greater proportion of firms with 
a majority of low-skilled workers increase their coverage to meet the 
ACA’s requirement and as firms with a majority of high-skilled work-
ers reduce the quality of their ESI offer in response to increased health 
care costs. Consequently, both coverage and quality of the ESI offer in 
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large firms is likely to converge between low- and high-wage work-
ers. This ESI convergence might be accompanied by a divergence in 
the offer of other benefits. CHES data suggest that large firms with a 
majority of high-skilled workers not only offered significantly more 
non-health-care benefits to workers in the prereform period but also 
were less likely to decrease these benefits than other firms when health 
care costs increased. As a result, the level of other benefits offered to 
low-wage and high-wage workers might become increasingly disparate 
if the ACA increases health care costs.
Chapter 5 focuses on how small firms might respond to the changes 
that the ACA brings. It examines the potential of the exchanges and 
tax credits to incentivize small firms that do not offer ESI to offer it 
Table 1.3  Proportion of CHES Firms in Various Size Categories, 
Unweighted and Weighted
  Unweighted Weighted 
n % %
Size (number of workers)    
5–20 475 33.3 65.2
21–50 227 15.9 20.8
51–299 436 30.6 8.6
300+ 289 20.3 5.4
Detailed size categories  
5–9 243 17.0 34.3
10–19 232 16.3 30.9
20–50 227 15.9 20.8
51–99 226 15.8 3.9
100–299 210 14.7 4.6
300–499 62 4.3 1.0
500–999 61 4.3 1.7
1,000–4,999 51 3.6 0.8
5,000–9,999 60 4.2 1.1
10,000+ 55 3.9 0.8
N 1,427
NOTE: Columns show the percentage of firms falling into each category. “Weighted” 
means observations were weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the 
distribution of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. Columns 
may not sum to 100.0% because of rounding.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
Health Care Coverage in the United States   29
Table 1.4  Industry Classification of Firms in the United States, of Firms 
in Counties Covered by the CHES, and of Firms Responding 
to the CHES
United 
States
(2003)
CHES 
counties
(2003)
CHES 
firms
(2005–2006)
Total 7,601,160 168,420 1,427
Industry
% retail trade 14.7 13.0 18.2
% professional, scientific, technical 
services, and management of 
companies and enterprises
11.7 14.0 8.3
% construction 10.6 9.7 8.0
% other services (except public 
administration)
9.7 8.6 8.5
% health care and social assistance 10.0 10.9 11.5
% accommodation and food services 8.1 9.2 11.1
% finance and insurance 6.5 6.5 5.9
% wholesale trade 5.7 5.4 6.2
% administrative support and waste 
management and remediation services
5.0 4.8 4.5
% manufacturing 4.4 3.9 6.7
% real estate and rental and leasing 5.0 5.7 3.0
% transportation and warehousing 2.8 2.4 2.7
% information 1.9 2.2 2.1
% arts, entertainment, and recreation 1.6 1.5 1.4
% educational services 1.1 1.3 1.2
% forestry, fishing, hunting, and 
agricultural support
0.3 0.4 0.3
% mining 0.3 0.1 0.0
% utilities 0.2 0.1 0.3
% unclassified 0.4 0.4 0.0
Size (no. of workers in the establishment)
Fewer than 50 (51) 94.6 94.8 90.4
% 1–4 54.4 54.6 2.0
% 5–9 18.8 18.7 39.7
% 10–19 12.7 12.6 31.9
% 20–49 (20–50) 8.7 8.9 16.8
% 50–99 (51–99) 3.0 3.0 4.8
(continued)
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and the potential consequences that would accompany ACA-induced 
cost increases for small firms that offered ESI in the prereform period. 
Although between one-fifth and one-third of small firms not offering 
ESI indicated an interest in offering it, and although a relatively large 
percentage of small firms cited financial difficulties and administra-
tive burdens as reasons for not offering ESI (areas the tax credits and 
exchanges were designed to address), my analysis suggests that the 
ACA might not be successful in inducing them to offer ESI. Only about 
16 percent of small firms said that not offering ESI produced negative 
consequences, which indicates that a relatively large percentage per-
ceive few benefits to offering it and raises questions about whether the 
ACA’s incentives go far enough to induce small firms to change their 
behavior. Furthermore, the ACA’s tax credits are designed only for very 
small, low-wage firms, and CHES data suggest that only about 8 per-
cent of all small firms and 31 percent of small firms not offering health 
benefits will be eligible for them. 
Increasing health care costs might have the same influence on small 
as on large firms in increasing the disparity in other benefits offered at 
low- and high-skilled firms; however, the effect on the ESI offer might 
Table 1.4  (continued)
United 
States
(2003)
CHES 
counties
(2003)
CHES 
firms
(2005–2006)
Size (no. of workers in the establishment)
% 100–249 (100–299) 1.7 1.6 3.1
% 250–499 (300–499) 0.4 0.4 0.4
% 500–999 0.2 0.1 0.9
% 1,000 or more 0.1 0.1 0.4
NOTE: Census industry classification is based on NAICS codes, while CHES industry 
is based on 1987 SIC codes. A crosswalk linked the two. When firm size categories 
differ between the census and CHES databases, numbers in parentheses indicate a 
CHES-defined category. Numbers reflect the number of workers in the establishment, 
consistent with census reporting. CHES observations are weighted so that the dis-
tribution of sample firms reflects the distribution of firms in the United States with 
respect to size and industry. Columns may not sum to 100.0% because of rounding.
SOURCE: United States and CHES counties from U.S. Census Bureau (2006a); CHES 
firms from Maxwell (2007). 
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differ. My analysis suggests that few differences existed in small firms 
as to the quality of the ESI offer between low- and high-skilled firms 
(other than choice of plans) in the prereform period and shows no indi-
cation that this parity would change should the ACA increase health 
care costs. Thus, the ACA might continue the similarity in ESI offers in 
small firms but create a divergence in other benefits offered. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the research and draws attention 
to the potential consequences, anticipated and unanticipated, that the 
ACA might have for ESI and other forms of compensation as it refo-
cuses the question individuals face in health care choices from “Do I 
qualify for any of the three ways of obtaining health insurance?” to 
“Which source of health care coverage best meets my needs?” 
Notes
1. Numbers are from the Kaiser Family Foundation survey of a random sample of 
2,003 adults aged 18 or older. 
2. Six firms (0.4 percent) had three to four employees at all locations, and 17 (1.2 
percent) had three to four employees in the local establishment. These firms were 
included in our analysis, although few differences existed with their exclusion.
3. The survey took 10 to 15 minutes to administer, and the targeted respondent was 
“the person with knowledge about benefits and jobs” at the establishment. Appen-
dix A provides a copy of the survey. The sampling frame for CHES was establish-
ments, and only one establishment in a firm was included. We discuss the data as 
if the firm was the unit of analysis because only 62 establishments of the 706 firms 
that were multi-establishment firms (representing 49.5 percent of the total number 
of firms) reported setting their own benefits. These 62 firms represented 4.3 per-
cent of the total number of firms. 
4. Fox and Fronstin (2000) argue that such numbers understate public expenditures 
because they do not include the tax break on health insurance and health spending 
that workers enjoy.
5. Tricare was the Department of Defense’s health care program for members of 
the uniformed services, their families and survivors, and retired service members. 
CHAMPVA (Civilian Health and Medical Program from the Department of Veter-
ans Affairs) provided health care benefits to disabled dependents of veterans and 
certain survivors of veterans.
6. Medicaid covered non-Medicare costs and long-term costs such as nursing homes 
for the disabled, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of the program costs despite 
nursing-home disabled making up only 25 percent of the recipients (Gruber 2003). 
7. Most low-income children qualified for Medicaid or CHIP, but low-income adults 
under age 65 qualified for Medicaid only if they were disabled, pregnant, or had 
dependent children.
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8. Other health care “plans” were programs designed to help individuals set aside 
funds for medical expenses (Davis, Doty, and Ho 2005). The Revenue Act of 1978 
created flexible spending accounts (FSA) and allowed employees to contribute 
pretax dollars from paychecks to an account used during the same calendar year 
to meet cost-sharing requirements or payments for services not covered. Employ-
ers created health reimbursement arrangements (HRA) to allow employees to use 
funds for health care services not covered by health insurance. Monies typically 
remain after the end of the year, but these funds expire if employees leave the firm. 
Tax-advantaged health savings accounts (HSA) were made available to individu-
als enrolled in a high-deductible plan (HDP) to offset medical expenses before the 
deductible. 
9. Fee-for-service coverage included basic and major medical coverage. Basic cover-
age paid for (at least part of) a hospital room and care; some hospital services and 
supplies (e.g., X-rays, prescribed medicine); cost of surgery, wherever performed; 
and some doctor visits. Major medical took over when basic coverage ended and 
covered the cost of long, high-cost illnesses or injuries. “Comprehensive plan” 
policies combined both coverages into one plan. 
10. HMOs were generally grounded in one of four models (Kaiser Family Founda-
tion 2006). The staff-model HMO directly employed health care providers who 
provide care exclusively to HMO enrollees. The group-model HMO contracted 
with one or more group practices for health care services, and each group primar-
ily treated the HMO enrollees. The Independent Practice Association (IPA) HMO 
contracted with physicians or associations of physicians in solo practice for health 
care services to enrollees and patients who were not HMO enrollees. The network-
model HMO contracted with one or more group practices or IPAs for health care 
services, but the network could provide care to patients outside the HMO. Some 
HMOs combined the four basic model types in a mixed-model HMO.
11. The reason for declining coverage was indeterminate for about 14 percent of work-
ers (Fronstin 2007b).
12. Part of the decline is accounted for by individuals who transferred to public and 
nongroup insurance. Between 2000 and 2006, the percentage of individuals cov-
ered by Medicaid or state funds increased from 8.8 to 11.3, the percentage covered 
by Tricare or Medicare increased from 2.1 to 2.3, and the percentage covered by 
private nongroup insurance increased from 5.1 to 5.6.
13. Ineligibility could not be determined for about 15.5 percent of workers.
14. Third-party benefit plans are directly regulated at the federal level and indirectly 
regulated at the state level. Self-funded plans are exclusively regulated at the fed-
eral level. The difference between federal and state regulation lies in the distinc-
tion between the terms “health benefit plan” and “health plan.” The health benefit 
plan is one of many employee benefit plans that an employer or union can offer 
and is governed by ERISA. A health plan is the content of the health benefit plan 
that is offered and, if it is offered as an insured product (e.g., health insurance), is 
regulated by states. 
15. ERISA’s “savings” clause, sec. 514(b)(2)(A), reinforced the states’ authority to 
regulate insurance, and its “deemer” clause, sec. 514(b)(2)(B), prevented states 
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from deeming nonpension benefit plans (e.g., self-funded health insurance) to be 
in the business of insurance, so that states could regulate them.
16. COBRA only covers health plans sponsored by employers with 20 or more 
employees in the previous year and is available only under certain circumstances. 
17. The Kaiser Family Foundation (2010b) and the Commonwealth Fund (2010) pro-
vide extensive summaries. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
was charged with interpreting and implementing the ACA’s many major provi-
sions and has established a Web site (http://www.healthcare.gov) to communicate 
the on-the-ground provisions of the act to individuals and employers.
18. The CBO estimated the potential effects of the November 2009 Senate bill, which 
differed slightly from the legislation ultimately passed in March; however, the 
effects are likely be very similar (Collins et al. 2010). 
19. Although the ACA favors state-run exchanges, it confers authority to create both 
a federal exchange and a multistate insurance program, and it provides for the 
possibility of regional exchanges (Jost 2010). The structure of the exchanges is 
unknown at the time of the writing of this book. 
20. Penalties for noncompliance cannot exceed the national average premium for 
bronze-level plans offered in the exchanges. Individuals who do not earn enough 
to pay income tax or who would spend more than 8 percent of their annual income 
on coverage would be exempt from the requirement to have coverage. Members 
of Native American tribes, individuals not lawfully present in the United States, 
religious objectors, and incarcerated populations would also be exempt. (Chaikind 
and Peterson [2010] provide a discussion.) 
21. The maximum percentage of workers that would be required to pay ranges from 
2.0 (133–150 percent of poverty) to 9.5 percent (300–400 percent of poverty). 
Premium credits pay for the premium of the silver plan in the exchange. They 
are delivered as a tax credit, irrespective of whether taxes are filed, and are paid 
in advance directly to the insurer that the individual chooses. Peterson and Gabe 
(2010) provide a discussion.
22. Legal immigrants are also eligible for credits if they are ineligible for Medicaid 
because they have lived in the United States for less than five years and have 
incomes below 133 percent of the poverty line.
23. Essential health benefits include ambulatory services, emergency services, hos-
pitalization, maternity/newborn care, mental health/substance abuse, prescription 
drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services, pre-
ventive and wellness/chronic disease management, and pediatric services includ-
ing oral and vision. 
24. Proposals cannot include provisions that would ration care; increase revenues; or 
change benefits, eligibility, or Medicare beneficiary cost-sharing. 
25. Weights were developed by dividing the percentage of U.S. firms in the county 
business pattern (CBP) data (U.S. Census Bureau 2006a) by the percentage of 
CHES firms within each two-digit, three-size category of industry: 5–19 employ-
ees; 20–50 (CHES) or 20–49 (CBP); and 51+ (CHES) or 50+ (CBP). Categories 
were combined if one contained fewer than 15 CHES firms.
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26. The CHES contains a slightly higher percentage of firms in retail trade (about 5.0 
percentage points), manufacturing (about 2.5 percentage points), and accommoda-
tion and food services (about 2.5 percentage points) than the United States and 
a slightly lower percentage of firms in the professional and management sector 
(about 5.0 percentage points) and in real estate and leasing (about 2.5 percent-
age points). More dramatic differences exist by firm size, however—even when 
weights are applied. Because CHES generally eliminated firms with fewer than 
five workers from the surveying, about 55 percent of the firms were ineligible for 
participating in CHES surveying because they were too small. As a result, 94.5 
percent of firms in the United States and in CHES counties had fewer than 50 
workers in 2000, but only 90.4 percent of the CHES-weighted sample have 50 or 
fewer workers.
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Employer-Sponsored  
Health Insurance
Many of the problems in health care access and coverage can, argu-
ably, be traced to the century-old marriage between health care access 
and employment—an arrangement that is uniquely American.1 At the 
turn of the twentieth century, a time that was prior to this marriage, the 
problems in health care were quite different from the ones that were 
present 100 years later, at the turn of the twenty-first century. Although 
the United States had a relatively high physician-to-population ratio and 
the population had easy access to physicians, the quality of care was 
mixed. The 1910 Flexner Report addressed the quality-of-care issue 
and surveyed the state of medical education in the United States and 
Canada. It concluded that American medical schools should increase 
their standards and adhere to the protocols of mainstream science. The 
Rockefeller Foundation supported the report’s conclusions and distrib-
uted about $78 million among 24 university-based medical schools so 
that they could adopt the recommended changes. Because the Associa-
tion of American Medical Colleges and the American Medical Asso-
ciation (AMA) formally embraced the suggested changes, the Flexner 
standards ultimately served as the basis for accrediting medical schools. 
At about the same time, states established licensing requirements for 
physicians, and many of these requirements specified that the physician 
must have studied at a school offering a curriculum adhering to AMA 
guidelines. 
The consequences of medical-school accreditation and state licens-
ing of physicians could easily have been predicted by any first-year 
economics student: the supply of physicians fell, and the price of medi-
cal care increased. The ratio of physicians per 100,000 population fell 
from 158 in 1906 to 126 in 1931, and the number of graduates from 
medical schools fell from 5,747 in 1904 to 3,047 in 1920. By the 1930s, 
the reduced supply of physicians made it difficult for rural communities 
to attract physicians, while the increased cost of medical care often left 
hospitals unable to collect payments for services rendered. Justin Ford 
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Kimble, a hospital administrator at Baylor University’s Baylor Hospital 
in Dallas (now Baylor University Medical Center), devised a plan in 
1929 that would alleviate both problems by making employers an inter-
mediary for medical care provision. His idea was to collect “insurance 
premiums” from employee groups and guarantee hospital services to 
members of the group subscribing to the arrangement. With employers 
collecting the payments, hospitals could lower marketing and enroll-
ment expenses and rural areas could attract physicians by ensuring that 
there would be sufficient demand for their services.
Kimble’s timing in positioning employers as intermediaries for 
medical-care provision could not have been better. The Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s had exacerbated the need for prepaid arrangements, 
as medical bills went unpaid and hospital beds stood empty.2 Hospitals 
and health care coalitions (e.g., Blue Cross Group Hospital Insurance, 
which Kimball originated) developed systems that linked a group of 
subscribers to a group of hospitals and physicians, and states provided 
such associations with preferential tax treatment if they used a lower-
priced “community rating” instead of individual pricing.3 The emerging 
system started to suffer from adverse selection, however, as community- 
rated plans became less expensive than individually priced plans for 
the unhealthy but more expensive than individually priced plans for the 
healthy. In response, hospital associations developed lower-cost plans 
for groups in which the risk for service was not skewed toward the 
unhealthy. These group plans dovetailed nicely into Kimble’s idea of 
employer intermediaries.
The marriage between employment and health care access thrived 
during World War II, as federally legislated wage and price controls con-
strained wage increases but not necessarily benefit increases. Because 
wage controls limited a firm’s ability to increase wages, market con-
ditions created strong incentives for firms to initiate or expand health 
insurance plans as a way to increase a worker’s compensation. Workers 
accepted such plans as compensation, in part because the premiums the 
firms paid on their behalf were not subject to income taxation. These tax 
incentives remained after wage controls were lifted, and the explosion 
in employment-based group health insurance plans continued. 
Not all individuals benefited from the marriage between health care 
access and employment. Retirees and others without a relationship to 
the labor market were left out of the system, and low-wage workers 
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often were better off substituting additional wages for health insurance. 
Concern for these individuals did not go unnoticed. In 1937 the AMA 
“Committee of 430,” a body of 430 internationally known physicians, 
articulated four principles for health care in the United States. One of 
these principles argued that providing adequate medical coverage for the 
economically needy might require different thinking. In 1965, through 
passage of the Social Security Act, Medicare addressed concerns about 
medical care for the elderly, and Medicaid addressed concerns about 
such care for the indigent. Concerns about low-wage workers remained 
largely unaddressed until the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 cre-
ated the exchanges.
This chapter provides a benefit-cost framework to assess three 
things: 1) the incentives for firms to offer employer-sponsored insur-
ance (ESI), 2) the advantages and disadvantages different types of firms 
face when offering it, and 3) the change that might occur in a firm’s ESI 
offer once the ACA takes effect. The chapter also highlights the distinc-
tive ability of the California Health and Employment Surveys (CHES) 
data to allow researchers to empirically examine a firm’s behavior in 
the years preceding the ACA deliberations and to extrapolate from that 
behavior in order to predict how the ESI offer might change once the 
ACA becomes fully implemented. 
The uniqueness of the CHES data allows us to build upon the 
nascent studies on predicted changes in ESI that will come with the 
ACA. Some such studies have surveyed employers and asked them to 
describe changes they might make in response to the legislation. The 
survey results suggest that between 50 and 60 percent of employers 
might pursue alternatives to ESI as they evaluate the opportunities and 
risks that arise when the ACA’s major provisions become effective 
(Singhal, Stueland, and Ungerman 2011). Other studies have used com-
puter algorithms to model current behavior and simulate changes that 
might occur under ACA-like conditions; these studies suggest that there 
will be a much smaller degree of change (Eibner, Husssey, and Girosi 
2010; Garrett and Buettgens 2011). The CHES data provide an oppor-
tunity to use an approach somewhere between these two by employing 
statistical analysis to explain prereform behavior and to extrapolate this 
behavior into the future. 
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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OFFERING ESI
Whether a firm offers health insurance depends on how it perceives 
the costs and benefits of replacing some portion of wage compensation 
with ESI.4 Although the relative costs and benefits of this action—and 
the portion of wage compensation replaced—will vary for each organi-
zation, it is possible to outline the general types of costs a firm bears in 
making an ESI offer and the categories of benefits it might receive from 
doing so. The costs that firms consider when making an ESI offer gen-
erally fall into four categories: 1) premiums, 2) administrative costs, 3) 
quality of the ESI plan and offer, and 4) access to the offer.5 Premiums, 
administrative costs, and quality all determine the per-employee cost 
of offering ESI, while access to the offer determines a firm’s overall 
expenditures in making the offer. 
Per-employee premium payments form the largest cost a firms bears 
when it offers ESI, and the size of this payment is closely linked to 
firm size. Insurers set lower premiums for larger groups because large 
groups are more likely to approximate a random sampling of the popu-
lation. As a result, they are more likely to be actuarially sound—in other 
words, they have a lower probability of adverse selection and have pre-
dictable and relatively stable costs of health care over time. Because 
smaller groups are less likely to approximate a random sampling of 
the population, insurers often use medical underwriting (i.e., screen-
ing and evaluation based on health risks) to rate them individually, in 
much the same way as they do for individuals in the nongroup market. 
Thus, while premiums in the group market are lower than those in the 
nongroup market, the small-group market faces higher premiums and 
greater variability in premiums than the large-group market, as is con-
sistent with the potential for greater adverse selection in small firms 
(Cutler 1994).6 
Per-worker administrative costs for ESI also fall as firm size 
increases, since the firm benefits from both externally and internally 
created economies of scale. External economies of scale arise because 
insurers face higher administrative costs with smaller firms. Smaller 
firms have an increased likelihood of adding or dropping coverage, 
going out of business, and having worker turnover (Williams and Lee 
2002), all of which create administrative costs for the insurer. Insurers 
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also benefit from reduced communication costs with a larger firm, as 
they only have to contact a single individual or department for claims 
processing and benefits administration. Internal economies of scale 
arise with declining administrative costs associated with less expensive 
and more competent governance structures in larger firms (Williamson 
1975) and with personnel who specialize in purchasing and adminis-
tering health benefits. Together, the external and internal economies 
of scale mean that administrative costs consume nearly 40 percent of 
every premium dollar for firms with one to four employees, but only 
about 5.5 percent of every premium dollar for employers with 10,000 
or more employees (Yegian 1999).
The price of ESI for firms is set in accordance with the ultimate 
quality of the health care a worker receives. ESI quality has at least 
two dimensions, which we define as 1) quality of the plan and 2) qual-
ity of the offer. Both components affect the price of insurance. We use 
the term “quality of the plan” to describe the type and level of services 
included in the coverage. Offering a plan with expansive service cov-
erages increases the plan’s quality (and cost) over offering one with 
restrictive coverages. The ACA directly regulates the quality of plans 
and places a floor on the quality of plan a firm can offer, by requir-
ing that the plan contain essential health benefits. Higher-quality plans 
include more services and carry higher prices. 
We use the term “quality of the offer” to capture the ability of 
a worker to access a plan that will cover needed services. From the 
worker’s perspective, this might mean how much he or she must pay 
for services and how much flexibility he or she has in selecting a plan 
that includes the type or level of services needed. Although the ACA 
places some limitations on a firm’s ability to set the quality of cover-
age (e.g., it eliminates cost-sharing on WellCare visits), a firm still has 
the ability to affect the ESI offer, because it can set the portion of the 
premium a worker pays and how many plans it will offer workers. All 
else being equal, a higher-quality ESI offer means firms pay a large pro-
portion of the premium and offer workers a choice in plans so they can 
select a plan that best meets their needs (Moran, Chernew, and Hirth 
2001). 
Both dimensions of quality increase a firm’s ESI cost. Heretofore, 
firms typically reduced their costs by having workers share in the pre-
mium costs. In 2010, about 84 percent of workers with single-worker 
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coverage and 95 percent with family coverage shared the premium 
payment with the firm; workers paid, on average, about 19 percent 
of the premium for single-worker coverage and 30 percent for family 
coverage (Claxton et al. 2010). Firms also control costs by restricting 
workers’ choice in plans. Offering a choice generally increases a firm’s 
ESI costs, since the firm often faces increased premiums as the pool of 
workers in any one plan falls and insurers charge higher loads. Further-
more, administrative costs increase, since the firm must communicate 
the details of different plans to workers and potentially negotiate with 
different insurers. In 2010, 84 percent of firms offering ESI offered only 
one type of health plan, leaving 48 percent of workers without a choice 
in plans (Claxton et al. 2010). 
Finally, a firm’s total expenditure on ESI is determined by the pro-
portion of workers that have access to that offer (Cutler and Madrian 
1998), in addition to the level of the per-worker price. Firms often limit 
who gets the ESI offer by setting a minimum on the number of hours per 
week a worker must work and the months of tenure a worker must have, 
and by stipulating that the employment contract be permanent rather 
than temporary before a worker can receive an offer. The tighter the 
restrictions (e.g., the greater the number of hours per week or months 
of tenure required to receive an offer), the lower the ESI costs, since 
a lower percentage of workers will qualify for an offer. Although the 
ACA requires large firms to offer workers ESI if they work at least 30 
hours per week and have three months of tenure, small firms have no 
such restrictions. 
Firms benefit from offering ESI in at least three areas. First, as the 
abbreviated history of company-sponsored medical plans suggests, one 
motivation to offer ESI is a decreased tax burden: employers can deduct 
both the wages and the ESI expenses as a business expense and are 
exempt from paying the 6.2 percent payroll tax for Social Security (for 
workers falling below its maximum wage) and the 1.45 percent payroll 
tax for Medicare. These tax savings make it relatively cheaper for a firm 
to compensate a worker with a dollar of ESI than with a dollar of wages, 
because the dollar of ESI is essentially taxed at a lower rate. 
Second, employing workers that are covered for health care can 
increase productivity. (O’Brien [2003] provides a summary.) Workers 
with health insurance have better health outcomes (Levy and Meltzer 
2001), reduced absenteeism (Paringer 1983), and increased productiv-
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ity (Dey and Flinn 2005; Kessler and Stang 2006). Firms offering ESI 
also have reduced worker turnover, as workers are more likely to stay 
with the firm for the insurance (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996; Cooper 
and Monheit 1993; Mitchell 1982).7 
Third, arguably the largest benefit to offering ESI is that a firm can 
use ESI to attract and retain workers with desired workforce skills, 
because many workers want it as part of their compensation. In one 
study, 73 percent of workers said the ESI provided by their employer 
was a very important factor in their decision to take or keep a job 
(Duchon et al. 2000), 65 percent ranked health insurance as the most 
important employee benefit, and only 10 percent stated they would pre-
fer a wage increase to health insurance (Salisbury and Ostuw 2000). 
Heterogeneity in ESI Demand and Homogeneity in ESI Offer
While some workers prefer trading a portion of wages for ESI, or 
vice versa, others do not. In the aggregate, workers appear to be will-
ing to trade one for the other dollar-for-dollar (Gruber 1994; Gruber 
and Krueger 1991); however, some workers place a greater weight on 
wages (Baicker and Chandra 2006; Olson 2002), while others value the 
additional dollar spent on health care significantly more than the addi-
tional wage dollar (Royalty 2008).
Workers’ relative preference for wages or health insurance deter-
mines, to a large extent, how much firms gain from offering ESI. If 
workers value an additional dollar spent on wages and an additional 
dollar spent on ESI equally, firms will be indifferent about whether to 
offer a worker one dollar’s worth of wages or one dollar’s worth of ESI 
as compensation (Cutler 1997; Pauly 1997; Summers 1989). If work-
ers value one additional dollar spent on ESI more than an additional 
dollar spent on wages, a firm benefits from trading some wages for 
ESI because it will be able to attract more workers with one dollar of 
ESI than with one dollar of wages. Workers might value ESI more than 
wages because firms frequently can offer insurance to their workers at 
a lower cost than workers would have to pay to obtain it in the non-
group market and because nonwage compensation is not included in 
their taxable income.8 Conversely, if workers value one dollar of wages 
more than one dollar of ESI, the firm benefits from offering additional 
wage compensation. Workers might not value ESI highly, as they may 
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have insurance from another source (such as their spouse or the govern-
ment) or would rather have wage compensation and remain uninsured 
because they believe themselves to be healthy and not in need of health 
insurance. 
A firm can maximize the value of a worker’s compensation and 
its ability to attach a desired worker more securely to the company by 
individually negotiating the compensation package. With individually 
negotiated benefits, a firm is able to allocate the dollars it has devoted 
to compensation in a manner that mirrors the worker’s relative prefer-
ences. For some workers, the package would contain all wages; for oth-
ers it would contain (lower) wages and health insurance. Unfortunately, 
both governmental and market forces virtually remove the possibility of 
individual-level negotiation of a compensation package. Section 105(h) 
of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits individual-level negotiation 
of compensation; the nondiscrimination rule9 governs firms with self-
insured health plans (EBRI 2009a)10 or with cafeteria plans that include 
health insurance.11 The ACA imposed similar nondiscrimination rules 
on insured group health plans issued on or after September 23, 2010. 
The general idea behind the nondiscrimination rule is that benefits 
for higher-paid employees must be equivalent to those for lower-paid 
employees. Its application requires firms to meet one of three coverage 
tests: 1) 70 percent of all employees benefit under the plan; 2) the plan 
benefits 80 percent of eligible employees, and 70 percent of all employ-
ees are eligible; or 3) the plan benefits a nondiscriminatory classifica-
tion of employees (e.g., the same type and level of benefits are available 
to all). Because firms offering multiple health insurance options might 
face difficulty in passing either the first or second test since employees 
are dispersed among the various plans, many firms satisfy the nondis-
crimination rule by offering the same plan to all eligible workers.
Group plans offered through a third-party insurer and put in place 
before September 23, 2010, are not affected by the nondiscrimination 
rule; however, they face many of the same restrictions from insurers 
who structure their contracts to reward large, nonselect groups. Such 
contracts require that individuals, to be eligible, meet minimum stan-
dards on certain health conditions; this reduces the probability of 
adverse selection in the pool of covered individuals.
The nondiscrimination and third-party rules provide firms with an 
incentive to move from individual-level negotiation of health insurance 
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to firm-wide negotiation, using a strategy of offering ESI that meets the 
preferences of the typical worker it desires to attract (Gruber and Lettau 
2004).12 Indeed, the heterogeneity in workers’ preferences for ESI and 
wages, combined with workers’ ability to sort among firms whose com-
pensation packages best match their preferences, gives firms a strong 
incentive to tailor ESI so that it will attract workers with the desired 
characteristics (Hirth et al. 2006; Monheit and Vistnes 1999). 
Firm Size Matters in Offering ESI
Whether or not a firm offers health insurance to its workers depends 
on the relative costs and benefits from extending the offer. The cost side 
of the comparison is determined, to a large extent, by the firm’s size, 
although a wide variation in cost exists even for firms of the same size. 
In 2005, premium contributions as a share of a firm’s payroll ranged 
from less than 4 percent to more than 15 percent (Eibner, Kapur, and 
Marquis 2006). 
Cost differentials are created across and within the two distinct 
markets for ESI: large-group and small-group (Hall 2000).13 The large-
group market for ESI consists of firms with more than 50 workers. The 
primary regulatory factors for that market are determined by whether 
the firm is self-insured: firms that self-insure are subject to ERISA regu-
lation, whereas firms with third-party insurance are subject to state reg-
ulation. The large-group market is experience-rated among groups but 
community-rated within groups, and underwriting is focused on group 
averages. The small-group market for ESI consists of firms with 50 or 
fewer workers. Because very few firms in this market are self-insured, 
the market is largely governed by state laws (and, to a lesser extent, by 
HIPAA). States generally exercise the most oversight of plan content 
in this market. Although regulations have largely diminished the use 
of medical underwriting in this market, it was still present in the years 
preceding implementation of the ACA. 
The distinction in the markets for ESI that existed between large 
and small firms—again, defined by a 50-worker ceiling for small 
firms—did not go unrecognized in the ACA. Critical provisions of the 
legislation acknowledged the different cost structures facing large and 
small firms by structuring different incentives for them to offer ESI in 
the postreform period. The ACA requires large firms to offer ESI or 
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potentially face financial penalties. Small firms will not be required to 
offer ESI by the ACA, and some of them will be eligible to receive a tax 
credit if they choose to offer it. 
Because the market for ESI differed between large and small firms 
in the prereform era and will continue to differ after the ACA is imple-
mented, the incentive to offer ESI likewise differs systematically by 
the 50-worker demarcation. As a result, assessment of their prereform 
behavior and predictions about their postreform behavior must be 
undertaken separately for large and small firms. 
Workforce Skills Matter in Offering ESI
The benefits side of the cost-benefit equation of offering ESI is heav-
ily dependent upon the relative preferences of a firm’s workers for ESI. 
One dimension along which worker preference for ESI varies is wages, 
as high-wage workers tend to value ESI more highly than do low-wage 
workers (Royalty 2000). Progressive marginal tax rates make the tax 
savings from nonwage compensation greater for high-wage workers 
than for low-wage workers.14 Although all workers pay taxes on their 
wages and pay no tax on ESI, workers paying a 35 percent marginal 
rate gain a greater dollar value from tax-free health benefits than those 
paying a 5 percent marginal rate. High-wage workers, who are more 
likely to fall into the 35 percent marginal tax bracket, therefore receive 
a greater tax savings from taking compensation in the form of benefits 
than do low-wage workers, who are more likely to fall into the 5 per-
cent tax bracket. Furthermore, low-wage workers and their families are 
frequently eligible for Medicaid and indigent care if they face a medi-
cal catastrophe (Currie and Yelowitz 2000). ESI largely gives them the 
ability to purchase routine WellCare and to obtain improved sick care, 
a luxury they may feel can be forgone to purchase necessities. Under 
such circumstances, they might prefer wage compensation to purchase 
goods rather than the option of having ESI. 
Research generally supports the proposition that high-wage workers 
have a greater preference for ESI as compensation than low-wage work-
ers have: studies show that firms with high-wage workforces are more 
likely to offer a generous health insurance plan than those with low-
wage workforces (Bundorf 2002; Cooper and Schone 1997; Vanness 
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and Wolfe 2002),15 and firms composed of young, low-wage workers 
(Evans and Leighton 1989; Hadley and Reschovsky 2002; Long and 
Marquis 1992) often do not provide health insurance. Furthermore, 
research shows a strong overlap (about 80 percent) between employees 
wanting (or not wanting) insurance and firms offering (or not offering) 
it (Hirth et al. 2006); much of the incongruity—the remaining 20 per-
cent—lies with high-wage workers employed in firms with mostly low-
wage workers, or low-wage workers employed in firms with mostly 
high-wage workers. Of course, the ACA explicitly attempted to change 
workers’ preferences for ESI by requiring essential health care cover-
age for most individuals; however, it also may have further decreased 
the preference for ESI among low-wage workers by expanding Medic-
aid eligibility and offering premium credits in the exchanges for low-
to-moderate-wage workers.
While wages might serve as a good proxy for worker preference 
for ESI among researchers, in actual practice wages alone make a poor 
criterion for establishing compensation policy since compensation is 
far broader; thus, wages must be considered with other benefits when 
making policy. After all, ESI is a critical component for workers when 
selecting a firm for employment (Lehrer and Pereira 2007). This, of 
course, presents firms with an opportunity to use ESI to attract the types 
of skills they need in workers. 
The line of causality between wages and ESI is important because 
it allows firms the chance to strategically structure a firm-wide ESI 
policy. Firms that need high-skilled workers are likely to have high-
wage workers, and such workers generally place a relatively high mar-
ginal value on ESI. Firms are therefore likely to attract such workers 
by building a compensation package that includes health insurance. In 
contrast, firms whose production relies on low-skilled workers, who are 
paid relatively lower wages, might be able to attract them by weighting 
the compensation package toward increased wages and not including 
much ESI.
The incentive for firms to set ESI firm-wide and the strategy of 
using ESI to attract workers with needed skills suggests that firms in 
which a majority of the positions require high skills will have an incen-
tive to offer ESI, because their typical worker will have a relatively high 
preference for trading some wages for a generous health care plan. In 
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contrast, firms in which a majority of the positions require a relatively 
low level of skills will have an incentive to offer added wages in lieu of 
ESI and offer a less generous plan, if they offer ESI at all.
Costs, Benefits, and the ACA
Using the cost-benefit framework and the level of workforce skills 
to capture the benefits a firm receives from offering ESI provides 
insights as to which firms are likely to make a high-quality ESI offer to 
workers. Because high-skilled workers are likely to value ESI as com-
pensation, firms in which at least a majority of the positions require 
high-skilled workers—what we call high-skilled firms—will be more 
likely to make an ESI offer, and to make a higher-quality offer, than 
other firms. Because low-skilled workers are likely to value additional 
wages as compensation, firms in which at least a majority of the posi-
tions require low-skilled workers—what we call low-skilled firms—will 
be less likely to make an ESI offer, and more likely to make a lower-
quality offer, than other firms. These predictions are likely to hold true 
within each of the two markets for ESI. 
Bifurcation of the ESI market into large- and small-group markets 
also allows for straightforward predictions about a certain type of firm’s 
behavior within each type of market, or about each type of firm’s behav-
ior in a particular market, but it makes for questionable predictions 
involving cross-firm, cross-market scenarios. That is, a high-skilled 
firm in the small-group market will be more likely to make a high-
quality offer of ESI than a low-skilled firm in the same market, and a 
high-skilled firm in the large-group market will be more likely to make 
a high-quality ESI offer than a high-skilled firm in the small-group mar-
ket. It is unclear, however, whether a high-skilled firm in the small-
group market is more or less likely to make a high-quality ESI offer 
than a low-skilled firm in the large-group market, because the relative 
costs and benefits in the comparisons do not work in the same direction. 
The cost-benefit framework, the use of workforce skill levels to 
capture the benefits of offering ESI, and the bifurcation of the ESI mar-
ket are also useful tools in doing two other things. First, they help to 
predict what changes will occur in a firm’s offer of ESI once the ACA 
becomes fully implemented. Second, they help to determine whether 
those changes will increase or decrease the disparities in the ESI offers 
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between low-wage and high-wage workers or between small and large 
firms that existed in the prereform period. 
It seems obvious that changes designed to increase the benefits that 
accrue to a firm from offering ESI will increase its probability of offer-
ing it, and changes designed to increase its costs will decrease its prob-
ability of offering it, other things being equal. What might be less obvi-
ous is that changes in behavior accompanying the ACA that cause large 
firms or firms with high-skilled workforces to improve their ESI offer 
will increase the disparity in ESI offers, unless small firms or firms with 
low-skilled workforces also improve their offer. Conversely, changes 
that cause small firms or firms with low-skilled workforces to improve 
their ESI offer will, unless there are similar changes in large firms or 
those with high-skilled workforces, reduce the disparities. 
Empirical Considerations and Data
Modeling the benefits to the firm of offering ESI, as measured by 
workforce skills, and modeling the firm’s costs, as measured by whether 
the firm belongs to a large- or a small-group market, is uncomplicated 
and straightforward. The prediction of whether the ESI offer (h) of a 
firm ( f ) is influenced by the market (S) in which it purchases ESI—i.e., 
large- or small-group—and the skills of its workforce (SK) can easily be 
modeled and estimated in the aggregate with a linear empirical model 
that also controls for other factors (e.g., industry, location, or for-profit 
status) (C):
(2.1) Hf = h(SKf , Sf , Cf ).
When the specification in Equation (2.1) is estimated for any mea-
sure of the ESI offer, the results can be used to test the proposition that 
the skills of a firm’s workforce and the market in which that firm oper-
ates are correlated with its ESI offer. To examine the general behavior 
of firms in the large- or small-group market, however, empirical esti-
mations must be stratified by Sf for analysis of behaviors in separate 
markets. The interest in the stratified estimations lies in how workforce 
skills are correlated with measures of ESI, each of which captures a 
different dimension of health insurance. The simple correlations from 
such estimations, without measures of firm characteristics (C), provide 
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insights into past associations between workforce skills and a dimen-
sion of ESI, which can be used as a basis for extrapolating behavior into 
the postreform period.
The simplicity of the Equation (2.1) specification masks the com-
plexity of its requirements for data, however. (Glied and Zivin [2004] 
provide a discussion.) Estimating the specification requires firm-level 
data containing measures of the firm’s ESI offer, measures of the firm’s 
characteristics, and measures of its workforce skills. The three most 
frequently used databases with firm-level data on the ESI offer do not 
contain information about the skills of a firm’s workforce or alternative 
measures of workforce preferences for ESI or wages, however.16 With-
out this information the data are limited in their ability to extrapolate 
changes in firm behavior that might occur with the ACA. Furthermore, 
the information often uses workers’ wage levels to describe associations 
with health insurance, which leaves unobserved (to the researcher) dif-
ferences in worker productivity or in jobs that increase both wages and 
health benefits and may serve as the basis for offering ESI (Buchmueller 
and Lettau 1997; Currie and Madrian 1999; Levy and Feldman 2001; 
Miller 2004; Monheit et al. 1985; Simon 2001).
The CHES database contains the information needed to estimate 
Equation (2.1) and can be used to describe the behavior of firms toward 
ESI in the prereform period.17 The CHES asked respondents whether 
their firms offered each of 22 different benefits, including health ben-
efits. For firms that did offer health benefits, surveyors asked a series 
of questions about those benefits, including the number and kinds of 
plans offered, how many months employees had to wait and how many 
hours per week they had to work before they could enroll in health ben-
efits, and whether health benefits were available to seasonal and tem-
porary workers. The CHES also asked questions about the typical plan 
a worker selects (“We are interested in knowing about the health care 
plan most workers select”), including the percentage of the premium 
the firm paid. 
I used this information to construct several different measures of 
H in Equation (2.1), including a binary measure of whether the firm 
offered health insurance, as well as measures of access to and quality 
of the offer.18 Access measures include the number of hours worked per 
week and the number of months an employee must be with the firm to 
receive an offer. We used a 30-hour-per-week (or less) work require-
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ment and three months (or less) of tenure as delineations of access, in 
order to be consistent with the ACA requirements that large firms must 
meet to avoid incurring penalties. Measures of the quality of the offer 
include whether a firm pays 90 percent of the premium and to what 
extent the firm offers choice of coverage (number of plans it offers and 
number of kinds of coverage it offers—conventional, HMO, PPO, POS, 
or other). 
The CHES also asked specific questions about how firms that 
offered ESI responded when health care costs increased, and about the 
reasons firms gave for not offering it. Firms that offered ESI answered 
a series of questions about what they had done in the past three to five 
years in response to escalating health care costs. Specifically, respon-
dents answered “Yes” or “No” to a query that began, “In response to ris-
ing health care costs, did your firm . . . ” The question then presented a 
series of specific actions loosely categorized into four types of changes: 
1) changes to benefits; 2) changes to the quality of the health insur-
ance; 3) changes to employees’ access to the offer; and 4) changes to 
wages, prices, and employment. Firms that did not offer ESI were asked 
to rate the reasons why they did not offer it. Specifically, respondents 
were asked, “We are interested in knowing why your firm does not 
offer health insurance. On a scale where one is not at all important and 
five is very important, please say why your firm does NOT offer health 
insurance to its workers.” Specific reasons were loosely categorized as 
belonging to one of three types: 1) health insurance costs, 2) workforce 
characteristics, and 3) worker demand for health insurance. The same 
firms were surveyed about “the impact NOT offering health insurance 
has on your workforce” by being asked to rate, “on a scale where one is 
virtually no impact and five is a very large impact,” the potential conse-
quences of not offering insurance, which were loosely categorized into 
the following five types: 1) recruiting, 2) retention, 3) worker health, 4) 
worker attitude, and 5) success of the business.
Arguably the most critical difference between the CHES and other 
firm-level data is the ability of the CHES to use education and work 
experience to measure workforce skills (SK) as opposed to wages, 
the more typical construct for examining disparities in ESI offers. Of 
course, the strong correlation between education, work experience, and 
wages suggests that whether one chooses to use education or wages 
in examining differences in ESI offers among workers may well be 
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inconsequential. Arguably, this position might hold true if my research 
focused on disparities for individuals. It is less persuasive if the focus is 
on the behavior of firms when both wages and health insurance are used 
to compensate workers for skills. 
The CHES obtained information on workforce skills, as surveyors 
asked the following: “We would like to ask a few questions about the 
different types of positions you have. We are particularly interested 
in learning about positions requiring different levels of education and 
work experience. In answering these questions, we would like you to 
think about ALL the positions in this firm at this location and to classify 
them by the education and training level required of workers when they 
start the job. What percentage of ALL workers are in [position level]? 
Please include anyone working on-site, such as temp help and contract 
workers.”19 Position levels included “entry level” (no more than a high 
school education and no more than one year of work experience at the 
time of hire), “mid-level” (some college and/or some work experi-
ence—say, one to three years at the time of hire), and “high-level” (a 
college degree or more and/or extensive work experience at the time of 
hire). 
The percentage of low-skilled and the percentage of high-skilled 
workers are used to construct binary measures of whether a firm has a 
majority of low-skilled positions (that is, a low-skilled firm) or a major-
ity of high-skilled positions (a high-skilled firm). Using this categoriza-
tion, 26.8 percent of the CHES firms were low-skilled firms, and 30.1 
percent were high-skilled in weighted analyses (Table 2.1).20 These cat-
egories allow us to examine potential distributional consequences of the 
ACA for low-wage and high-wage workers by comparing the behaviors 
of low-skilled and high-skilled firms. 
The CHES also collected information on the number of workers 
in the firm, which allows us to categorize firms into small- and large-
group markets. Surveyors asked, “How many workers are at ALL loca-
tions? (Include all workers, including part-time/full-time, temporary/
permanent, that  are paid by  the firm.)” Firms were provided 12 cat-
egories: 1–4, 5–9, 10–19, 20–50, 51–99, 100–299, 300–499, 500–999, 
1,000–1,999, 2,000–4,999, 5,000–9,999, and 10,000+. We collapsed 
the CHES categories to approximate the definition in the ACA of large 
firms (at least 51 full-time-equivalent workers), which generally cor-
responds to the size delimiters of small- and large-group markets. We 
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used the CHES category of firms with 5–19 workers to approximate the 
ACA definition of the small-group market eligible for tax credits: that 
of firms with fewer than 25 full-time-equivalent workers. About 65.2 
percent of CHES firms had between 5 and 19 workers and about 20.8 
percent had 20–50 workers in the weighted analysis (Table 2.1). About 
13.9 percent of CHES firms might be considered large under the ACA, 
as they contain at least 51 workers. 
Finally, the CHES contains information that captures some firm 
characteristics that have been shown in other research to create differ-
ences in the offer of health benefits (i.e., C in Equation 2.1), including 
industry and location (metropolitan or nonmetropolitan) of the firm and 
information on whether it is unionized or a nonprofit. 
Table 2.1 shows how CHES firms are distributed with respect to 
workforce skills, size, and offer of ESI. The CHES contains 1,245 firms 
that offer ESI and 182 firms that do not. As expected, the distribution 
of firms that do not offer it differs dramatically from the distribution of 
Table 2.1  Distribution of CHES Firms by Offer of Health Insurance (%)
 
Distribution
Offer health 
insurance
Do not offer 
health insurance
Total 100.0 77.6 22.4**
Workforce skills
Low-skilled 26.8 23.4 38.6**
High-skilled 30.1 32.5 21.7**
Size (number of workers)
5–19 65.2 60.5 81.5**
20–50 20.8 22.0 17.0**
51–99 3.9 4.7 1.2**
100–299 4.6 5.9 0.2**
300+ 5.4 6.9 0.2**
N (unweighted) 1,427 1,245 182
NOTE: Observations are weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the 
distribution of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. Percent-
ages represent the distribution of firms in each category. All rows reflect significant 
(p ≤ 0.05) differences between the percentage of firms that offer and the percentage 
that do not offer insurance, as determined by a t test (** significant at the 0.05 level). 
Columns may not add up to 100.0% because of rounding.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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ones that do, with respect to both workforce skills and size. CHES data 
suggest that firms offering ESI disproportionately contain a majority of 
high-skilled positions and are larger in size, while those that do not offer 
it disproportionately contain a majority of low-skilled positions and are 
smaller in size. This is consistent with my benefit-cost framework. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The marriage of health care access and employment has a nearly 
century-old history in the United States. In 1929, Baylor Hospital 
devised a scheme to collect prepaid premiums from employers for 
guaranteed hospital services, thus initiating the relationship between 
employment and health care coverage. The marriage flourished dur-
ing the economic downturn of the 1930s and gained momentum in the 
1940s when firms, in order to increase compensation in an effort to 
attract scarce labor, circumvented the wage and price controls of World 
War II by expanding or initiating health insurance plans. The proportion 
of nonelderly individuals covered by ESI continued to grow after the 
war, as firms could purchase coverage in the group market at a lower 
premium price than individuals could in the nongroup market, and the 
preferential tax treatment of ESI for both firms and individuals made it 
an attractive form of compensation. 
This chapter developed a cost-benefit framework for explaining 
why some firms offer ESI and why the offer would vary between large 
and small firms (defined using a 50-worker demarcation) and between 
firms requiring different levels of skills from their workers. The frame-
work posited that firms with high-skilled workforces would benefit 
more (at the margin) from making a high-quality ESI offer to their 
workers, while those with low-skilled workforces would benefit more 
from offering additional wages. The framework further posited that 
large firms have lower per-worker ESI costs than small firms; the differ-
ence is created, in part, by different markets for ESI. The bifurcation of 
markets requires examining ESI offers separately for firms operating in 
the small-group market and those operating in the large-group market. 
This research uses the framework and the CHES data to explain a 
firm’s ESI offer—and the disparities in that offer—in the period prior 
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to the ACA being enacted, and to provide a basis for assessing changes 
that might occur after the legislation is implemented. The CHES is 
uniquely suited for this purpose because it contains firm-level data and 
a plethora of information to capture details about a firm’s ESI offer, the 
skills of a firm’s workforce, and the number of workers in the firm. 
Notes
 1. Much of the material in this section, except where noted, relies on information in 
Richmond and Fein (2005).
 2.  At about the same time, prepaid group practice plans—the forerunner of the 
HMO—arrived. These plans employed salaried physicians or contracted with a 
group of physicians for services to group members. The AMA’s opposition to such 
plans slowed their growth until 1943, when its actions were ruled a violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. 
 3. The states offered preferential tax treatment because they considered the prepaid 
nature of the nonprofit coalition plans to be prepayments, not insurance. 
 4. Research has shown factors such as industry, location of the firm, unionization, 
and for-profit status to be correlated with whether a firm offers ESI. We argue that 
these differentials arise from systematic differences in costs and benefits along 
these lines. For example, Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) provide a discussion about 
worker preferences and compensation in nonprofits. 
 5.  While our discussion is structured as if the firm purchases insurance from a third 
party, the same general logic applies to a firm that self-insures and makes a “pre-
mium” payment to itself. Brien and Panis (2011) provide an overview of self-
insured firms and their characteristics. 
 6. Although some argue that state mandates underlie the premium increase for small 
firms, Williams and Lee (2002) provide evidence that they do not.
 7. In contrast, Kapur (1998) and Holtz-Eakin (1994) find no effect on mobility, 
Gilleskie and Lutz (2002) find no effect on mobility for married males and only 
a small (10 percent) reduction for single males, and some research questions the 
efficiency of “job lock”—the reluctance of an employee to leave a job because 
doing so would result in the loss of health or retirement benefits (Gruber and 
Madrian 1994, 2002; Madrian 1994).
 8. The tax benefit alone is estimated at an average of 27 percent of the premium price 
(Gruber and Poterba 1996).
 9. In 2008, the nondiscrimination rule covered 89 percent of workers employed in 
firms with 5,000 or more employees, leaving 55 percent of workers with health 
insurance coverage through a self-insured plan (EBRI 2009b) and subject to the 
purview of the nondiscrimination rule. Several of its provisions allow a firm to 
discriminate, however. Firms can establish separate plans for distinct classes of 
large groups (more than 50 employees) by using a business rationale (e.g., hourly 
and salaried), although explicit grouping by compensation level is not allowed. 
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Businesses can also exclude certain workers from the rule (e.g., those with less 
than three years of tenure, those under age 25, those who are part-time or seasonal, 
and those working under a collective bargaining agreement). Carrington, McCue, 
and Pierce (2002) provide a discussion.
 10. A self-insured plan is one in which the firm acts as its own insurer and bears 
the risk of providing health coverage for insured events, even if the employer 
contracts with an insurance company to administer the plan. In contrast, a fully 
insured plan is one in which a firm pays a per-employee premium to a third party 
(an insurance company), which then assumes the risk of providing health care 
for insured events. Congress restricted nondiscrimination coverage to self-insured 
plans in part because ERISA exempts self-insured plans from state insurance laws. 
However, these laws apply to fully insured plans; thus Congress believed the laws 
would protect workers from discrimination. Indeed, one reason employers self-
insure is that then they are not subject to state-mandated benefit laws and insur-
ance premium taxes and can therefore provide a uniform set of benefits to all 
employees regardless of where they live. 
 11. Unless a cafeteria plan meets various reporting and nondiscrimination require-
ments, benefits received through that plan are taxed, because recipients are 
deemed to be in constructive receipt of the cash (Lyke 2006). 
 12. Gruber and Lettau (2004) support this focus of the ESI offer on the typical worker 
by showing the disproportionate amount of influence that the median worker has 
on a firm’s health insurance coverage (“median” in this case is measured with 
respect to wages). The distinction between “marginal,” “average,” and “typical” 
worker is not superfluous. Goldstein and Pauly (1976) highlight how firms that 
base their offer on the characteristics of the median worker might weight the offer 
more towards lower-wage workers than if they used average wages, because the 
low-end boundary of zero or minimum wage makes median wages lower than 
average wages. The distinction becomes less salient if firms base their offer on 
skills and not wages, as this study argues for. 
 13. We ignore the individual market in this discussion because our focus is on ESI. 
Hall (2000) provides a good discussion of “border crossing” techniques that blur 
these market divisions. 
 14. Pauly (2001) provides a succinct overview of the issues in the wrap-up to his vol-
ume on employment-based health insurance.
 15. Simulations suggest that the presence of highly compensated workers can be a 
substantial influence in setting the trade-off (Gruber and Lettau 2004).
 16. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), an annual survey of households, 
medical providers, and establishments across the United States, contains an Insur-
ance Component (MEPS-IC) that surveys private firms and public agencies about 
the number and types of private health insurance plans they offer and includes 
information on the plans’ benefits, premiums, contributions by firms, workers’ eli-
gibility requirements, and firm characteristics such as size and industry (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2009). In 2008, about 38,754 firms were 
surveyed. The closest equivalent to a measure of workforce skills in the MEPS-IC 
is the information about the percentages of workers in three categories: 1) those 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance   55
earning less than $11 an hour, 2) those earning between $11 and $25.50, and 3) 
those earning more than $25.50. However, wage measures confound the measure-
ment of skills (higher-skilled workers earn higher wages) and institutional factors 
(e.g., a unionized environment raises wages irrespective of skills), making it a 
less-than-clean measure of skills. 
   The National Compensation Survey (NCS) annually surveys establishments 
(not including the federal government or agriculture) nationwide for informa-
tion on occupational wages, employment cost trends, benefit incidence, and plan 
provision (BLS 2009) and includes information on establishments’ industry and 
size. In 2007, about 36,433 establishments were surveyed. Although occupational 
wages might approximate workforce skills because they are available for different 
occupational levels, as defined by the duties and responsibilities of the jobs, the 
listing of occupations is not exhaustive within an establishment. As a result, the 
NCS contains no measure of the overall level of skills in a firm’s workforce. 
   The Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) and the Health Research and Educa-
tion Trust’s (HRET) Employer Health Benefits Survey (EHBS) annually surveys 
firms for a detailed look at trends in employer-sponsored health coverage. The 
California version of EHBS, called the California Employer Health Benefits 
Survey, or CEHBS (California Healthcare Foundation 2012), allows for a direct 
comparison with the CHES data used in this study. Firm characteristics in both 
databases include size, region, and industry. The 2007 survey included 3,078 ran-
domly selected public and private firms with three or more employees (1,997 of 
which responded to the full survey and 1,081 of which responded to an additional 
question about offering coverage). Neither CEHBS nor EHBS provides any infor-
mation on workforce skills. 
 17. Differences between CHES and CEHBS (discussed in note 16) provide insights 
into possible biases that might arise in using CHES. Differences emerge in six 
critical areas. First, CHES includes only establishments with five or more employ-
ees, while CEHBS/EHBS includes those with three or more employees. Second, 
CHES selected 27 northern California counties for a random sampling of private-
sector establishments within each county and a sample of firms with an urban-rural 
distribution close to that for the nation as a whole, whereas CEHBS randomly 
selected private-sector firms throughout California. Third, although both surveys 
stratified sampling by firm size to oversample large establishments, CHES defined 
“large” as 50 or more employees, while CEHBS defined it as 200 or more employ-
ees. Fourth, CHES used a Yellow Pages–based marketing systems database, while 
CEHBS used Dun and Bradstreet. Fifth, CHES had a 67 percent response rate, 
whereas CEHBS had only a 48 percent rate. And sixth, CHES had a more open-
ended question related to health benefits (“Does your firm offer health benefits?”) 
and a definition of health benefits that included union-only plans, while CEHBS 
excluded union plans and asked a more narrowly targeted question (“Does your 
company offer or contribute to a health insurance program as a benefit to your 
employees?”). As might be expected given the CEHBS/EHBS inclusion of firms 
with three or four persons and its narrower definition of health benefits, the CHES 
shows higher-weighted estimates of the percentage of firms that offer health insur-
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ance. CEHBS data suggest that 71 percent of California firms offer health insur-
ance, while CHES data (California weights) suggest that 79 percent do.
 18. Appendix C provides a detailed definition of all empirical constructs.
 19. Temporary and contract workers are seldom eligible for health insurance, but are 
included in the composition of the firm’s workforce. To determine if their inclu-
sion produced biases in estimations, we included measures of the percentage of 
temporary/contract workers in estimations; however, they were rarely significant 
and were therefore dropped from analyses. 
 20. Some 27.2 percent of firms were mid-skilled, and about 16 percent had a mixed-
skilled workforce (i.e., did not have a majority of workers at any single skill level). 
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Benchmarking Change 
Employer-Supported Insurance before the ACA
The ACA was designed to increase the percentage of individuals 
with access to health care, to increase the quality of health care, and to 
control health care costs, as Chapter 1 discussed. Achieving these goals 
would reduce the discrepancies in coverage that existed in the prere-
form period. To help achieve its goals, the ACA kept ESI as the cor-
nerstone of coverage for individuals under age 65 and clearly defined 
requirements for firms, individuals, and governments. 
In the years preceding passage of the ACA, Massachusetts, Ver-
mont, and Hawaii all enacted similar legislation—Hawaii in 1974; Mas-
sachusetts and Vermont in 2006. How firms and individuals responded 
to the legislation in those states might indicate the types of changes that 
will occur after the ACA is fully implemented. These responses suggest 
that the ACA may expand both public and private health insurance cov-
erage. The percentage of uninsured in Hawaii fell from 11 to 10 percent 
after the mandate (Dick 1994).1 The increased take-up of public insur-
ance in Vermont lowered the number of uninsured after the mandate but 
potentially decreased the ESI take-up (Deprez et al. 2010). Massachu-
setts saw a dramatic decline in the percentage of its uninsured popula-
tion after legislation, but reforms in the insurance market had occurred 
at about the same time, making attribution problematic (Long 2008). 
Such changes in ESI might be accompanied by a change in a firm’s 
behavior that would spill over into other workforce areas. For instance, 
the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB 2008) sug-
gests that businesses might increase product prices, close operations, 
or reduce employment under legislation similar to the ACA. Research 
supports at least some of these suppositions (Baicker and Levy 2007) 
and raises new ones. Hawaii’s increase in part-time employment after 
its mandate (Thurston 1997) suggests that firms might shift employ-
ment in ways that reduce worker eligibility for an ESI offer. Further-
more, some of the costs of the legislation might be shifted to workers 
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in the form of lower wages (Abraham and Voos 2008), especially with 
increases in the firm’s premium payments (Sinaiko 2004) or the quality 
of mandated services in a plan, such as a requirement that families be 
covered (Baicker and Levy 2007).
The impact of the ACA—intentional and unintentional—might dis-
proportionately affect low-wage workers. The ACA’s provisions, like 
those in Massachusetts, Vermont, and Hawaii, broadly target workers 
and their families for increased coverage. Low-wage workers frequently 
fail to meet these coverage requirements (e.g., they are part-time work-
ers) and are at increased risk of unemployment. Both conditions leave 
them less likely to obtain an ESI offer, even with expanded coverage, 
than other workers (Burkhauser and Simon 2007). Moreover, because 
legislative requirements might change employment opportunities and 
work hours, low-wage workers could become more vulnerable to shifts 
that occur with expanded coverage. 
This chapter discusses the ways in which the ACA might affect 
whether a firm offers ESI. For those firms that do offer ESI after the 
ACA takes effect, the chapter discusses how the ACA may affect the 
access to and quality of the offer. Because my analysis is grounded in 
CHES data that were obtained from firms in 2005–2006, it provides a 
benchmark for behavior, allowing me to identify potential changes that 
the ACA might produce with respect to whether firms make an ESI 
offer, the access to the offer, and the quality of the offer. It also provides 
a benchmark for the disparities between low- and high-skilled firms 
in the ESI offers that existed prior to the ACA reform, so that we can 
assess the potential for changes in ESI disparities between low-wage 
and high-wage workers that may occur under the ACA.
LEGISLATING TO INCREASE ESI COVERAGE AND 
REDUCE ESI DISPARITIES
The ACA contains several provisions designed to reshape ESI in a 
way that increases the number of workers who would receive an ESI 
offer. It has, at its core, provisions that attempt to increase coverage in 
each of the three areas required for a worker to gain coverage: 1) offer, 
2) eligibility, and 3) take-up (Table 3.1). The act recognizes the dif-
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ferent constraints facing firms operating in the small- and large-group 
markets, and its provisions have structured different incentives for large 
and small firms to offer ESI. 
Offer and Access
The ACA requires large firms (firms employing at least 50 full-time-
equivalent workers) to provide employees that work at least 30 hours 
a week and their dependents (up to age 26) with affordable insurance 
within 90 days of their employment or potentially face financial pen-
alties. The ability of the legislation to expand coverage in large firms 
hinges on two factors: 1) the extent to which large firms already meet 
these requirements and, if they do not, 2) the extent to which poten-
tial penalties can induce behavioral change. If virtually all large firms 
already offer ESI to employees working at least 30 hours a week and 
having at least three months of tenure, the ACA will not expand the 
number of workers offered coverage. 
But if few large firms had structured their prereform offer in a way 
that meets the ACA requirement, facing a potential penalty might change 
their behavior, spurring them to offer expanded coverage. Alternatively, 
firms might opt to face the penalty and continue to not offer ESI. The 
relatively small size of the penalty has left open the question of which 
choice a firm will make. The ACA will invoke a penalty on a large firm 
offering ESI of $2,000 per ESI-eligible employee after the first 30 such 
employees if the firm’s plan does not meet minimum essential cover-
age, or $3,000 for each employee who receives an exchange subsidy 
because the plan exceeds 9.5 percent of household income. (The total 
amount cannot exceed $2,000 times the number of employees after the 
first 30.) Similarly, the penalty for not offering ESI is $2,000 per eli-
gible worker after the first 30 workers. These penalties are lower than 
the 2010 EHBS-estimated ESI premiums of $5,049 for single coverage 
and $13,770 for family coverage (Claxton et al. 2010), which makes 
it financially advantageous for some firms to pay the penalty and not 
offer ESI.2 
The ACA took a completely different approach to structuring 
incentives for small firms to offer ESI. It structured the Small Business 
Health Options Program (SHOP) within the exchanges and developed 
small-group market reforms to provide more-affordable ESI options 
60 Table 3.1  Major ACA Provisions Affecting ESI 
Aspects of plans offered Potential influence on firm or ESI
Coverage
Offer
Large firm required to offer ESI or pay penalty. Increase cost if firm did not previously offer ESI.
Some small firms receive tax credits for premiums. Reduce cost of providing ESI.
Access/eligibility
Young adults remain on parents’ ESI plan. Increase ESI premium by expanding coverage.
No rescissions. Increase ESI premium by expanding coverage and increasing 
risk pool.
For large firms:
Family coverage required. Increase ESI cost if firm did not offer by expanding coverage.
30+ hours a week qualifies workers and dependents. Increase ESI cost if access was more stringent.
Three-month limit on wait period for ESI. Increase ESI cost if access was more stringent.
Take-up
Individual required to have minimum essential coverage. Increase ESI take-up; reduce ESI premium with better 
risk pool. 
Premium subsidies (tax credits) to low-income persons. Reduce ESI take-up by offering some low-wage individuals 
subsidized insurance in exchange.
Automatic ESI enrollment, opt-out provision. Increase ESI take-up by making enrollment easier.
Medicaid expansion. Decrease ESI take-up among low-wage workers by providing 
lower-cost alternative.
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Quality requirements for plans 
High-cost plan excise tax. Eliminate or reduce high-end ESI health plans by increasing 
their cost.
Nondiscrimination rule for all firms. Equalize quality of offer throughout firm.
Essential health benefits package mandated. Increase ESI premium price by increasing services.
Limits on annual out-of-pocket spending. Increase ESI premium price by increasing payments for 
services.
No copayments for preventive care. Increase ESI premium price by increasing payments for 
services.
No limits on annual benefits. Increase ESI premium price by increasing payments for 
services.
No limits on lifetime benefits. Increase ESI premium price by increasing payments for 
services.
No exclusion for preexisting conditions. Increase ESI premium price by increasing payments for 
services.
Cost containment
Review premium increases. Slow ESI premium increases.
Require insurers to spend 85 percent of the premiums on 
direct care.
Slow ESI premium increases.
Transparency in pricing and benefits. Slow ESI premium increases.
NOTE: Table includes only selected provisions of the ACA that might affect a firm’s ESI offer. 
SOURCE: Author’s interpretation of the literature on the intent of the legislation.
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with more-stable premiums. It also structured tax credits for premium 
payments for some small firms to help offset part of the costs of offering 
ESI. Starting in 2014, all firms with fewer than 100 employees will be 
eligible to purchase coverage in the SHOP exchanges, and the reformed 
small-group market outside the exchanges will be in effect. For exam-
ple, plans in the exchanges will be required to conform to the new rating 
restrictions (60, 70, 80, and 90 percent of actuarial value), which will 
make cost comparisons across plans more feasible.3 Premiums will only 
be allowed to vary in the exchanges and small-group markets based on 
age, tobacco use, geography, and single/family policy, which will sta-
bilize the premium price. Firms (excluding sole proprietorships) with 
fewer than 25 full-time employees that contribute at least 50 percent 
to the worker’s ESI premium will be eligible for tax credits of up to 50 
percent of the employer contribution (Commonwealth Fund 2010). 
Take-Up
The ACA took a shotgun approach to influencing the rate at which 
workers take the ESI offer, in contrast with its targeted approach to 
increasing ESI offer rates within both the small- and the large-group 
market. Broad incentives for workers to take an ESI offer were cre-
ated by the requirement for most individuals to have minimum essential 
health care coverage (or pay financial penalties). New full-time workers 
in firms with more than 200 full-time employees become automatically 
enrolled in the lowest-cost premium plan, and enrollment of current 
employees automatically continues unless the worker opts out of the 
coverage (in contrast to the prereform practice of opting in for cover-
age). The opt-out provision makes it easier for a worker to enroll and 
stay in ESI. Some workers who declined the ESI offer and remained 
uninsured in the prereform period might be motivated to accept the 
offer in the postreform period by two things: 1) the requirement to have 
insurance and 2) the ease with which they can get coverage. 
The ACA provisions targeted at workers accepting an ESI offer 
might be offset, in the aggregate, by the law’s incentives for some work-
ers to obtain coverage from other venues, which could prompt them to 
decline the ESI offer. Some of the ACA’s provisions, such as premium 
assistance, will lower the cost of coverage in the nongroup market and 
provide workers with an incentive to purchase coverage on their own. 
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Furthermore, some low-wage individuals might decline the ESI offer 
because, under the ACA, they will become eligible for Medicaid, whose 
eligibility will expand under the act. 
Quality of Plans
The ACA also contains provisions designed to increase the average 
quality of the ESI plan by standardizing the offer within and across 
firms. Standardization within firms might occur with the ACA’s exten-
sion of the nondiscrimination rule to include new third-party-insured 
ESI plans and with its excise tax on the aggregate value of plans above 
a certain threshold. The act imposes a stiff penalty on firms under rules 
similar to the detailed nondiscrimination rules found in section 105(h) 
of the Internal Revenue Code. If a plan discriminates in favor of highly 
compensated individuals it must pay $100 per day for each employee 
against whom the plan discriminates.4 The 40 percent excise tax on 
insurers or plan administrators (of self-insured plans) on high-value 
“Cadillac” insurance plans beginning in 2018 might also serve to stan-
dardize plans within a firm if such plans are no longer offered. 
Standardization across firms might occur with the ACA’s require-
ments for essential health services in a plan and for information pro-
vided to workers about plans. All new health plans must provide com-
prehensive coverage, which includes a minimum set of services, caps 
on annual out-of-pocket spending, no cost-sharing for preventive ser-
vices, and no annual or lifetime limits on coverage. Information and 
reporting requirements were designed to ensure that individuals have 
both knowledge of the individual mandate and proof of meeting it, as 
well as the ability to compare plans, including ESI plans across firms. 
FIRMS’ BEHAVIOR IN THE PREREFORM PERIOD 
To determine how ACA requirements might affect the ESI offer and 
disparities in the offer between low-wage and high-wage workers, I 
examine the prereform ESI offer both for firms in the aggregate and 
for firms with different levels of workforce skills. By benchmarking 
the ESI offer in low-skilled and high-skilled firms in the years prior to 
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ACA deliberations and assessing the changes that might occur with the 
ACA, we can envision the ESI offers and disparities after the ACA is 
implemented. I examine two different dimensions of a firm’s behavior 
before ACA discussions to provide this benchmark. I first assess the 
measure’s potential reach by determining the proportion of firms that 
did not meet its requirements before it was being actively deliberated. I 
then assess the extent to which prereform behavior differs between low- 
and high-skilled firms to determine the measure’s potential to affect ESI 
disparities between low-wage and high-wage workers. 
The Potential Reach of the ACA 
The potential of the ACA to meet its goals depends on the number 
of firms that it will affect. The CHES data can be used to approximate 
the percentage of large firms that might not meet the requirements to 
offer ESI to employees. This exercise suggests that the ACA has the 
potential to change the behavior of a relatively large number of firms 
(Table 3.2). About 55.4 percent of large firms in 2005–2006 did not 
meet the ACA requirement to offer coverage to employees working at 
least 30 hours a week and having three months of tenure. Although only 
2.4 percent of large firms did not offer ESI, for the 97.6 percent that did, 
the offer extended was frequently inconsistent with ACA requirements 
for coverage. Some 49.4 percent of large firms did not meet the ACA 
requirement to offer ESI to employees working at least 30 hours per 
week, and 12.9 percent did not meet the ACA requirement to offer it to 
workers with at least three months of tenure. Taken together, these num-
bers suggest that the majority of the 13.9 percent of firms that are large 
will face increased ESI expenditures, all else being equal, simply from 
expanding their coverage to meet the ACA requirements or potentially 
paying penalties for noncompliance. 
Several points in the CHES data suggest that the ACA might affect a 
greater proportion of low-skilled than high-skilled firms. First, a greater 
proportion of large firms are low-skilled (35.5 percent) than are high-
skilled (25.4 percent), which means the ACA coverage requirements for 
large firms are disproportionately targeted at low-skilled firms (Table 
3.3). Second, a significantly (p ≤ 0.10) greater percentage of large, low-
skilled firms (63.1 percent) than large, high-skilled firms (59.1 percent) 
did not meet the ACA requirements for coverage in 2005–2006 (Table 
Benchmarking Change   65
3.2). The biggest difference in meeting coverage requirements lies in 
the period a worker must wait before ESI is offered: 14.6 percent of 
low-skilled large firms required workers to wait longer than the ACA’s 
three-month limit, but only 4.6 percent of high-skilled firms did not 
meet this requirement in 2005–2006. If large firms change their ESI 
offer to meet the ACA’s coverage requirements instead of electing 
to pay the penalties, the coverage in low-skilled firms will expand to 
Table 3.2  Percentage of Firms Failing to Meet Various ACA 
Requirements before Legislation
Total
Workforce skills
Low-skilled High-skilled
% offer (CHES, 2005–2006) 77.6 67.6 83.8**
% large firms not meeting coverage 
requirements (CHES, 2005–2006)
55.4 62.1 58.0*
Required more than 30 hours per week  
of work 
49.4 54.0 54.6
Required more than 3 months’ wait 12.9 14.6 4.6**
Did not offer health benefits 2.4 2.7 2.7
% large firms (weighted) 13.9 18.5 11.8**
N (unweighted) 725 268 165
% firms not meeting plan requirements  
(EHBS, 2010)
Cost-sharing for primary carea 95 — —
Age limit for dependents up to and 
including age 26
88 — —
Annual limits for single coverage 66 — —
NOTE: Columns show the percentage of firms that fall into each category. In the CHES 
data, five firms are missing skill data. Because the CHES computations are based on 
weighted analysis, numbers in the table cannot be computed using the unweighted 
N. The numbers under the row heading “% firms not meeting plan requirements” are 
based on the employer plan with the largest enrollment. CHES observations were 
weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the 
United States with respect to size and industry. * significant difference between low- 
and high-skilled firms at the 0.10 level; ** significant difference between low- and 
high-skilled firms at the 0.05 level.  — = not available.
  aThe table’s last three rows come from EHBS data, not CHES data, and so do not carry 
decimal places, as the EHBS does not report decimals.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007); EHBS (Claxton et al. 2010). 
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become more like the coverage in high-skilled firms, once the ACA is 
implemented. Coverage expansion would therefore be greater among 
low-wage workers than among high-wage workers because the firms in 
which they work would be those most likely to expand coverage. 
The ACA’s reach might be greater in increasing the quality of the 
plans firms offer, which could increase the premium price firms must 
pay. The 2010 EHBS data suggest that virtually none of the largest-
enrollment ESI plans in 2010 met ACA requirements (Table 3.2). 
Although the ACA’s grandfathering clause exempts established plans 
from many of the requirements, eventually firms will want to adopt 
a new plan and henceforth will be forced to comply with these regu-
lations. About 95 percent of firms had cost-sharing requirements for 
primary care, which the ACA most probably will not allow, as new 
plans cannot have cost-sharing for preventive care. About 88 percent 
did not allow dependents to remain on the plan until age 26, an ACA 
requirement that became effective in January 2011. About 66 percent 
had annual limits for single coverage, which the ACA will not allow. 
Table 3.3  Distribution of CHES Firms by Workforce Skills and Size
 
Total 
distribution
Workforce skills
Firm size 
(number of workers)
Low-
skilled
High-
skilled 5–20 21–50 51+
Total 100.0 26.8 30.0 65.2 20.8 14.0
Workforce skills
Low-skilled 26.8 100.0 0.0 22.9 33.3** 35.5**
High-skilled 30.1 0.0 100.0 32.5 25.6** 25.4**
Size
5–20 65.2 55.7** 70.5** 100.0 0.0 0.0
21–50 20.8 25.8** 17.7** 0.0 100.0 0.0
51+ 14.0 18.5** 11.8** 0.0 0.0 100.0
N (unweighted) 1,427 432 390 474 226 725
NOTE: Columns show the percentage of firms falling into each category. Five firms 
are missing skill data. Observations were weighted so that the distribution of sample 
firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and 
industry. ** significant difference between “Total distribution” and other categories 
at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007).
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The ACA’s Potential to Affect Disparities
The potential for low-skilled large firms to be disproportionately 
affected by the ACA requirements hints at the measure’s potential to 
close ESI disparities between low-wage and high-wage workers. How-
ever, this potential depends on the details of ESI offers made by low-
skilled and high-skilled firms during the prereform period. 
The CHES data provide several ways to capture a firm’s ESI offer 
prior to ACA deliberations, which allows us to compare the offers of 
low- and high-skilled firms along several dimensions. In addition to the 
simple binary measure of whether a firm offers ESI, the CHES contains 
information that is used to capture several measures of access to the 
offer, including the following three: whether a firm 1) extends the offer 
to employees who work at least 30 hours a week and either 2) makes 
workers wait more than three months before receiving an offer or 3) has 
no wait period before ESI begins. The CHES also provides informa-
tion that can be used to construct several measures of the quality of the 
offer, including these three: whether a firm 1) pays at least 90 percent 
of the premium, which can serve as an extremely crude measure of the 
financial adequacy of the offer; 2) offers workers a choice in plans (i.e., 
more than one plan); and 3) offers workers a variety of plans (i.e., more 
than one type of plan).
The comparative advantage of the CHES data lies in their ability to 
highlight the differences in the ESI offer between firms with different 
levels of workforce skills (Table 3.4), although the data also can be used 
to show differences between large and small firms, as has been high-
lighted in other research. In 2005–2006, 77.6 percent of CHES firms 
offered ESI, a figure that broke down into 67.6 percent of low-skilled 
firms and 83.8 percent of high-skilled firms.5  While this 16.2-percentage-
point differential is far less than the 25.6-percentage-point differential 
between firms that have 5 to 19 workers and those with 50 or more work-
ers (not shown in the table), its large size nonetheless raises the possi-
bility that low-wage workers might be disproportionately employed in 
(low-skilled) firms that are less likely to offer ESI. 
Even if the firm offers ESI, some workers might not be eligible to 
receive it if the firm places tight restrictions on who can receive the 
offer. Workers that are not full-time are especially vulnerable. About 
57.1 percent of all CHES firms—and 66.0 percent of low-skilled 
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firms—required employees to work more than 30 hours per week before 
insurance was offered (Table 3.4). Still other workers do not receive an 
ESI offer because they do not have sufficient tenure with the firm. The 
CHES data suggest that the average wait period was about 3.2 months, 
and that 18.5 percent of firms made workers wait longer than three 
months. Once again, workers in low-skilled firms are at a disadvantage, 
as 26.0 percent of low-skilled firms but 15.7 percent of high-skilled 
firms made workers wait more than three months for an ESI offer. 
If a worker does receive an ESI offer, the quality of the offer may 
influence, in part, whether the offer is accepted. The CHES data sug-
gest that 60.6 percent of firms offering insurance pay at least 90 percent 
of the premium (Table 3.4). This number varies dramatically between 
low-skilled and high-skilled firms, however. Close to three-quarters of 
high-skilled firms but only about half of low-skilled firms pay at least 90 
percent of the ESI premium. Although paying at least 90 percent of the 
premium is not necessarily an indication of overall quality (since firms 
might be more willing to pay a higher percentage of a lower-quality 
plan), it does broadly indicate a relative price workers must pay for ESI.
Offering a choice in plans is another indication of the quality of the 
ESI offer, for it allows workers to select the coverage that best meets 
their needs. The ability of the coverage to match worker preferences 
might be particularly strong if the firm offers a choice not only in plans 
but in the types of ESI plans it offers (e.g., HMO, PPO). The CHES data 
suggest that 49.9 percent of all firms offer workers a choice in plans, 
and 42.5 percent offer a choice in the type of plan. Choice varies with 
the level of skills characterizing a firm’s workforce: 44.3 percent of 
low-skilled firms and 57.9 percent of high-skilled firms offer workers a 
choice in plans, and 36.4 percent of low-skilled firms and 51.0 percent of 
high-skilled firms offer them a choice in the type of plan they can select. 
The multivariate analysis that is estimated using Equation (2.1) in 
Chapter 2 tells virtually the same story as these descriptive statistics, 
even as it holds other firm characteristics constant. In these estimations, 
we use each of the ESI outcomes discussed in our descriptive analysis 
as a dependent variable and control for whether a firm is low-skilled or 
high-skilled and whether it has only 5 to 19 workers (and is potentially 
able to receive tax credits for premiums under the ACA) or has 20 to 
50 workers. The estimations also control for industry, for-profit status, 
ruralness, and the presence of a union. 
  69
Table 3.4  Descriptive Analysis of the Disparities among Companies Regarding Making the Offer, Access to the 
Offer, and Quality of the Offer (%)
All firms
Total Large firms Small firms
Low- 
skilled
High- 
skilled
Low- 
skilled
High- 
skilled
Low- 
skilled
High- 
skilled
Making the offer      
Offer made 77.6 67.6 83.8** 97.3 97.3 60.9 82.0**
Access to offer  
Hours
More than 30 hours required 57.1 66.0 56.4** 54.0 54.6 70.5 56.7**
Tenure
No wait time 10.6 3.5 18.5** 11.4 35.7** 0.5 15.7**
More than 3 months’ wait 18.5 26.0 15.7** 14.6 4.6** 30.2 17.6**
Quality of offer  
Premium
90%+ firm-paid premium 60.6 51.5 74.3** 46.4 57.6** 53.1 76.9**
Plans
At least 2 plans offered 49.9 44.3 57.9** 62.4 88.8** 37.6 52.9**
At least 2 types of plans offered 42.5 36.4 51.0** 49.1 84.6** 31.7 45.5**
Na 1,427 432 390 268 165 164 225
nb 1,245 355 353 255 160 100 183
NOTE: CHES observations were weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the distribution of firms in the United States with 
respect to size and industry. ** significant difference between low- and high-skilled firms at the 0.05 level. 
aN equals the number of firms offering health insurance.
bn is a subset equalling the number of firms providing easy access to and a good quality of health insurance.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Significant workforce skill and size coefficients indicate that the 
ESI offer varies along these lines. Our intent with the multivariate anal-
ysis is not to structure a model that can test the determinants of a firm’s 
coverage, but to establish and isolate the role of workforce skills (con-
trolling for the characteristics and size of firms) insofar as they contrib-
ute to the firm making a quality ESI offer to workers.
Probit estimations generally support the disparities in access to 
and quality of the ESI offer that arise between low-skilled and high-
skilled firms (Table 3.5) and that are shown in the descriptive analysis. 
Both workforce skills and firm size influence not only whether a firm 
offers insurance but the access to the offer and the quality of the offer. 
Estimations suggest that both access to and quality of an ESI offer are 
lower in firms dominated by low-skilled positions. The probability that 
a firm offers ESI is lower in low-skilled firms, and the requirement that 
employees work more than 30 hours per week and wait more than three 
months before receiving an offer is increased in them. Furthermore, the 
probability that a firm pays at least 90 percent of the premium, offers at 
least two plans, and offers at least two types of plans is higher in high-
skilled firms. Predictable firm size differences exist: being a smaller 
firm (one having fewer than 50 workers) of either size (5–19 or 20–50)
significantly lowers the probability of a firm offering ESI, having no 
wait time, and offering a choice in plans. It increases the probability 
that a firm restricts access to employees who work more than 30 hours 
a week. Smaller firms have an increased probability of paying at least 
90 percent of the premium, however. 
Perhaps the most striking finding about the ESI offer in the CHES 
data from 2005–2006 is the very large disparities that arise when dif-
ferences as measured by workforce skills are superimposed on those 
as measured by firm size. Stark differences exist in the ESI offered to 
workers in small, low-skilled firms as compared to those offered to 
workers in large, high-skilled ones (Table 3.4). A 36-percentage-point 
difference exists in the 2005–2006 data between small, low-skilled 
firms and large firms when it comes to whether a firm offered ESI: 
60.9 percent of small, low-skilled firms did, compared to 97.3 percent 
of large firms (irrespective of workforce skills). Access to the offer is 
also disparate: nearly a 16-percentage-point differential exists between 
the 70.5 percent of small, low-skilled firms that made employees work 
more than 30 hours a week before receiving an ESI offer and the 54.6 
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Table 3.5  Multivariate Estimations of Access to and Quality of ESI Offer, by Workforce Skills and Firm Size
Access to offer Quality of offer
Offer
More than 
30 hours 
required No wait time
More than 3 
months’ wait 
90%+ firm-
paid premium 
At least 2 
plans 
offered 
At least 2 
types of plans 
offered
Workforce skills
Low-skilled firm –0.094** 0.087** –0.040* 0.088** −0.005 –0.060* −0.050
High-skilled firm 0.000 0.062 0.079** 0.038 0.168** 0.077** 0.085**
Size
5–19 workers –0.220** 0.062 –0.099** 0.080** 0.241** –0.324** –0.282**
20–50 workers –0.135** 0.157** –0.131** 0.066* 0.118** –0.098** −0.056
N 1,405 1,200 1,205 1,205 1,015 1,208 1,195
NOTE: Observations were weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with 
respect to size and industry. Table shows the unstandardized coefficients from an ordinary least squares estimation of Equation (2.1) in 
Chapter 2. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level. Appendix C provides a description of all variables used in the 
estimations. Full results of the estimations, including coefficients on variables not presented in the table, are available from the author. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007).
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percent of large, high-skilled firms that did. Even greater differences 
exist in the time a worker must wait before receiving an offer: virtu-
ally no small, low-skilled firms offered workers ESI immediately upon 
employment, and over 30 percent of them made workers wait more 
than three months. In contrast, 35.7 percent of large, high-skilled firms 
extended an ESI offer immediately, and only 4.6 percent made workers 
wait for more than three months before receiving an offer. 
The difference between small, low-skilled firms and large, high-
skilled ones in the choice in ESI that a firm offered workers in the 
CHES survey is particularly striking: over a 50-percentage-point dif-
ferential exists in whether firms offered a choice. Some 37.6 percent of 
small, low-skilled firms offered workers at least two different plans, and 
31.7 percent offered them a choice in the type of plan. In stark contrast, 
88.8 percent of large, high-skilled firms offered workers a choice in ESI 
plans, and 84.6 percent offered them a choice in the type of plan. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Workers wanting ESI coverage can easily face a myriad of com-
plications and obstacles in gaining it from their employer. Even if their 
firm offers health insurance, any particular worker may not be covered 
because the firm places eligibility restrictions on who can receive an 
offer. Prior to passage of the ACA, a firm generally could determine 
the restrictions it placed on workers who received an offer, as long as 
self-insured firms complied with the nondiscrimination rule and third-
party-insured firms complied with the rules set by their insurers. From 
the workers’ vantage point, the quality of the offer was critical: workers 
are more likely to take an ESI offer if the firm pays virtually all of the 
premium costs and if it offers them a choice in plans so they can select 
a plan that best suits their needs. 
The ACA was designed to expand access to an ESI offer. Its poten-
tial to effect this change can be determined by establishing the extent 
to which a firm’s ESI offer before the reform met the ACA require-
ments. Its potential to reduce disparities in the ESI offer can be deter-
mined by recording the disparities in the prereform period and identify-
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ing whether the legislation was designed to change the behavior along 
those dimensions. 
My analysis of the CHES data suggests that the ACA will affect vir-
tually all firms. Some 56.5 percent of large firms in the CHES database 
did not meet the ACA requirements for covering workers in 2005–2006, 
and at least 95 percent of the largest-enrollment ESI plans of firms in 
the 2010 EHBS did not meet the ACA requirements for services cov-
ered, which is likely to affect the future cost of offering ESI. 
Several points in my analysis suggest that the ACA might affect 
low-skilled firms more than high-skilled firms. First, a greater percent-
age of low-skilled large firms than high-skilled large firms did not meet 
the ACA requirements for coverage. Because the ACA requires large 
firms to meet its coverage requirements or potentially face financial 
penalties, low-skilled firms will be forced to change their behavior once 
these provisions are implemented, either by expanding the ESI offer to 
meet the requirements or, potentially, by paying penalties. Second, low-
skilled firms are more likely to be large and subject to the ACA cover-
age requirements than are high-skilled firms, leaving a greater propor-
tion of them to meet the ACA coverage requirements. 
Because low-skilled large firms are more likely to be affected by 
the ACA, their probability of expanding coverage is greater than that 
of high-skilled large firms. Low-wage workers might therefore be more 
affected by the legislation than high-wage workers, as low-skilled 
firms are likely to employ a greater percentage of low-wage workers 
than are high-skilled firms. If these changes occurred in isolation from 
other changes, the ACA would have the effect of reducing some of the pre-
reform ESI differences between low-wage and high-wage workers. 
The CHES data suggest that large disparities existed in the pre- 
reform era between the offer a low-skilled firm made and one a high-
skilled firm made. Both descriptive and multivariate statistics suggest 
that a firm’s ESI offer—including the access to it and the quality of 
it—varied with both the skills of its workforce and the size of its work-
force. In fact, the CHES data suggest that a 16.2-percentage-point dif-
ferential existed in 2005–2006 between low-skilled and high-skilled 
firms in the percentage that offered their workers ESI (67.6 vs. 83.8 
percent). Even if low-skilled firms offered ESI, the CHES data suggest 
that they provided a lower proportion of their workers with access to the 
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offer than did high-skilled firms. About two-thirds of low-skilled firms 
made employees work more than 30 hours a week, and slightly over 
one-quarter made them wait more than three months before receiving 
an ESI offer, which is nearly 10 percentage points higher than in high-
skilled firms. 
The CHES data suggest that workers in low-skilled firms that 
offered ESI received a lower-quality offer than workers in high-skilled 
firms. As a result, they might be less likely to take ESI when offered. 
About half (51.5 percent) of the low-skilled firms paid at least 90 per-
cent of the ESI premium payment, compared to about three-quarters 
(74.3 percent) of the high-skilled firms. Furthermore, 44.3 percent of 
low-skilled firms offered workers a choice in plans (and 36.4 percent 
offered a choice in the type of plan), compared to the 57.9 percent of 
high-skilled firms that offered a choice in plans (and the 51.0 percent 
that offered a choice in the type of plan). 
In short, the CHES data suggest that prior to active deliberations 
about the ACA, workers in low-skilled firms were disadvantaged with 
respect to an ESI offer over workers in high-skilled firms. They had 
less access to an offer and, when an offer was made, received a lower-
quality offer. Particularly striking, however, were the disparities that 
existed when the differences by workforce skills and size were com-
bined. Comparing the ESI offers of small, low-skilled firms to those 
of large, high-skilled firms revealed roughly a 36-percentage-point dif-
ferential in the percentage that offered ESI (60.9 vs. 97.3 percent), a 
16-percentage-point differential in the percentage that made employees 
work more than 30 hours per week before receiving an offer (70.5 vs. 
54.6 percent), a 35-percentage-point differential between the percent-
age that did not make workers wait before receiving an offer (0.5 vs. 
35.7 percent), and a 26-point differential in the percentage that made 
them wait more than three months (30.2 vs. 4.6 percent). A whopping 
51-percentage-point differential existed in the percentage of firms that 
offered workers a choice in plans (37.6 vs. 88.8 percent). 
The next two chapters explore how the ACA might affect these dis-
parities in the ESI offer within the large-group (Chapter 4) and small-
group (Chapter 5) markets, with a particular eye toward the differential 
effects that might occur for firms with different levels of workforce 
skills, and how those impacts might change these existing disparities. 
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Notes
 1. Research suggests that the ACA’s exemption of small firms from the requirement 
to offer coverage might leave as many as half of the uninsured workers without 
coverage (Burkhauser and Simon 2007).
 2. Incentives would reverse if the marginal cost of covering additional workers were 
to lie below the average cost of providing coverage (Maxwell 2011) and push the 
cost of making an additional ESI offer below the penalty.
 3. The distinction between plans was discussed in Chapter 1. Bronze-level plans 
cover at least 60 percent of the actuarial value of the covered benefits, silver-level 
ones cover at least 70 percent, gold-level plans cover 80 percent, and platinum-
level plans cover 90 percent.
 4.  “A highly compensated individual” belongs to one of three categories: he is either 
1) one of the five highest-paid officers of the company, 2) a shareholder of 10 
percent or more of company stock, or 3) among the highest-paid 25 percent of all 
employees (including the five highest-paid officers). 
 5.  The estimate that 77.6 percent offered ESI circa 2006 is far higher than the 56 
percent estimated for all California firms in the MEPS-IC in 2009 (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 2011) and the 69 percent estimated for U.S. firms 
with three or more workers in the EHBS in 2010 (Claxton et al. 2010). The differ-
ences most probably arise from the different definitions of firms used to compute 
the estimates. Because only 37.1 percent of MEPS-IC firms with fewer than 10 
employees and 46 percent of EHBS firms with three to nine workers offered insur-
ance, the MEPS-IC estimate of the offer for all firms would fall below the others 
and the EHBS estimate for firms with at least three workers would fall below the 
CHES estimate for firms with at least five workers. 
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4 
How Large Firms 
Might Respond to the ACA
The ACA has the potential to increase a firm’s expenditures on ESI, 
as the popular press was quick to point out with respect to premium 
increases (e.g., Adamy 2010). Analyses presented in Chapter 3 sug-
gest that costs will increase for at least the 55.4 percent of large firms 
that do not meet the legislation’s requirements for covering workers 
and so must either expand their coverage to meet these requirements or 
potentially pay financial penalties. Chapter 3 also highlights potential 
premium increases that might be associated with meeting the ACA’s 
requirements for new plans and the potential increase in workers taking 
up coverage, both because of the individual mandate to maintain essen-
tial health coverage and because of the ACA’s rule that firms with more 
than 200 workers must automatically enroll (and stay) in a plan unless 
the worker explicitly opts out of coverage.
This chapter examines how large firms might change their ESI offer 
if the ACA increases their total expenditures on health care. It exam-
ines the actions that large firms took in the past when health care costs 
increased and extrapolates those actions into the period after the ACA 
is fully implemented. Because the CHES survey was fielded during 
a period in which the economy was fairly stable—prior to the Great 
Recession—and following a period in which health care costs had 
increased rapidly, the firms’ self-reported changes to ESI reflect how 
firms changed their behavior when business strategies focused on rising 
health care costs. We anticipate such a period might follow the ACA’s 
implementation. 
THE ACA AND INCREASING COSTS 
The changes discussed in Chapter 3 that large firms will face when 
the ACA becomes fully implemented reflect only some of the cost 
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increases that might occur with the new legislation. The ACA could also 
alter risk pools for insurers in ways that increase their costs, increase the 
proportion of the contribution to premiums that a firm must make, and 
necessitate implementation of an excise tax on high-cost ESI. Each of 
these changes might increase health care expenditures for firms. 
The fully implemented ACA alters an insurer’s risk pool by expand-
ing coverage to those that might have been ineligible for insurance and 
thus remained uninsured in the prereform period. Insurers will not be 
allowed to charge higher premiums based on health status and gen-
der, to deny coverage for reasons such as preexisting conditions, or to 
rescind coverage, except in cases of fraud. Each of these actions helped 
insurers manage their risk pools with reduced adverse selection prior 
to the ACA. Restricting their ability to use these tools would lead to 
poorer risk pools and increased premiums as insurers attempt to recover 
the increased expenses incurred from providing coverage to individu-
als with a high expected usage of medical care. Although large firms 
are rarely assessed for risk in setting premiums, some of the provisions 
(e.g., preventing them from denying coverage for preexisting illness) 
will alter the type of plan they can offer. 
The large firm’s contribution to ESI premiums might increase if 
that firm does not meet the ACA’s requirement for it to offer at least one 
plan for which the worker’s premium contribution does not exceed 9.5 
percent of the worker’s household income. A survey of 2,800 firms by 
Mercer (2010) suggests that nearly two-fifths of large firms do not meet 
this requirement. Over 80 percent of firms not meeting the requirement 
said they will likely take steps to ensure that coverage is affordable to 
all workers eligible for ESI and either lower worker contributions or 
add a low-cost plan to their offering. Such actions will likely increase 
a firm’s ESI expenditures as the firm acquires a greater proportion of 
premium payments with a corresponding reduction in worker payments 
or bears administrative expenses from offering an additional plan. 
Finally, the ACA will impose a 40 percent excise tax on insurers 
or plan administrators (of self-insured plans) on the aggregate value 
of plans above a certain threshold. The tax, which is slated to begin 
in 2018, will likely be absorbed by the firm as higher premiums. The 
aggregate value of a plan, upon which the tax is based, includes the 
combined worker and employer contributions to premiums and any 
employer contributions to a health savings account, medical savings 
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account, or flexible spending arrangement but excludes dental and 
vision benefits. The high-cost thresholds are set at $10,200 for indi-
vidual coverage and $27,500 for family coverage in 2018,1 although 
they might be adjusted upward if the federal employee health benefits 
program premiums rise more than expected between 2010 and 2018. 
Thresholds will be indexed by inflation annually starting in 2020. The 
Mercer (2010) survey suggests that 39 percent of firms might face the 
40 percent excise tax unless they make plan design changes. About 23 
percent of large firms have said they will do whatever is necessary to 
bring costs below the threshold amounts for computing the excise tax.
The CBO (2009) estimates that ESI premiums will increase 27 to 
30 percent for firms but that the plans offered will contain an enhanced 
level of health care coverage. Legislators were aware of the potential 
of these provisions to increase premiums and included provisions in 
the ACA to offset such increases. Key provisions include an annual 
review of premium increases by states, restrictions on the way premi-
ums can be spent, and requirements to improve an insurer’s risk pool. 
Let us look closer at the first of these key provisions just mentioned, 
the annual review. The ACA developed a process in which states are 
required to annually review premium rates for all fully insured health 
care insurance plans to ensure that none are “unreasonable.” Regulators 
could deny rate increases found to be unreasonable or not allow the 
policies to be sold in the exchanges. 
Furthermore, the ACA requires insurers to offer rebates to enroll-
ees if their health plan spent less than 85 percent of their premium on 
medical care or activities in the large-group market. States are free to 
increase the percentage—they can say, for example, that 90 percent of 
the policy must go toward medical care. Self-insured plans are exempt. 
The goal of this provision is to reduce expenditures on administrative 
overhead and marketing and put downward pressure on premiums. 
Finally, the ACA requires most U.S. citizens to carry minimal essen-
tial health insurance coverage starting in 2014. This requirement was 
specifically designed to draw previously uncovered healthy individuals 
into the health insurance market and offset the worsened quality of the 
insurer’s risk pool owing to the limitation that the legislation sets on an 
insurer’s ability to exclude unhealthy individuals from pools. 
Predictions about ESI premium prices and coverage differ tremen-
dously, in part because they must contain different assumptions about 
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how firms and insurers will respond to legislative changes. Will ESI 
premiums increase with the new benefit requirements in plans and the 
excise tax, or will they decrease with the administrative review of pre-
mium increases and limitations on nonmedical care expenses? Will risk 
pools become worse given the inability of insurers to deny coverage 
and their limited ability to vary the premiums charged, or will they 
improve because of the individual requirement to carry insurance? Will 
large firms expand ESI as a result of the legislative changes or will they 
brave potential penalties? 
The CBO (2009) estimates that when all provisions of the ACA 
are considered, premiums and coverage will change little in the large-
group market, according to a letter CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf 
sent to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in March 2010. The Urban Insti-
tute (Buettgens, Garrett, and Holahan 2010) concurs, predicting little 
change in coverage, but the RAND Corporation (Eibner, Hussey, and 
Girosi 2010) predicts a large (8.7 percent) net increase in ESI coverage, 
and Holtz-Eakin and Smith (2010) predict large decreases (22.3 per-
cent).2 Of note, none of the studies explicitly included in their assump-
tions the potential changes in a firm’s total expenditures on health care 
that might result from its offering coverage to more workers. 
I argue that the plethora of ways in which the ACA might affect 
large firms will increase a firm’s total ESI expenditures. The legislation 
has the potential to do four things: 1) increase the number of workers 
covered, 2) extract penalties, 3) increase the premiums charged, and 
4) increase the proportion of the premium a firm pays. While states 
might slow premium increases through the annual review process, 
not all states have the capacity to conduct such reviews (Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation 2010a) and, in the past, have rarely rigorously denied 
premium increases under such reviews. I therefore posit that the ACA 
has the potential to increase both premiums and coverage—the two 
key components of ESI expenditures—and base my predictions about 
changes in coverage on how firms will respond to expenditure increases. 
The CHES data allow us to assess how a large firm might respond 
to ACA-induced health-care cost increases by examining the actions 
firms that offered ESI said they took when health care costs increased 
in the past. The CHES asked firms about how they responded to health-
care cost increases in the three-to-five-year period prior to the survey’s 
fielding in 2005 and 2006. During this period, the compound growth in 
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health insurance premiums stood at 114.1 percent, as compared to a 29 
percent growth in earnings and a 24.3 percent growth in prices (Figure 
1.1, Chapter 1). We are not arguing that the ACA will increase costs at 
the same rate as premium increases in the past. Rather, we are arguing 
that the past cost increases were so noticeable that firms took strategic 
actions in response and that these responses might be similar to the ones 
they would take if the ACA increases ESI expenditures in the future. 
CHES surveyors asked respondents, “Because health care costs 
have risen in the past few years, we are interested in getting your 
impressions of what your firm has done in the past three to five years 
about escalating health care costs. We would like you to answer ‘Yes’ 
to our question if you think the action we mention is one your firm has 
taken and ‘No’ if it has not . . . ‘In response to rising health care costs, 
did your firm decrease or eliminate . . . ?’” Respondents could answer 
with one or more of the following: health insurance coverage (e.g., ser-
vices like pharmaceuticals), non-health benefits (e.g., pensions, vaca-
tions), vision insurance, dental insurance, other health-related cover-
age (e.g., substance abuse, mental health), number of plans offered, 
or variety of plans offered. Surveyors also asked, “In response to ris-
ing health care costs, did your firm . . . ?” Respondents could choose 
one or more of the following: change health insurance carriers, start a 
health reimbursement arrangement, start a flexible spending account, 
move to a high-deductible plan, contribute to a worker’s health sav-
ings account, or increase either the premium the worker had to pay for 
single worker health coverage, the premium paid for family coverage, 
or the copayment/coinsurance payments. Surveyors also asked the fol-
lowing: “Health care costs can impact different things other than health 
benefits. In response to rising health care costs, did your firm . . . ?” 
Possible responses included increase its prices (or reduce its services), 
give fewer raises or reduce wages, increase the hours a week worked or 
length of time a worker must be with the firm before receiving benefits, 
or use more workers not eligible for benefits in response to increased 
health care costs.3
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LARGE FIRMS’ BEHAVIOR AS A RESPONSE TO 
INCREASING COSTS
How firms respond to increasing ESI expenditures is of great con-
cern to policymakers, consumers, and workers, since their actions 
might lead to consequences that policymakers regard as undesirable. 
Policymakers hope the law will increase coverage in the private—not 
the government—sector; consequently they worry that firms will drop 
ESI with cost increases. Legislators designed provisions that contain 
penalties to inhibit large firms from dropping ESI if health care costs 
increase. The Mercer (2010) survey found that about 6 percent of firms 
with 500 or more employees and about 20 percent of firms with 10 
to 499 employees said they are likely to terminate their health plans 
after 2014, by which time most of the ACA provisions will be in place. 
This suggests that the incentives might be at least somewhat effec-
tive. Mercer’s findings are consistent with Marquis and Long’s (2001) 
research showing that relatively few firms discontinue ESI when costs 
increase.4 
Policymakers and consumers might also worry that increased com-
pensation costs will push prices up. Market forces in competitive mar-
kets could increase prices as all large firms face the same ACA-induced 
ESI cost increases and as forces in noncompetitive markets allow large 
firms to pass increased costs on to consumers in the form of increased 
product prices. CHES data show that about 21 percent of large firms 
said they increased prices or decreased services when health care costs 
increased in the past; this suggests that price increases might occur in 
about one-fifth of large firms after the ACA is implemented. 
How firms respond when ESI expenditures increase is also of great 
interest to workers. While workers might worry about a general rise 
in prices, they are also likely to worry about how the increased cost of 
ESI will change the composition of their compensation. Dropping ESI 
is a somewhat radical change, as discussed above, and firms might be 
more likely to engage in less radical actions, as is consistent with the 
marginal analysis of offering ESI that was discussed in Chapter 2. 
Rosen (1986) formalized the potential trade-off benefits as non- 
pecuniary components of worker compensation in a theory of com-
pensating differentials. The theory argued that benefits and wages are 
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traded so that a firm increases expenditures on benefits and reduces 
expenditures on wages until its workers remain indifferent (at the mar-
gin) when evaluating compensation packages as a whole. The result is 
that profit-maximizing firms will keep compensation costs competitive 
and trade monetary and nonmonetary benefits in compensation, while 
utility-maximizing workers trade benefits for wages in accepting the 
compensation offer. It follows that increasing expenditures on one com-
ponent of compensation will decrease expenditures on others. 
The compensating differentials framework suggests that the actions 
firms will take if ACA increases ESI costs fall into three general strate-
gies: 1) reduce wages or employment, 2) reduce the quality of the ESI 
plan or offer, and 3) reduce other benefits. All are strategies that the 80 
percent of firms that do not increase product prices could undertake to 
keep compensation costs at the same level when their health care costs 
rise. 
We expect the strategy that a firm adopts will vary systematically 
with the skills of its workforce as workers sort—or re-sort—them-
selves toward the firm offering the compensation package that most 
closely matches their preferences. Of course, the nondiscrimination 
rule—which was expanded under the ACA—will constrain the firm 
to adopt a firm-wide strategy in recalibrating the compensation, and 
it becomes the role of the typical worker with desired skills to set the 
strategy adopted for the trade-off. Because of this, high-skilled firms 
might be less likely than other firms to select a strategy that reduces 
benefits, and low-skilled firms might be less likely to select a strategy 
that reduces wages. Because high-wage workers, who are likely to be 
high-skilled workers, place a high value on nonwage compensation, the 
marginal worker in a high-skilled firm is likely to want to retain ben-
efits. In contrast, low-wage workers, who are likely to be low-skilled 
workers, place a high value on wage compensation, suggesting that the 
marginal worker in a low-skilled firm is likely to want to retain real 
wages. As a result, high-skilled firms might be less likely to reduce ben-
efits when ESI expenditures increase than other firms, while low-skilled 
firms might be less likely to reduce real wages. The Mercer (2010) sur-
vey results support these propositions, as firms with low-paid workers 
and high turnover were the most likely to say they would eliminate ESI 
after 2014. 
84   Maxwell
Reduce Wages or Workforce Access
Firms might decide to restructure wages and employment when 
faced with increased ESI expenditures (Abraham and Voos 2008; 
Baicker and Levy 2007). If wages are flexible, firms might reduce real 
wages by slowing the growth of wage increases or by hiring new work-
ers on a lower pay scale. Aggregate numbers support such a trade-off 
(Table 4.1). In 2010, ESI made up about 7.5 percent of employers’ per-
hour compensation costs, an increase from 6.2 percent in 1995. During 
that same period, wages decreased as a percentage of compensation 
costs (from 71.6 to 70.8 percent).
The wage-ESI trade-off is the most-researched response to increased 
health care costs. Empirical examinations of this trade-off frequently 
involve estimating wage regressions; measures of ESI are included on 
the right-hand side, and a negative coefficient is interpreted as evidence 
supporting the trade-off. While a few studies have supported such a 
trade-off (e.g., Gruber 1994; Olson 2002), the collective empirical 
research evidence is inconclusive at best. Indeed, an oft-cited quota-
tion summarizes this body of research nicely: “The empirical validity 
[of the wage-ESI trade-off] has been difficult to establish. The typical 
estimates are either wrong-signed, insignificant, or both. The literature 
has thus focused not on the magnitude of the wage–health insurance 
trade-off, but on the reasons why economists cannot find evidence that 
there is one” (Currie and Madrian 1999). 
At least two explanations have been posed for the failure of the 
empirical evidence to support a wage-ESI trade-off. Most explanations 
hinge on some source of unobserved (to the researcher) heterogeneity 
in the worker (e.g., skills or ability) or in the firm (e.g., working condi-
tions) that increases both wages and ESI. Presumably, if the researcher 
could control completely for the skill levels (for example) of workers 
and jobs, the theoretically predicted trade-off would emerge. Another 
explanation argues that the trade-off does not occur at the individual 
level, which is the unit of analysis of most empirical research, but 
instead occurs at a more aggregate level such as the firm (Maxwell 
2011). The CHES poses that the trade-off occurs at the firm level and 
asked firms directly if they gave fewer raises or reduced wages when 
health care costs rose. 
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If wages are rigid (e.g., as in a unionized pay scale), increasing ESI 
expenditures might decrease overall employment or shift tasks from 
labor to capital as the relative price of labor increases. Firms might 
swap out workers eligible for ESI in favor of those that do not have 
access to an offer (e.g., those working fewer than 30 hours per week 
after the ACA). In support of this theory, Baicker and Chandra (2006) 
show that a 10 percent increase in premiums reduced the aggregate 
probability of employment by 1.2 percent, reduced hours worked by 2.4 
percent, and increased the likelihood of part-time employment by 1.9 
percent. One way that firms might reduce “employment” is to tighten 
their eligibility requirements and further restrict who gets an ESI offer. 
Of course, this option will only be available if the firm’s requirements 
are less strict than the ACA’s floor for hours worked or tenure. CHES 
data suggest that about 34 percent of large firms met both the hours and 
tenure requirements and were less restrictive in at least one of them, 
which would permit them to adopt a strategy of restricting their access 
when ESI costs increase. The CHES data allow us to examine the trade-
off between ESI and workforce access to ESI by asking firms if they 
Table 4.1  Private-Sector Employer Per-Hour Costs for Employee 
Compensation, 1986–2010
1986 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Total compensation ($) 13.25 14.96 17.10 19.85 24.17 27.42
% wages and salaries 73.0 72.4 71.6 73.0 71.0 70.8
% benefits 27.0 27.6 28.4 27.0 29.0 29.2
% legally required benefits 8.4 9.0 9.3 8.4 8.7 8.2
% insurancea 5.5 6.1 6.7 6.0 7.3 8.0
% paid leave 7.0 6.9 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.8
% retirement and savings 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.5
% supplemental pay 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7
% other benefits 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 —
% health insurance — — 6.2 5.5 6.8 7.5
NOTE: — = data not available. 
a  “% insurance” includes payments for insuring against loss or harm to one's person, 
property, life, etc., while “% health insurance” includes payments for insuring against 
medical and surgical expenses. Categories under “% benefits” may not sum to total 
because of rounding.
SOURCE: EBRI (2010).
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reduced their workforce, increased the number of workers not eligible 
for benefits, or increased the months or hours needed to receive health 
benefits when health care costs increased.
Decrease Quality 
Increased ESI expenditures might lead firms to reduce the quality 
of ESI (Royalty and Hagens 2005) in order to keep the total health care 
expenditures relatively constant. While an ACA requirement restricts 
firms’ ability to reduce the quality of plans (e.g., in services covered), 
the ACA affords more flexibility in reducing the quality of the offer. 
Firms can change the type of plan offered (e.g., from PPO to HMO), 
reduce the worker’s choice in plans, change to a lower-cost carrier 
(which presumably would lower overall quality), or increase the cost 
of the coverage for workers by increasing premium payments or cost- 
sharing for things like sick-visit care. Increasing the price for workers 
might be a particularly attractive option for firms, since few workers 
respond to changes in the price of insurance (Barringer and Mitchell 
1994; Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin 2001; Royalty and Hagens 
2005), although large firms must be conscious of the potential for penal-
ties if workers become eligible for premium subsidies in the exchanges. 
The CHES data allow us to examine the potential for a decrease in 
the quality of the ESI offer because the survey asked firms about the 
types of ESI plans they offered workers before ACA reform was being 
actively discussed, and because it asked detailed questions about the 
plan that most workers selected, including the worker’s monthly pay-
ment for single coverage, the percentage of the premium the firm paid, 
the copayment or coinsurance for a doctor visit, and the copayment 
or coinsurance for a generic prescription. The CHES also asked firms 
about changes they had made to the ESI offer when health care costs 
rose in the past; their responses can be used to capture the answers 
to the following two questions: 1) whether they changed offer quality, 
including whether they increased the amount a worker pays for sin-
gle worker health coverage or family coverage, and 2) whether they 
increased copayments or coinsurances, changed health insurance carri-
ers, or decreased the number or variety of health plans offered. 
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Reduce Benefits Other than ESI
Although most of the research examining compensation trade-offs 
with ESI focuses on wages, firms might also trade ESI for other ben-
efits. After all, ESI is but one of the many types of voluntary compen-
sation that could be traded for wages (Table 4.1). On the one hand, 
replacing ESI with other benefits might be an attractive alternative if the 
benefits’ favorable tax treatment for both individuals and firms makes 
the substitution tax-neutral (Table 4.2).5 On the other hand, firms might 
be reluctant to trade ESI for other benefits for a couple reasons. First, if 
other benefits are taxed as wages, workers might require a greater-than-
dollar-for-dollar trade for equivalent compensation payments. Second, 
some benefits provide the firm with information about workers during 
the recruiting stage, and such information would be lost if the benefits 
are eliminated because of increased ESI costs.6 
The CHES data contain information on whether a firm offered 
22 different benefits that are not included in its ESI plan and are not 
required by the state or federal government. I analyzed the potential 
trade-offs of the 10 benefits that require a firm to make a monetary 
outlay of funds during the worker’s stay with the company and are not 
monetary compensation (e.g., shift premium and bonuses): 1) vision, 
2) dental, 3) life, 4) long-term disability, 5) long-term health, and 
6) retiree-health insurance; 7) paid vacation; 8) paid holidays; 9) paid 
sick leave; and 10) pension.7 The CHES also asked whether firms 
decreased health insurance coverage, non-health benefits, vision insur-
ance, dental insurance, or other health-related coverage when health 
care costs rose.
PAST BEHAVIOR AND POTENTIAL INCREASED HEALTH 
CARE COSTS
By juxtaposing behavioral changes stemming from health-care cost 
increases in the past with prereform levels of ESI and other benefit offer-
ings, we can predict the changes that might occur if ESI expenditures 
increase. We can also predict how the changes might alter prereform 
ESI disparities between low-wage and high-wage workers by compar-
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Table 4.2  Tax Incentives for Various Types of Benefits, and Percentage of Firms Offering Them, 2005–2006
Tax benefits for firms  
(as compared to wages)
Tax benefits for 
individuals
(as compared to wages)
Percentage offering
Total                 Low-skilled High-skilled
ESI Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 97.6 97.3 97.3
Paid time benefits 98.9 98.9 98.4
Paid vacation Taxed as wages Taxed as wages 96.0 94.4 96.5*
Paid holidays Taxed as wages Taxed as wages 94.7 91.2 97.5**
Paid sick leave Taxed as wages Taxed as wages 85.3 79.7 93.4**
Supplemental health benefits 94.3 91.9 96.6**
Dental Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 84.2 84.3 90.4**
Life insurance Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 80.5 72.9 87.2**
Long-term disability  
(wage replacement)
Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 66.3 56.5 82.8**
Vision Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 59.7 58.2 60.5
Long-term health benefits 23.8 24.1 20.0*
Long-term health care  
(e.g., nursing home)
Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 15.4 15.1 13.0
Retiree health Excluded from payroll tax Tax-exempt 12.4 10.9 11.4
Pension Excluded from payroll tax Tax-deferred and 
no payroll tax
87.7 85.4 95.6**
N (unweighted) 725 268 165
NOTE: Columns show the percentage of firms in each category that offer the benefit. For the worker, tax-exempt means that the premium 
(for example) is not subject to income or payroll tax. Life insurance was tax-exempt only for term insurance of $50,000 or less at the time 
the survey was in the field. Observations were weighted so that the distribution of the sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the 
United States with respect to size and industry. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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ing differences between low-skilled and high-skilled firms in their pre-
reform levels of ESI and in their responses to increases in health care 
costs in the past. For example, if high-skilled firms were more likely to 
offer a wide array of benefits than low-skilled firms prior to the ACA 
and were less likely to reduce them when health care costs increased, 
we would predict that the disparity in the offer of benefits between low 
and high-skilled firms might increase if the ACA increases ESI costs, 
since high-skilled firms retain their high level of benefit offerings and 
low-skilled firms reduce them. I use means and frequency distributions 
to describe the behaviors of firms prior to the ACA. The description 
is presented in the aggregate for all firms and disaggregated for low-
skilled and high-skilled firms. A t test allows us to identify significant 
differences between low- and high-skilled firms in descriptive analysis. 
Descriptive analysis would quickly become overwhelming if we 
examined each of the 10 benefits other than ESI individually. Further-
more, benefits often fall into categories that firms are likely to offer, and 
these categories would facilitate interpretation of their (potential) trade-
offs with ESI. I use a factor analysis to identify these groupings (Appen-
dix B presents details). This analysis identifies four distinct bundles of 
benefits that explain about 63 percent of the variance in the benefits 
firms offered: 1) paid time benefits (vacation, holidays, and sick leave), 
2) supplemental health benefits (dental, life, long-term disability, and 
vision insurance), 3) long-term health (long-term health care and retiree 
health), and 4) pensions. 
I conceptualized a strategy that a firm adopts when health care costs 
increase—one in which the firm takes a closely related set of actions. 
Our discussion of past research suggests that three strategies might 
describe firms’ behavior when health care costs rise: firms can concen-
trate on saving money by altering 1) wages and access, 2) the quality of 
the offer, and 3) other benefits. I use a factor analysis on the CHS data 
to validate the three strategies. This analysis, which is also described in 
detail in Appendix B, identifies five groupings of behaviors that overlap 
substantially with our categorization of strategies: firms look to save 
money by adjusting 1) benefits, 2) the worker price of ESI, 3) the qual-
ity of the plan, 4) workforce costs, and 5) access. These five factors 
explained about 56 percent of the variance in the actions firms took 
when health care costs increased. 
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Two separate factors capture my wage and employment access strat-
egy (workforce costs and access to benefits). One contains the actions 
of giving fewer raises or reducing wages, reducing the workforce, and 
increasing the number workers not eligible for ESI; the other contains 
the actions of increasing the number of months of tenure or the number 
of hours worked per week needed to receive ESI. Together, these two 
factors explained about 18.7 percent of the variance in the actions that 
firms took when health care costs increased. 
Two separate factors identify my quality-of-the-ESI-offer strategy: 
1) worker price of ESI and 2) ESI choices. The first contains the actions 
of increasing the amount the worker paid for family coverage and the 
amount paid for single coverage, and the second contains the actions 
of decreasing the variety of ESI offered and the number of ESI plans 
offered and changing carriers. These two factors explain about 21.7 per-
cent of the variance. 
A single factor captures my benefits strategy, and this factor explains 
about 27.9 percent of the variance. Actions contained in this strategy 
include decreasing dental insurance, vision insurance, non-health ben-
efits, or other health-related coverage. 
The general alignment of my factor loadings with the three a priori 
research categorizations, in combination with the relatively high pro-
portion of variance explained in individual actions firms took when 
health care costs rose, provides support for my using the three catego-
ries of strategies to describe firms’ responses to rising health care costs.
I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis to examine the dif-
ferences between low- and high-skilled firms in each of these three 
strategies. I quantify a strategy as the number of actions a firm takes 
within each of the three strategies. I use this number within each strat-
egy as a dependent variable in an OLS analysis that contains only two 
binary measures as independent variables: 1) whether a firm employed 
a majority of high-skilled workers or 2) whether it employed a majority 
of low-skilled ones.8 
My intent with these estimations is to capture whether low-skilled 
and high-skilled firms adopted different strategies when health care 
costs increased in the past. It is not to model the behavior of firms. 
By including only measures of workforce skills in my estimations, the 
correlations captured by my coefficients allow for a more straightfor-
ward discussion of the implications of increased health care costs for 
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low-skilled and high-skilled workers than would be the case with coef-
ficients estimated from a fully specified model of firm behavior. For 
example, if the coefficient on the high-skilled variable was positive and 
the coefficient on the low-skilled variable was negative or insignifi-
cant in the estimation of the number of actions taken in the strategy of 
reducing the quality of the ESI offer, the results would suggest that 
high-skilled firms were more likely than other firms to adopt this strat-
egy when health care costs increased. If high-skilled firms had a higher 
quality of ESI offer prior to health care costs rising than low-skilled 
firms, I would presume that the quality of the offers of high- and low-
skilled firms would converge with increased health care costs. If the 
estimation was fully specified, my assessment of a convergence would 
be less straightforward, as the associations would hold in a world where 
all else was equal. 
Cut Back on Wages or Workforce Access
Nearly 20 percent of all large firms took one of the actions in the 
strategy of reducing wages or employment access when health care costs 
increased (Table 4.3). About 10.3 percent gave fewer raises or reduced 
wages, 6.3 percent reduced the size of their workforce, and 3.0 percent 
replaced workers eligible for coverage with those who were ineligible 
when costs increased. Low-skilled firms were more likely than high-
skilled firms to give fewer raises, reduce wages, or increase the num-
ber of workers ineligible for benefits, but they were not more likely to 
reduce the workforce. OLS estimations confirm that high-skilled firms 
are less likely to take actions in this strategy when health care costs 
increase, with a significant coefficient on the high-skilled variable of 
–0.140 (Table 4.4). This finding suggests that differences exist between 
low- and high-skilled firms in adopting a strategy of reducing wages or 
workforce access when health care costs increase. 
CHES data show that relatively large disparities existed in access 
to the ESI offer between low- and high-skilled firms prior to the heated 
discussions that took place in Congress—and in the public at large—
about the ACA (Table 4.5). Arguably, the most telling difference lies 
in a firm’s ability to meet the ACA requirements. Some 62.1 percent 
of large firms with low-skilled workforces, and 58.0 percent of those 
with high-skilled workforces, did not meet the ACA hours and tenure 
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Table 4.3  Large-Firm Responses to Rising Health Care Costs, 2005–2006
All
Low-
skilled
High- 
skilled
Percentage taking one action below 77.4 68.4 87.1**
Wages and access 19.2 21.2 13.0**
Workforce costs 13.9 16.6 10.0**
Give fewer raises or reduce wages 10.3 13.2 6.5**
Reduce workforce 6.3 5.3 5.8
Increase workers not eligible for benefits 3.0 5.7 1.2**
Access to benefits 7.1 6.2 3.5**
Increase months to receive benefits 5.9 4.7 2.4**
Increase hours to receive benefits 2.1 2.3 1.1**
Quality of ESI offer 69.7 60.3 80.0**
Worker price of ESI 69.2 53.5 73.6**
Increase worker payment for single coverage 41.1 33.5 59.2**
Increase worker payment for family coverage 37.2 32.7 49.3**
Increase copayment or coinsurance 35.9 32.2 29.9
ESI choice 31.6 25.1 40.9**
Change health insurance carriers 26.2 19.5 36.2**
Decrease variety of health plans 10.8 10.0 10.2
Decrease number of health plans 7.0 5.0 9.1**
Benefits 11.2 13.0 5.6**
Decrease health insurance coverage 8.3 7.9 5.3
Decrease non-health benefits 3.3 3.1 1.0
Decrease vision insurance 3.0 4.2 2.2
Decrease dental insurance 2.8 4.3 1.3**
Decrease other health-related coverage 2.3 1.7 2.1
Increase prices of products 20.9 18.6 15.1**
N (unweighted) 725 268 165
NOTE: Row headings complete the question posed to firms offering health insurance: 
“In the past 3 to 5 years, in response to rising health care costs, did your firm . . . ?” 
** significant at the 0.05 level. Observations have been weighted so that the distribu-
tion of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect 
to size and industry. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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requirements in 2005–2006, which suggests that as many as five out of 
eight low-skilled large firms, many of whom are low-wage, will have 
to increase their ESI coverage of workers or face potential financial 
penalties. 
Although the CHES data suggest that about one-third of large firms 
exceeded the ACA’s coverage requirements (i.e., required fewer than 30 
hours per week of work or fewer than three months’ tenure for cover-
age) and could adopt a strategy that reduces access to ESI after the ACA 
is fully implemented, a much smaller percentage of low-skilled than 
high-skilled firms will be able to adopt this strategy. About 26.7 per-
cent of low-skilled but 35.7 percent of high-skilled firms had coverage 
requirements that were less restrictive than those required by the ACA 
(Table 4.5). Such differences might be superfluous, however, since only 
about 6.2 percent of low-skilled and 3.5 percent of high-skilled firms 
increased hours or tenure requirements when health care costs increased 
in the past (Table 4.3).
Table 4.4  Coefficients of Large-Firm Responses to Rising Health Care 
Costs by Low- and High-Skilled Firms, 2005–2006
 
Wages and 
access
Quality of 
ESI offer Benefits
Low-skilled firm 0.007 –0.193 –0.001
High-skilled firm –0.140** 0.387** –0.110*
Mean dependent variable 0.267 1.604 0.188
Range 0–5 0–6 0–5
N (unweighted) 667 658 676
NOTE: Questions were only asked of firms that offered ESI. The table shows the 
unstandardized coefficients from an estimation of large firms, with each dependent 
variable reflecting the number of actions taken in each strategy (see Table 4.3 for 
details) and the two binary variables as dependent variables. Appendix C provides a 
full definition of all empirical constructs used in the estimations. Observations have 
been weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms 
in the United States with respect to size and industry. * significant at the 0.10 level; 
** significant at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Table 4.5  Prereform Behaviors of Large Firms That Offer ESI, 
2005–2006
Total
Low-
skilled
High-
skilled
Wages and access
% not meeting ACA hours and tenure 
requirements
55.4 62.1 58.0*
% exactly meeting ACA hours and tenure 
requirements
10.7 11.2 6.4**
% with greater access than ACA requirements 33.9 26.7 35.7**
Quality of offer
% that offer more than one plan 71.2 62.4 88.8**
% that offer more than one type of plan 60.5 49.1 84.5**
Price of ESI for workers
Worker monthly payment, single coverage ($) 46.40 50.30 38.40**
Average % premium paid 15.5 14.8 10.5**
Copayment or coinsurance 
Average copayment for doctor visit ($) 16.80 18.00 13.20**
Average % for coinsurance for doctor visit 15.6 ª ª
Average copayment for generic prescription 
($)
11.90 12.20 10.40**
Average % for coinsurance for generic 
prescription 
20.1 ª ª
N (unweighted) 725 268 165
NOTE: Table includes only large firms that offered health insurance. Item-specific non-
response reduced the number of respondents greatly in the “Price of ESI for work-
ers” variable. Non-health benefits include retirement, life insurance, paid vacation, 
holidays, and sick leave. Other health-related benefits include mental health/substance 
abuse, long-term health insurance, and long-term disability, all of which are separate 
from the health insurance plan. Observations have been weighted so that the distribu-
tion of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to 
size and industry. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level. Totals 
may not sum to 100.0% because of rounding.
ª  Indicates the cell contains fewer than 20 firms (other cells have at least 35 firms).
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007).
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Reduce the Quality of the Offer
CHES data show a large difference between low- and high-skilled 
firms in the quality of ESI offered to workers in 2005–2006 (Table 4.5). 
A larger percentage of high-skilled large firms made workers a higher-
quality offer than did low-skilled large firms. This difference was cap-
tured in each of the eight measures of quality contained in the CHES. 
High-skilled firms were nearly one-and-a-half times more likely to 
offer workers a choice of health care plans than were low-skilled firms 
(88.8 vs. 62.4 percent). The price workers paid for ESI also differed. 
Workers at high-skilled firms paid about $38 per month (or about 10.5 
percent of the premium) for the plan that most selected, while  those at 
low-skilled firms paid about $50 per month (or about 14.8 percent of 
the premium). Workers in high-skilled firms paid, on average, about a 
$13.20 copayment for a doctor visit and $10.40 for a generic prescrip-
tion, while workers in low-skilled firms paid about $18.00 for a doctor 
visit and $12.20 for a prescription. 
CHES data suggest that when health care costs increase, the differ-
ences in the quality of the ESI offer between low- and high-skilled large 
firms might converge. High-skilled firms were about one-third more 
likely to take an action that reduced the quality of the ESI offer than 
low-skilled firms (80 percent vs. 60 percent), as shown in Table 4.3. 
When firms reduced quality, both low- and high-skilled firms tended to 
increase the amount a worker paid for coverage; however, high-skilled 
firms tended to be more proactive than low-skilled firms in taking the 
actions. Nearly 74 percent of high-skilled firms but only about 54 per-
cent of low-skilled firms increased the worker price of ESI when health 
care costs rose, and nearly 60 percent of high-skilled firms but only 
about 33 percent of low-skilled firms increased the price workers paid 
for single coverage. Relatively fewer firms of each type changed carri-
ers, which presumably reduced both cost and quality, when health care 
costs increased (about 36 percent of high-skilled and 20 percent of low-
skilled firms). 
OLS estimations confirm that high-skilled firms are significantly 
more likely than other firms to adopt a strategy of reducing the quality 
of the ESI offer when health care costs increase; these estimations show 
a significant coefficient on the high-skilled variable of 0.387 (Table 
4.4). Because high-skilled firms are more likely than low-skilled firms 
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to extend a good-quality ESI offer before cost increases and more likely 
to adopt a strategy of reducing the quality of that offer when health care 
costs increase, our analysis points to a convergence in the quality of the 
ESI offer between low- and high-skilled firms if the ACA leads to ESI 
costs increases. 
Decrease Benefits
My descriptive analysis of the benefits firms offered in 2005–2006 
shows a large variation in the percentage of firms that offered each of 
the four groups of benefits, although the variation does not appear to 
be related to the tax treatment of the benefit (Table 4.2). Virtually all 
firms offered paid time benefits, even though neither the firm nor the 
individual receives a tax advantage on offering or accepting benefits as 
compared to wages. Furthermore, even though firms can exclude retiree 
health and long-term health care premiums from their payroll tax base 
and workers do not pay income or payroll taxes on receiving paid-up 
premiums as compensation, fewer than 16 percent of firms offered them 
as benefits. 
The seeming lack of association between taxes and offered benefits 
highlights the possibility of a firm offering benefits in accordance with 
the preferences of its workers. My descriptive analysis supports this 
conclusion by showing that a greater percentage of high-skilled firms 
offered benefits within each group except long-term health insurance. 
A greater proportion of high-skilled than low-skilled firms offered paid 
vacation, holidays, and sick leave, although over 98 percent of each 
type of firm offered at least one of those benefits. About 97 percent 
of high-skilled firms offered supplemental health benefits, compared 
to about 92 percent of low-skilled firms; the largest differences (about 
15 percentage points) lay in the higher proportion of high-skilled firms 
offering life insurance and long-term disability. Almost 96 percent of 
high-skilled large firms offered worker pensions, which was over 10 
percentage points higher than for low-skilled firms. Relatively few dif-
ferences existed between low- and high-skilled firms in the percentage 
offering long-term health benefits. 
Differences also existed in the percentage of low- and high-skilled 
firms that took actions that reduced benefits when health care costs 
increased in the past. Although about 11 percent of all firms reduced at 
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least some benefits when health care costs increased, low-skilled firms 
were about twice as likely as high-skilled firms to take one of these 
actions (Table 4.3). About 13 percent of low-skilled firms and only 5.6 
percent of high-skilled firms decreased health care coverage, non-health 
benefits, dental insurance, vision insurance, or other health-related cov-
erage when health care costs increased. The OLS estimation confirms 
the difference between low- and high-skilled firms in adopting the strat-
egy of reducing benefits; it shows a significant (p ≤ 0.10) coefficient on 
the high-skilled variable of –0.110 (Table 4.4). Because high-skilled 
firms were more likely to offer benefits than low-skilled firms and less 
likely to reduce them when health care costs increased, ACA-induced 
increases in ESI costs might increase the disparity between low- and 
high-wage workers in non-ESI benefits offered. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The ACA has the potential to increase the cost a large firm incurs 
when it provides ESI to its workers. Some large firms might need to 
expand coverage to comply (or pay financial penalties). Some might 
need to pay increased premiums for the coverage they offer or to pay an 
increasing proportion of the premium. In 2005–2006, over 56 percent 
of large firms did not meet the ACA’s requirement to offer ESI to all 
employees who work at least 30 hours a week and have three months 
of tenure with the firm. These firms will face increased ESI costs as 
they expand coverage to meet the ACA requirements or potentially pay 
penalties. Firms might also face premium increases to bring their plans 
into conformity with the ACA’s expanded coverage requirements (e.g., 
dependents remaining on ESI at least until age 26), with its established 
levels of minimum benefits, and with its limitations on out-of-pocket 
expenses, since it is likely that insurers will raise premiums to cover the 
increased costs from these additional requirements. Premiums will also 
increase for the 39 percent of firms whose plans are projected to exceed 
the threshold for invoking a 40 percent excise tax. Finally, because the 
ACA requires large firms to offer at least one plan for which worker 
premium contributions do not exceed 9.5 percent of household income, 
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some firms may increase their portion of the contribution or face poten-
tial penalties.
The CHES data provide an opportunity to predict how the changes 
firms might make will affect worker compensation and disparities 
between low-wage and high-wage workers. The data provide informa-
tion on the benefits large firms offered prior to the extensive discussions 
in society and Congress about health care reform and how large firms 
have responded to rising health care costs in the past. By examining the 
changes these firms made in response to rising health care costs in the 
context of their ESI offer and offer of other benefits, we can surmise 
changes that might occur with the ACA. My analysis looked at three 
general areas in which worker compensation might be reduced with ESI 
cost increases: 1) wages or employment access, 2) quality of ESI offer, 
and 3) other benefits. 
The CHES data suggest that large disparities existed between low- 
and high-skilled firms in each of these areas in 2005–2006. A higher 
percentage of high-skilled than low-skilled large firms met the ACA’s 
coverage requirements, which suggests a greater need to expand cov-
erage (or pay penalties) in low-skilled firms. When high-skilled firms 
offered ESI, they made workers higher-quality offers than did low-
skilled firms; they did this through a greater choice of health care plans, 
lower premium payments for workers, and lower copayments for doc-
tor visits and generic prescriptions. High-skilled large firms were also 
more likely than low-skilled ones to offer workers paid time and sup-
plemental health benefits and pensions. Such differences are consistent 
with our framework of high-wage workers having a stronger preference 
for nonwage compensation than do low-wage workers. 
When health care costs increased in the past, the typical strategy 
large firms adopted was one that directly affected a worker’s compen-
sation: they reduced the quality of the ESI offer. Almost 70 percent 
of large firms decreased the quality of their ESI offer by raising the 
payments workers paid for the coverage or for services (copayments/
coinsurance). About 19 percent of large firms reduced wages or work-
force access, and about 10 percent said they either gave fewer raises 
or reduced wages when health care costs increased. About 11 percent 
decreased benefits. (Some firms adopted multiple strategies.) 
Differences between high-skilled and low-skilled firms existed in 
how they responded in the past to increasing health care costs. The dif-
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ferential response suggests that the ACA will affect disparities in com-
pensation between low- and high-skilled workers if it increases a firm’s 
ESI expenditures. High-skilled firms were about 33 percent more likely 
to take an action that reduced the quality of the ESI offer than were 
low-skilled firms. Low-skilled firms were more likely than high-skilled 
firms to reduce wages and hire workers not eligible for ESI when health 
care costs increased. They were also more likely to increase the require-
ments relating to hours worked per week and months spent on the job 
which workers would need to meet to receive an offer, although this 
action is only available to about one-quarter of low-skilled firms—
the low-skilled firms that had less restrictive offers than the ACA will 
require. Low-skilled firms were also 2.3 times more likely to decrease 
benefits. Multivariate estimations suggest that the difference in response 
between low- and high-skilled firms might be strongest for high-skilled 
firms adopting a strategy of decreasing the quality of the ESI offer, as 
opposed to low-skilled firms doing so. The coefficient on taking actions 
in this strategy is over 2.5 times greater than the coefficients on reduc-
ing wages and access or reducing benefits. 
My analysis suggests that prereform disparities in ESI coverage and 
quality of offer between low- and high-wage workers might lessen after 
the ACA is implemented, as both the quality of ESI offer and the ESI 
coverage between low-skilled and high-skilled firms converge. Two 
pieces of evidence support this assertion. First, a greater proportion of 
low-skilled than high-skilled firms must increase coverage to meet the 
ACA requirements or potentially pay penalties. Not only are a greater 
proportion of low-skilled firms large and subject to the ACA require-
ments (35.5 vs. 25.4 percent; see Table 3.3 in Chapter 3) but a greater 
proportion did not meet those requirements in the CHES. If large firms 
expand their ESI coverage to meet the ACA’s requirements, the cover-
age in low-skilled firms will expand to become more like the coverage 
in high-skilled firms. Such a change suggests that ESI coverage would 
expand more among low-wage workers than among high-wage work-
ers. Second, low-skilled firms that offered ESI in the prereform period 
had lower-quality offers than high-skilled firms, and high-skilled firms 
were more likely to take an action that reduced the quality of that offer 
when health care costs increased. If the ACA increases health care costs 
and high-skilled firms lower the quality of their ESI offer, disparities 
in the quality of offer would decrease between low-skilled and high-
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skilled firms when the ACA is fully implemented. As a result, the qual-
ity of ESI offer in large firms is likely to converge between low-wage 
and high-wage workers.
CHES data suggest that the convergence in ESI coverage and qual-
ity of offer between low-skilled and high-skilled firms might be accom-
panied by a divergence in the offer of other benefits. High-skilled firms 
offered significantly more benefits to workers in the prereform period 
and were less likely to decrease these benefits in the past when health 
care costs increased. It stands to reason that if the ACA increases ESI 
expenditures and high-skilled firms are less likely than other firms to 
reduce benefits in response, existing disparities in benefits offered to 
workers might increase as other firms reduce them. As a result, the ben-
efits offered to low-wage and high-wage workers in large firms might 
become increasingly disparate if the ACA increases health care costs. 
Notes
 1.  Thresholds will be adjusted for firm-specific age and gender composition and 
increased by $1,650 (single coverage) or $3,450 (family coverage) for three 
categories of people: 1) retirees 55 and older who are not Medicare-eligible; 2) 
electrical and telecommunications installation/repair workers; and 3) individuals 
in high-risk jobs such as longshore work, emergency response, firefighting, law 
enforcement, construction, mining, agriculture, forestry, and fishing.
 2. RAND predicts that, with the individual requirement to have insurance and with 
the lower-cost options available in the exchanges, coverage will increase propor-
tionately more at small firms as workers increasingly demand coverage.
 3.  My analysis does not include the four behaviors that may have been responses 
to changes in the federal tax code and not to rising health care costs: 1) starting a 
health reimbursement account, 2) starting a flexible spending account, 3) starting 
a high-deductible plan, or 4) starting a health savings account. 
 4.  The CHES data do not allow us to examine whether a firm might drop ESI if 
health care costs increase. 
 5.  For a full discussion of the nature of the excludability of benefits, see IRS (2011, 
2012). Dental, vision, and retiree health insurance; educational assistance; child 
care; discounts; parking; cafeteria facility; Keogh plans and defined benefit pen-
sions; and flexible spending accounts all receive the same favorable tax treatment 
as ESI for firms. Dental, vision, and retiree health insurance; educational assis-
tance; child care; discounts; flexible spending accounts; parking; cafeteria facility; 
and meals all receive the same favorable tax treatment for individuals. Individuals 
face deferred taxes and no FICA taxes on pension income. Paid leave (e.g., vaca-
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tion, holidays, and sick leave) and supplemental income are taxed like wages for 
both firms and individuals. 
 6.  Because individuals sort among firms that offer benefits that match their prefer-
ences (Marino and Zábojnίk 2008), careful construction of a firm’s benefit offer-
ings can be used to attract the desired workforce by generating a pool dispropor-
tionately composed of workers with certain characteristics. For example, offering 
a family-friendly bundle of benefits might help a firm attract and retain workers 
in their thirties and forties who are near the beginning or midpoint of their careers 
and looking for a stable career trajectory. In contrast, offering pensions, retiree 
health care, and long-term health care insurance might enable a firm to attract and 
retain experienced workers in their fifties. Baughman, DiNardi, and Holtz-Eakin 
(2003) illustrate this potential and show a trade-off between wages and flexible 
sick leave, child care services, and flexible scheduling when examining family-
friendly policies and wages.
 7. I excluded from analysis benefits for which the firm bears no explicit costs (flex-
ible hours, job training, cafeteria plan, and financial assistance for child care—typ-
ically a dependent care allowance), benefits that generally are not used to attract 
a specific type of worker (severance pay, supplemental unemployment, substance 
abuse), and benefits that represent general human capital investments (financial 
assistance for education). I combined whether a firm offered a defined benefit or 
a defined contribution pension plan into a single variable that captures whether 
the firm offers a pension benefit, because firms rarely offer both types of plans. I 
recognize that differences exist in the types of firms offering each type of plan and 
that the nature of the pension in each plan differs tremendously. However, I want 
to keep the pension measure consistent with other benefit measures, which capture 
whether a benefit is offered, not the quality of the offer. 
 8.  Firms with a majority of mid-skilled jobs and those without a majority of jobs at 
any skill level compose the omitted category. 
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5
 How Small Firms 
Might Respond to the ACA 
Small firms are less likely than large firms to offer ESI, to make a 
lower-quality offer, and to pay increased premiums for a given level of 
coverage. In 2009, only about 34 percent of firms with fewer than 10 
employees offered ESI, compared to 99 percent of firms with 10,000 
or more workers (McMorrow, Blumberg, and Buettgens 2011). Offer 
rates between small and large firms have become more disparate over 
time. Between 2000 and 2009, offer rates for all firms fell from about 59 
percent to 55 percent. Large firms (more than 50 workers) had no dis-
cernible decline, firms with 10 to 24 workers had a 10 percent decline, 
and firms with fewer than 10 workers had a 15 percent decline. One 
explanation for the decline might be increasing premium costs, which 
by 2010 had left small firms paying 18 percent higher premiums than 
large firms for equivalent coverage (Pelosi 2010).1 
The coverage and premium differences between large and small 
firms have been a focal point for discussion in health care reform for 
decades. Two issues typically have driven the discussion (as Chapter 2 
discusses): 1) small-group market risk assessment and 2) underwriting 
in premium-setting. These two issues are the dominant issues in the 
individual market for insurance and are related to the high administra-
tive costs that smaller firms face.
Creating economies of scale helps counteract the increased costs 
facing small firms, and purchasing alliances are one way for small firms 
to achieve such economies of scale. Alliances mimic the large-group 
market by creating a formalized arrangement in which small firms pool 
their contributions to self-contributing or self-insuring benefit plans in 
the hope of gaining the economies of scale and the lower ESI admin-
istrative costs available to large firms. Multiple-employer welfare 
arrangements (MEWAs) and multiple-employer trusts (METs) provide 
examples of such alliances.
However, a purchasing alliance pool must have the ability to attract 
and retain a large enrollment base or it will not be in a position to 
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achieve the economies of scale and negotiate effectively with health 
plans (Curtis and Neuschler 2005). Past experiences with alliances 
often revealed problems such as the following: large start-up costs in 
time, money, and collective action; heterogeneity across employers in 
tastes for health plans; lack of awareness of the existence of such alli-
ances; modest cost savings and concomitant resistance from brokers 
because of lower commission rates; and insufficient funding and inad-
equate reserves to pay claims (EBSA 2004). 
The small-group market—of which associations are a part—falls 
under ERISA requirements for state regulation. State regulations helped 
reduce variability within a state in small-group plans by using several 
different means. The first is risk bands, in which premiums fall within a 
prescribed range of an average experience-rated premium. An alternative 
to risk bands is community rating, in which all enrolled groups face the 
same or a slightly characteristic-adjusted premium. And another means 
of reducing variability in small-group plans is through guaranteed issue 
to all applicants, guaranteed renewal, limitations on preexisting condi-
tion exclusions, and portability of coverage to limit coverage variability 
(Monheit and Schone 2004). State regulations tended to create variabil-
ity between states, however, with their different requirements for risk 
assessment, underwriting, and associations. The ACA presumably will 
reduce between-state variability, as most of the small-group market will 
move into the newly designed state-run exchanges and all plans offered 
in the exchanges must meet ACA-established requirements, as well as 
any additional state-imposed requirements. 
The shift to a more centralized regulation in the small-group mar-
ket by the ACA, albeit one more akin to a confederacy than a dicta-
torship, was designed to enable more small firms to offer ESI to their 
workers. The CHES data can be used to assess the potential for change 
in four distinct ways. First, the CHES asked firms that did not offer 
ESI why they did not offer it. The reasons small firms gave can be 
aligned with the incentives provided by the ACA to offer ESI as a way 
of determining their alignment. If small firms showed an inclination 
toward offering ESI, and the ACA’s incentives to offer it would offset 
their reasons for not offering it, we would presume that the act could 
incentivize at least some small firms to offer ESI. Second, the CHES 
asked small firms that offered ESI the battery of questions about how 
they responded to increased health care costs in the past three to five 
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years. These questions were used in Chapter 4’s analysis to assess how 
large firms might act if the ACA increased ESI costs; they are used in 
this chapter to assess the potential response of small firms to ESI cost 
increases and to extrapolate their response to the postreform period. 
Third, the CHES allows us to segregate small firms into two different 
sizes to assess whether small firms of different sizes exhibit different 
ESI behaviors. Such an analysis is driven by the ACA’s tax credit provi-
sions targeted at firms with 25 or fewer workers. Although the CHES 
size category 5–19 is not a perfect overlap with the ACA category of 
25 and under, it can be used to provide a crude assessment of whether 
the ACA provisions align with the behaviors of the very small firms 
to which the provisions are targeted.2 Fourth, the CHES allows us to 
categorize small firms by workforce skills, which in turn enables us 
to examine disparities in ESI coverage between low-skilled and high-
skilled small firms and to capture potential changes in those disparities, 
as we did for large firms in Chapter 4. 
THE ACA AND SMALL FIRMS
The ACA does not require small firms to offer ESI. Instead, it 
developed the exchanges to help structure the small-group market and 
provide incentives for small firms to offer ESI. Although the exchange 
within each state is often discussed as a single operation, it consists 
of two separate entities: the individual exchange and the Small Busi-
ness Health Options Program (SHOP) exchange. The distinction exists 
because the ACA requires insurers to pool all individual members in 
one risk pool and all small-firm group members in another. The states 
have the flexibility to structure their exchange, since the ACA allows 
them three options: 1) to combine the two risk pools, 2) to operate sepa-
rate individual and SHOP exchanges, or 3) to merge the two into a 
single exchange.3 The legislation also allows states to develop subsid-
iary exchanges within a state and regional exchanges within a region, 
and to develop health care choice compacts between states that would 
allow insurers to sell policies in any state participating in the compact.
The ACA designed the exchanges to empower small firms (and 
individuals) in the health insurance market by increasing the flow of 
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information about health care plans sold and providing a venue through 
which subsidized price reductions for premiums could be implemented. 
The increased flow of information, which results in part from the stan-
dardization of plans in the exchanges, was designed to provide small 
firms (and individuals) with an ability to focus their selection of insur-
ance on key features such as price or cost-sharing requirements and to 
eliminate the potential for unanticipated consequences that can some-
times be created by the fine print of health care contracts.4 The subsidi-
zation of premiums was designed to provide small firms (and individu-
als) with an ability to afford health care coverage. 
The ACA’s focus on informed choice is manifested in its transpar-
ency and standardization provisions, which constitute the two pillars 
of increased information and minimum standards. The act requires 
all plans sold in the exchanges to communicate items such as claims- 
payment policies and practices, financial information, data on enroll-
ment and disenrollment and on claims, denials and rating practices, and 
information on cost-sharing for out-of-network coverage. It also requires 
all health plans sold in the exchanges and small-group markets to meet 
certain criteria for items like marketing, network adequacy, accredita-
tion, and quality improvements in plans.5 All group plans sold in the 
exchanges and all small-group plans (100 or fewer employees) sold 
outside the exchanges must cover the following areas: preventive and 
primary care; emergency, hospital, physician, outpatient, and maternity 
and newborn care; pediatric care (including dental and vision); medical/
surgical care; prescription drugs; lab; and mental health and substance 
abuse. Medical underwriting is prohibited for all small-group plans, 
and insurers can only vary premiums based on age, tobacco use, family 
composition, and geography.6 Premiums cannot be based on health sta-
tus, claims history, industry group, group size, or duration of coverage. 
Plans are required to fit into actuarial value tiers—designated as “plati-
num,” “gold,” “silver,” and “bronze”—at 90, 80, 70, and 60 percent of 
actuarial value, and deductibles are limited to $2,000 for single cover-
age and $4,000 for family coverage. 
Exchanges will ultimately serve as the vehicle for the small-business 
tax credits for ESI premiums. Starting in 2014, small businesses meeting 
both of two conditions—1) 25 or fewer full-time-equivalent employees 
and 2) average annual wages of no more than $50,000—are eligible for 
tax credits toward the purchase of ESI coverage.7 Tax credits, for any 
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two years, are available for up to 50 percent of the employer contribu-
tion if it covers at least 50 percent of the premium. Premiums for which 
firms do not receive a tax credit can still be deducted from taxes. 
SMALL FIRMS THAT DID NOT OFFER ESI 
If the exchanges operate as planned, they will make it easier, in 
at least four ways, for a small firm that does not offer ESI to offer it. 
These ways are as follows: 1) simulate large-group economies of scale 
and reduced administrative costs, 2) increase information flow, 3) pro-
vide some very small, low-wage firms with premium subsidies, and 
4) reduce premium variability. Past research suggests mixed conclu-
sions about the ACA’s ability to increase the ESI offer among small 
firms. Some research highlights the potential for success by showing 
the ways in which the ACA might meet the concerns of small firms with 
regard to premiums, health care costs (Feldman et al. 1997; Hadley and 
Reschovsky 2002), variability of premiums, and administrative hassles 
(Morrisey, Jensen, and Morlock 1994), all of which might inhibit their 
making an ESI offer. Other research highlights the possibility that some 
small firms are recalcitrant in not making an ESI offer, as they believe 
their workers prefer other forms of compensation (McLaughlin and 
Zellers 1992), and the preference among workers for additional wages 
might intensify with the expansion of Medicaid eligibility or might 
reverse with the requirement for most individuals to have insurance.
We can use the CHES data to assess how the ACA incentives align 
with the reasons why small firms did not offer ESI. The CHES asked 
firms to rate the importance of a series of factors on their decision not to 
offer ESI by asking, “We are interested in knowing why your firm does 
not offer health insurance. On a scale where ‘1’ is not at all important 
and ‘5’ is very important, please say why your firm does NOT offer 
health insurance to its workers.” Potential reasons rated for importance 
included the following: premiums were too high, worker turnover was 
too high, workers were covered under another plan, firm can attract 
good workers without it, firm is too small or new, firm had seriously ill 
worker, plan set-up is too complicated/time consuming, firm’s revenue 
is too uncertain, business can’t afford it, workers can’t afford it, work-
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ers don’t need it, workers prefer wages, firms don’t need health insur-
ance to get good workers, workers are temporary, and firms don’t know 
where to go to get information. I use descriptive statistics to identify 
the reasons small firms do not offer ESI in the aggregate and for low- 
and high-skilled firms. A factor analysis of the potential reasons for not 
offering ESI distilled a small number of motivations and helped me 
assess whether these motivations might align with the incentives in the 
ACA to offer it. 
Analysis of the CHES data suggests that premium and administra-
tive costs were prevalent motivations for small firms not to offer ESI and 
that the ACA’s tax credits for premiums and exchanges were designed 
to offset these motivations (Table 5.1). The factor analysis (Appendix 
B presents details) of the 11 reasons in the CHES that contribute to a 
firm’s decision not to offer ESI in the prereform period identifies four 
motivations for not offering ESI.8 Of these four motivations identified, 
there are two we are calling “costs too high” and “administrative costs 
(and worker preferences).” Together these two factors explain about 
38.4 percent of the variance in the reasons small firms provided for not 
offering ESI. Over 82 percent of small firms gave a reason for not offer-
ing ESI that fell into the cost-too-high motivation (Table 5.1). Some 
78.5 percent said they did not offer ESI because the premiums were too 
high, 67.3 percent said their business could not afford it, and 48 percent 
said revenue was too uncertain to commit to a plan. About 82 percent of 
small firms also listed at least one of the reasons in the administrative-
costs-and-worker-preference motivation for not offering ESI. Nearly 
58.6 percent said their firm was too small or too new to offer ESI, and 
52.2 percent said their workers could not afford it. Some 24.9 percent 
said that setting up a plan was too time-consuming or complicated (pre-
sumably because they did not have benefit specialists in the firm).
The categories of “workforce characteristics” and “healthy work-
ers” round out the four motivations and account for the remaining 30.5 
percent of the variation explained by the reasons firms did not offer ESI. 
About 59 percent of small firms listed at least one of the reasons in this 
motivation. Some 42.8 percent of small firms said they could recruit and 
retain good workers without ESI, although that was the reason with the 
smallest correlation to the factor-defined motivation. About 34.6 per-
cent said their workers are temporary or part-time. Nearly 31.5 percent 
cited high worker turnover as a reason for not offering ESI, although 
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Table 5.1  Reasons Small Firms Did Not Offer ESI (%)
Total 
Workforce 
skills
Firm size 
(no. of workers)
Low- 
skilled
High- 
skilled 5–19 20–50
Percentage citing one of the 
reasons below
91.8 95.0 83.3** 90.4 98.7**
Costs too high 82.6 89.8 65.4** 81.0 95.7**
Premiums too high 78.5 86.8 61.2** 75.6 91.7**
Business cannot afford it 67.4 81.8 45.7** 65.8 75.1**
Revenue too uncertain to commit 
to a plan
48.0 66.6 32.7** 43.5 68.7**
Administrative costs and worker 
preference
81.8 75.8 76.4 79.0 94.4**
Firm too small or new 58.6 52.9 59.6 58.6 58.5
Workers cannot afford it 52.2 56.4 25.5** 48.4 69.6**
Workers prefer wages or other 
benefits
42.3 49.9 40.7* 40.9 48.6
Plan set up to be too complicated 
and time-consuming
24.9 26.5 16.0** 24.0 29.2
Workforce characteristics 58.9 60.9 50.6** 57.0 67.9**
Don’t need ESI for good workers 42.8 41.7 37.0 39.4 58.8**
Workers are temporary, part-time 34.6 44.2 18.9** 30.7 53.6**
Worker turnover too high 31.5 37.2 9.8** 27.0 52.1**
Healthy workers
Workers are healthy and do not 
need it
20.2 28.7 18.9** 18.2 29.7**
N (unweighted) 160 60 39 124 36
NOTE: Firms not offering health insurance were asked how important each reason was 
in their decision not to offer it. Numbers represent the percentage of firms saying that 
the stated reason for not offering insurance was either very important or important. 
Observations have been weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the 
proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. * significant 
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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the instability could arise because the firm did not offer ESI. About 20.2 
percent of small firms did not offer ESI because they believed their 
workers were healthy and did not need health care coverage—the last 
motivation we identified. 
This analysis suggests that small firms that did not offer ESI in 
the prereform period might be swayed by ACA provisions to offer it, 
because the SHOP exchanges present solutions to the primary concerns 
of small firms. Costs—premium and administrative—and workers’ 
ability to afford ESI were cited as important reasons for not offering 
it in a majority of firms, and the legislation was specifically designed 
to overcome such obstacles. The tax credits for premiums for some 
small firms were intended to offset out-of-pocket ESI expenses. The 
exchanges were designed to offset administrative concerns, and the pre-
mium credits for low-income workers were devised to help workers 
afford ESI premiums. 
Furthermore, the CHES data suggest that small firms might have 
a propensity to take advantage of the ACA incentives to offer ESI, as 
about 30 percent that did not offer ESI in the prereform period said they 
might be interested in offering it. About 29.3 percent of small firms 
said they were at least somewhat likely to offer it in the next two years 
(Table 5.2), and 29.2 percent had shopped for it in the past year—about 
the same percentage as shown in the Employer Health Benefits Survey 
(EHBS) (Claxton et al. 2010).9
However, other evidence in the CHES suggests that most small 
firms that did not offer ESI in the prereform period will not offer it 
after the ACA. Few small firms perceived negative ramifications from 
not offering ESI, which might make it hard to motivate them to offer 
it. Firms not offering ESI were asked a battery of questions about the 
perceived impact on them of not offering it.  The questions asked, “On 
a scale where ‘1’ is virtually no impact and ‘5’ is a very large impact, 
please rate the following.” There followed a list of areas including 
worker recruitment, retention, attitude/performance, health and absen-
teeism, and the overall success of the business. Should firms perceive a 
large impact on their business of not offering ESI, one would presume 
they might readily respond to incentives to offer it. If, however, they 
perceive few negative consequences from not offering ESI, it might be 
more difficult for the ACA to change their behavior. The CHES data 
suggest that only about 16 percent of small firms said they felt repercus-
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sions from not offering ESI (Table 5.3).10 About 11 percent said that not 
offering ESI had a large impact on worker retention/turnover, the most 
frequently mentioned negative consequence. Fewer than 9 percent of 
firms said  that not offering ESI had a large impact on worker recruit-
ment, attitude and performance, or health; and fewer than 5 percent said 
it had a large impact on absenteeism and the overall success of their 
business. 
As well, few small firms appear to be eligible for tax credits. 
Although low-skilled and very small firms had low rates of offering 
ESI11 and are the firms targeted for tax credits for premiums, the pro-
portion of these firms is low—in part, because very small firms are dis-
proportionately high-skilled (Table 5.2). Because only about 23 percent 
Table 5.2  Characteristics of Small Firms with Regard to ESI, by Skill 
Level and Firm Size
Total 
Workforce skills
Firm size 
(no. of workers)
Low- 
skilled
High- 
skilled 5–19 20–50 
All small firms
% low-skilled firms 25.4 — — 22.9 33.3**
% high-skilled firms 30.8 — — 32.5 25.6**
% very small (5–19 workers) 75.8 68.3 79.9** — —
% offer ESI 74.3 60.9 82.0** 72.0 81.7**
N (unweighted) 702 164 225 475 227
Small firms not offering ESI
% offered past 5 years 11.7 18.1 13.4* 12.8 5.1**
% shopped ESI past year 29.2 25.5 19.2* 29.1 29.9
% at least somewhat likely to 
offer next 2 years
29.3 27.7 20.2** 24.7 51.1**
N (unweighted) 162 60 40 125 37
NOTE: “% offered past 5 years” is the percentage of firms not offering ESI that offered 
it sometime in the past five years. “% shopped ESI past year” is the percentage of 
firms not offering ESI that shopped for it in the past year. “% at least somewhat likely 
to offer next 2 years” is the percentage of firms not offering ESI that say they are 
somewhat or very likely to offer it within the next two years (as opposed to not likely 
to do so). Observations have been weighted so that the distribution of sample firms 
reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. 
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007).
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of very small firms are low-skilled, CHES data suggest that only about 
17 percent of all small firms and 31 percent of small firms not offering 
health benefits will be eligible for the tax credit on premiums. 
Even if a small firm is eligible for a tax credit, the incentive might 
not be large enough to motivate firms to change their behavior. Although 
only 11.7 percent of CHES small firms not offering ESI had offered it 
in the past five years (Table 5.2),12 about 40 percent of them said they 
dropped it because it was too expensive. Despite the potential of tax 
credits to lower premiums, they are targeted at few firms and last only 
two years. Furthermore, premium costs are likely to rise, as the last 
chapter argued. It is therefore not evident that such weak incentives 
will cause many of these firms to reverse their behavior and offer ESI. 
Table 5.3  Small Firms’ Perceived Consequences of Not Offering ESI
Total 
Workforce skills
Firm size
(no. of workers)
Low- 
skilled
High- 
skilled 5–19 20–50
Impacted in at least one of the 
ways belowa
16.1 17.7 1.3** 14.6 30.2**
Worker retention (turnover) 11.4 12.2 0.0** 8.8 24.1**
Worker recruitment 8.4 9.1 0.0** 5.7 21.5**
Worker attitude and performance 8.1 8.4 0.0** 4.8 24.2**
Health of workers 7.2 7.4 0.0** 3.9 23.2**
Absenteeism 4.8 3.5 0.0** 1.6 21.1**
Overall success of business 4.6 7.7 1.3** 4.6 4.3
N (unweighted) 160 60 39 124 36
NOTE: Item-specific nonresponse lowered sample sizes in some cells. The question 
was posed to firms not offering health insurance: “I’d like to ask you some questions 
on the impact NOT offering health insurance has on your workforce. On a scale where 
‘1’ is virtually no impact and ‘5’ is a very large impact, please rate the following . . .” 
Numbers represent the percentage of firms saying that the consequence of not offering 
insurance had either a large or a very large impact (4 or 5). Observations have been 
weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the 
United States with respect to size and industry. ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
a  “Impacted in at least one of the ways below” shows the percentage of firms not offer-
ing ESI that mentioned they were affected in a negative way. Firms might have men-
tioned one of the reasons listed in the table or another reason not covered by the listed 
categories.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007).
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Maxwell’s (2011) simulation using the CHES data shows that the per-
centage of small firms offering ESI would increase from 74.3 percent to 
77.7 percent with tax credits and 1.5 percent premium increases. 
Both descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis suggest differ-
ences between low- and high-skilled firms and the very small (5 to 19 
workers) and larger of the small firms (20 to 50 employees) in their 
motivations for not offering ESI. Low-skilled firms were more likely 
to cite every reason in the cost-too-high motivation for not offering 
ESI than were high-skilled firms, and very small firms were less likely 
than the larger of the small firms to cite them (Table 5.1). Multivariate 
analysis suggests that skill factors override the size factors (Table 5.4). 
I use the number of reasons cited in each factor-identified motivation 
as dependent variables in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with 
workforce skills (high-skilled and low-skilled) and size (fewer than 25 
workers) as independent variables. Results show a positive and signifi-
cant (p ≤ 0.05) coefficient on low-skilled small firms and a negative and 
Table 5.4  Motivations for Not Offering ESI, by Level of Workforce Skills 
and Firm Size
Costs 
too high
Admin. costs 
and worker 
preference
Workforce 
characteristics
Healthy 
workers
Workforce skills
Low-skilled firm 0.516** –0.084 0.078 0.167**
High-skilled firm –0.377* –0.049* –0.453* 0.086
Firm size
Very small (5–19 workers) –0.404* –0.238 –0.596** –0.125
Mean dependent variable 1.944 1.793 1.073 0.202
Range 0–3 0–4 0–3 0–1
N (unweighted) 156 153 156 156
NOTE: Questions only asked of firms not offering health insurance. Item-specific non-
response decreased sample size in the “Administrative costs and worker preference” 
estimation. Numbers reflect estimated OLS coefficients, with the dependent vari-
able reflecting the number of reasons the firm said it undertook in each motivation presented
in Table 5.1. Appendix C provides a definition for variables used in the analysis. 
Observations have been weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the 
proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. * significant 
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007).
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significant (p ≤ 0.10) one on high-skilled firms, suggesting that low-
skilled firms might be more likely to take advantage of the tax credits 
for premiums, and that they are likely to be the firms that are eligible 
for them. 
Low-skilled firms were also more likely to cite worker issues as 
reasons for not offering ESI (Table 5.1). About half of low-skilled firms 
but only about one-quarter of high-skilled firms claimed they did not 
offer ESI because workers could not afford it. Of course, the ACA 
might change this reasoning, as the workers in low-skilled firms might 
become eligible for expanded Medicaid eligibility. OLS estimations 
suggest that high-skilled firms (p ≤ 0.10) and the larger of small firms 
(p ≤ 0.05) were less likely to cite reasons in the worker-characteristic 
motivation than other firms (Table 5.4). Particularly striking is the rela-
tively low percentage of high-skilled firms that cite temporary workers 
(18.9 percent) or high turnover (9.8 percent) as reasons, compared to 
44.2 and 37.2 percent of low-skilled firms. 
A significantly higher percentage of low-skilled firms and of the 
larger (20 to 50 employees) of the small firms gave some indication 
of offering ESI than did high-skilled or very small firms. Low-skilled 
firms and the larger of the small firms had higher percentages of firms 
that expressed negative consequences from not offering ESI (Table 
5.3), which suggests that these firms might be those most likely to be on 
the brink of offering it. About 30 percent of firms with 20 to 50 workers 
perceived consequences from not offering ESI, compared to about 15 
percent of firms with 5 to 19 workers. Only 1.3 percent of high-skilled 
firms felt that not offering ESI had a large impact in any of the above-
mentioned areas.
SMALL FIRMS THAT OFFERED ESI
Chapter 4 provided a detailed discussion of how the ACA might 
increase ESI premiums. Enhanced services, such as more comprehen-
sive coverage of the essential benefit package and the lower out-of-
pocket costs that the ACA requires in plans, might increase premium 
costs for firms. Small firms are not exempt from these requirements. 
Indeed, because the plans small firms offered prior to the ACA often 
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contained less extensive coverage, higher deductibles, and greater 
cost-sharing provisions than those of larger firms (Williams and Lee 
2002), the premium increase for small firms might be greater than for 
large firms, as their prereform plans might be further from the ACA 
requirements. Perhaps because of these potential premium increases, 
the Mercer (2010) survey of 2,800 firms found that about 20 percent of 
small firms (10–499 employees) said they are likely to terminate their 
health plans after 2014, when most of the ACA provisions are imple-
mented. Firms with low-paid workers and high turnover were most 
likely to say they would eliminate their health plans. 
Although the CHES data provide no insight into whether increased 
health care costs might cause small firms to drop ESI coverage, the data 
do allow me to analyze the 16 actions small firms took when health care 
costs increased in the past and to assess how a small firm that keeps its 
coverage might alter its behavior if ESI costs rise, as I did in Chapter 
4 for large firms. I note that about 22 percent of small firms increased 
product price or decreased the quality of the services they provided 
when health care costs increased in the past—about the same propor-
tion as for large firms.
My factor analysis of the actions small firms took when health care 
costs increased in the past (Appendix B provides details) suggests that 
small firms adopted the same five strategies as large firms. I discuss 
these strategies in same three categories as I did for large firms: 1) 
reduce wages or employment access to ESI, 2) reduce the quality of the 
ESI offer, and 3) reduce other benefits. 
Reduce Wages or Access
Even though the ACA will not require small firms to provide ESI to 
employees, we can use the requirement that large firms must make an 
offer to employees working 30 hours per week and having three months 
of tenure as a benchmark by which we can gauge access. In 2005–2006, 
about two-thirds of small firms that offered ESI did not meet this bench-
mark (Table 5.5). Nearly 60 percent (58.8) required employees to work 
more than 30 hours per week, and close to 20 percent (19.7) required 
them to wait longer than three months before receiving an offer. 
When health care costs increased, about 25 percent of small firms 
(31 percent in the larger category of small firms, 20–50 workers) took 
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Table 5.5  Prereform Behaviors of Small Firms Offering ESI, by Skill Level and Firm Size
Total
Workforce skills
Firm size 
(no. of workers)
Low-
skilled
High-
skilled 5–19 20–50
Wages and access 
% not meeting large-firm hours and tenure requirements 66.1 77.5 63.7** 63.0 74.9**
% exactly meeting large-firm hours and tenure requirements 9.4 10.8 6.6** 9.9 8.1**
% with greater access than large-firm requirements 24.5 11.8 29.7** 27.1 17.1**
% requiring more than 30 hours per week worked 58.8 70.5 56.8** 55.7 66.9**
% without a wait period 8.3 0.6 15.7** 9.3 5.5**
% with a wait period of more than 3 months 19.7 30.2 17.6** 20.0 19.0
Quality of ESI offer
Price of ESI for workers
Worker monthly payment, single coverage  ($) 38.00 51.60 35.70 34.80 48.10
Average % premium paid 11.5 12.9 7.4** 10.6 14.0
Average copayment for doctor visit ($) 21.50 21.00 20.00 20.20 25.30
Average % of coinsurance for doctor visit 12.2 a a a a
Average copayment for generic prescription ($) 13.70 13.00 14.40 13.70 13.90
Average % of coinsurance for generic prescription a a a a a
Choice in plans
% that offer more than one plan 45.3 37.6 52.9** 39.7 60.8**
% that offer more than one type of plan 38.5 31.7 45.6** 32.8 54.0**
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Other benefits (% offering)
Paid time benefits
Paid vacation 94.1 87.8 95.7** 93.0 97.3**
Paid holidays 91.7 88.9 94.2** 91.1 93.2**
Paid sick leave 76.0 57.7 85.4** 74.9 79.2**
Supplemental health benefits
Dental 60.9 65.4 67.4 54.2 79.4**
Life insurance 33.5 33.9 35.9 27.8 49.0**
Long-term disability (wage replacement) 28.2 22.6 34.2** 27.0 31.6**
Vision 31.7 39.6 35.6 25.3 49.4**
Long-term health benefits
Long-term health care (e.g., nursing home) 8.6 13.5 13.0 9.3 6.7**
Retiree health 5.7 4.7 6.7 5.9 5.1*
Pension 59.3 55.5 69.0** 56.0 68.5**
Number of non-health benefits 3.6 3.4 3.8** 3.4 3.9**
Number of other health-related benefits 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
N (unweighted) 536 104 185 347 198
NOTE: Item-specific nonresponse reduced the percentages greatly in the “Price of ESI for workers” variables. Non-health benefits include 
retirement, life insurance, paid vacation, holidays, and sick leave. Other health-related benefits include mental health/substance abuse, 
long-term health insurance, and long-term disability, all of which are separate from the health insurance plan. Observations have been 
weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. 
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level.  
a Cell contains fewer than 20 firms.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Table 5.6  Small-Firm Responses to Rising Health Care Costs, 2005–2006
Total
Workforce skills
Firm size 
(no. of workers)
Low-skilled High-skilled 5–19 20–50
Percentage taking one action below 61.7 56.1 65.9** 59.8 66.4**
Wages and access 25.2 22.7 27.1* 23.1 31.0**
Workforce costs 21.9 17.5 24.0** 20.0 26.9**
Give fewer raises or reduce wages 17.2 13.1 18.0** 15.3 22.3**
Reduce workforce 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.5 13.2**
Increase workers not eligible for benefits 6.2 2.6 6.3** 3.7 13.0**
Access to benefits 6.1 8.9 4.9** 4.9 9.4**
Increase months to receive benefits 4.6 7.4 2.6** 3.7 7.3**
Increase hours to receive benefits 2.4 2.0 2.5* 2.2 2.8**
Quality of ESI offer 51.7 45.9 57.5** 48.6 59.8**
Worker price of ESI 41.4 36.1 42.2** 37.0 52.8**
Increase worker payment for single coverage 31.0 22.2 29.5** 27.2 40.8**
Increase worker payment for family coverage 21.4 23.1 15.7** 17.5 31.9**
Increase copayment or coinsurance 21.4 23.5 16.0** 17.6 31.7**
ESI choice 30.2 28.1 36.3** 28.4 35.0**
Change health insurance carriers 23.2 21.8 30.7** 22.7 24.6
Decrease variety of health plans 12.8 9.8 14.4** 12.1 14.9**
Decrease number of health plans 7.0 6.5 5.5 7.5 5.5**
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Benefits 13.9 12.3 8.2** 12.8 16.9**
Decrease health insurance coverage 9.5 7.4 5.2** 8.6 12.1**
Decrease non-health benefits 6.3 7.1 2.8** 6.5 5.8
Decrease dental insurance 3.8 4.9 3.2** 3.5 4.6**
Decrease vision insurance 3.4 3.3 2.0** 2.3 6.2**
Decrease other health-related coverage 1.9 2.0 0.7** 1.4 3.2**
Increase prices 22.0 24.3 16.9 21.2 24.2*
N (unweighted) 529 103 179 342 187
NOTE: The following question was posed to firms offering health insurance: “In the past 3 to 5 years, in response to rising health care 
costs, did your firm . . . ?” Observations have been weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the 
United States with respect to size and industry. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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an action that reduced wages or access to ESI (Table 5.6). About 22 
percent gave fewer raises or reduced wages. A significantly lower per-
centage of low-skilled than of high-skilled firms reduced real wages, 
which we would anticipate, since low-skilled workers have a stronger 
preference for wages than for benefits. 
Very small firms were less likely than other firms to adopt a general 
strategy of reducing wages or access when health care costs increased. 
Because a lower percentage of very small firms than of the larger cat-
egory of small firms (63 vs. 75 percent) did not meet the access bench-
marks set by the ACA (Table 5.5), their decreased likelihood of chang-
ing access would cause access rates among small firms of different sizes 
to converge (Table 5.6). The negative and significant (p ≤ 0.05) OLS 
coefficient for very small firms confirms the association (Table 5.7). 
Decrease Quality of the Offer
Small firms might reduce the quality of the ESI offer in the pre-
reform period in a number of ways. For one, they could reduce the 
Table 5.7  Coefficients of Small Firms’ Responses to Rising Health Care 
Costs, by Workforce Skills and Size, 2005–2006
 Wages and 
access
Quality of 
ESI offer Benefits
Workforce skills
Low-skilled firm –0.130 –0.291 –0.105
High-skilled firm –0.047 –0.101 –0.192
Very small firm (5–15 workers) –0.275 –0.486 –0.096
Mean-dependent variable 0.400 1.145 0.247
Range-dependent variable 0–5 0–6 0–5
N (unweighted) 522 489 516
NOTE: Questions were only asked of firms that offered ESI. Item-specific nonresponse 
decreased sample size in some estimations. Numbers reflect estimated OLS coeffi-
cients, with the dependent variable reflecting the number of responses that the firm 
said it undertook in the strategy as presented in Table 5.6. Appendix C provides a 
definition for all variables used in the analysis. Observations have been weighted 
so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United 
States with respect to size and industry. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant 
at the 0.05 level. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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choice in plans. About 45 percent offered workers a choice in health 
care plans, with close to 39 percent offering them a choice in the type of 
plan they could select (Table 5.5). The availability of choice increased 
with skill level and size. High-skilled firms were about 1.4 times more 
likely to offer workers a choice in plans than were low-skilled firms, 
and the larger of the small firms were about 1.5 times more likely to 
offer choice than were very small firms. The quality of the offer might 
also be reduced by decreasing the percentage of the premium that the 
firm paid or by increasing copayments or coinsurance requirements. 
Few differences existed between small firms with different levels of 
workforce skill or size along these dimensions in the prereform period 
(the lower-percentage premium paid by high-skilled than low-skilled 
firms being the exception). 
When health care costs increased, about half of the small firms took 
an action that decreased the quality of the ESI offer (Table 5.6). Some 
41.4 percent increased the worker’s price of ESI, and about 30 percent 
decreased choice.13 While descriptive statistics suggest that both high-
skilled and the larger category of small firms were more likely adopt 
this strategy when health care costs increased in the past, multivariate 
analysis (Table 5.7) suggests that, once such analysis holds skills con-
stant, only the size differential remains. 
Reduce Benefits
I used the factor-analysis-defined groupings of benefits, described 
in Chapter 4, to describe the types of benefits small firms offer (Table 
5.5). Descriptive analysis suggests that a great deal of variation exists in 
the benefits that small firms offer, and that systematic differences exist 
according to both the skills of a firm’s workforce and its size. Over nine-
tenths of small firms offered paid vacation and holidays, and over three-
quarters offered paid sick leave. Both high-skilled and the larger of the 
small firms offered significantly (p ≤ 0.05) higher levels of each paid-
time benefit than low-skilled and very small firms. Although about 60 
percent of small firms offered dental insurance and pensions, only about 
30 percent offered other supplemental health benefits, and fewer than 
9 percent offered long-term pensions. Few differences existed between 
low- and high-skilled firms in these offerings (long-term disability and 
pension being the exceptions). Size differences did exist, however, as 
122   Maxwell
the larger of the small firms offered significantly more supplemental 
health benefits and pension benefits but fewer long-term health benefits. 
About 14 percent of small firms took an action that reduced ben-
efits when health care costs increased, with a larger percentage of low-
skilled and very small firms taking this action (Table 5.6). OLS analysis 
suggests that, when size is held constant, the workforce-skills influ-
ence affects whether firms adopt a strategy of reducing benefits when 
health care costs increase (Table 5.7). The negative and significant 
(p ≤ 0.05) coefficient on high-skilled firms confirms the description that 
they are less likely than other firms to adopt a strategy of cutting ben-
efits when health care costs increase. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The ACA was designed to encourage ESI coverage in small firms 
by building state-run exchanges that would simulate the advantages of 
the large-group market, establish common rules for offering and pricing 
certified health benefit plans, and provide a vehicle for giving tax cred-
its on a sliding scale for ESI premiums to small businesses having two 
qualifying conditions: 1) 25 or fewer full-time-equivalent employees 
and 2) average annual wages of no more than $50,000. The hope was 
to decrease the effective cost of ESI for small firms, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that they will offer it.
How likely are small firms that don’t offer ESI to change their 
behavior with the ACA and offer it? The CHES data suggest the leg-
islation might not change their behavior. Although about 30 percent of 
small firms indicated their potential to offer ESI in the years before or 
after the surveying and a relatively large percentage cited financial dif-
ficulties and administrative burdens as reasons for not offering ESI, the 
CHES data suggest that only about 17 percent of all small firms and 31 
percent of small firms not offering health benefits might be eligible for 
the tax credit for premiums. Furthermore, only about 16 percent of small 
firms said that not offering ESI held negative consequences, which sug-
gests that many firms perceive few benefits to offering ESI. The lack 
of perceived negative ramifications from not offering ESI raises doubts 
about the ACA’s ability to incentivize small firms to offer it. 
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What are the potential consequences of ACA-induced ESI premium 
increases for small firms that currently offer ESI? Although the CHES 
data do not contain information that would allow us to assess whether 
firms are likely to drop ESI with premium increases, they do allow us to 
assess changes that might affect worker wages or employment access, 
quality of the ESI offer, and other benefits and disparities between low-
wage and high-wage workers. My analysis suggests that small firms 
that offered ESI might exhibit many of the same behaviors as larger 
firms if the ACA increases premium costs. When health care costs 
increased in the past, about 62 percent of small firms took an action 
that directly affected the nature of worker compensation or employ-
ment access to ESI. The typical strategy was to decrease the quality of 
the ESI offer—about half of all small firms took such an action. About 
41 percent raised the price of ESI to workers, and about 30 percent 
decreased the choice of plans. About 25 percent of small firms reduced 
wages or workforce access to ESI; within this 25 percent, about 17 
percent gave fewer raises or reduced wages, 10 percent reduced the 
workforce, and 6 percent reduced access (firms could select more than 
one action). About 14 percent of small firms reduced benefits in the past 
when health care costs increased. 
Data in the CHES showed few disparities in quality of the ESI offer 
between low-wage and high-wage small firms in the prereform period 
(other than in choice of plans), unlike the differences shown for large 
firms. The CHES also provided no indication that this parity might 
change in the postreform period, in contrast to the convergence between 
low- and high-skilled small firms in terms of the access to and quality of 
the ESI offer suggested for large firms. Very small firms were less likely 
to adopt a strategy of reducing wages, access, and quality of offer when 
health care costs increased, which might reduce existent prereform dif-
ferentials between firms of different sizes. 
The CHES data suggest that increased ESI premium costs might 
create a divergence in the offer of other benefits to low-wage and high-
wage workers in small firms, as it did in large firms (Chapter 4). High-
skilled small firms were less likely than other small firms to adopt a 
strategy of decreasing benefits when health care costs increased, just 
like their large-firm equivalents. Because high-skilled small firms 
offered higher levels of paid time, supplemental health, and pension 
benefits than low-skilled small firms in the prereform period and were 
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less likely to decrease them with ESI cost increases, the existing dis-
parities in benefits offered to low-wage and high-wage workers might 
increase if the ACA increases health care costs for small firms. 
Notes
 1. Premium differences do not always translate into a higher level of coverage in 
small firms. Indeed, the lower quality of ESI offered (e.g., higher deductibles and 
cost-sharing provisions) places average premiums below those for large firms 
(Williams and Lee 2002).
 2.  The ACA counts employees in full-time-equivalent units and the CHES counts 
employees as the number of workers. Two part-time workers in the CHES could 
count as one worker using the ACA definition.
 3. A separate SHOP exchange might better serve the administrative needs of small 
firms (e.g., processing applications for coverage and subsidies, billing enrollees, 
doing financial reconciliation, paying commissions, developing and maintaining 
Web sites, performing marketing and outreach, and providing broker and human 
resources training). An integrated exchange might be more cost-effective in areas 
like certifying and rating qualified plans and allowing movement between indi-
vidual and ESI plans.
 4. The ACA allows states to adopt more stringent requirements for the structure, 
plans, and information than are set forth in its legislation. 
 5. Grandfathered and self-insured plans are generally exempt. 
 6. The premium charged for individuals aged 64 or older is capped at three times the 
premium for an 18-year-old with the same coverage. The premium difference is 
capped at 1.5 for those using tobacco. The same pricing standards apply to all fully 
insured large group plans in and out of the exchange in states that permit large-
group plans in their exchange. Self-insured plans are exempt.
 7. The full credit is available to firms with 10 or fewer workers and average annual 
wages of $25,000 or less. The size of the credit phases out as the average wage and 
firm size increases, up to $50,000 and 25 or fewer full-time workers. The sliding-
scale tax credit was worth up to 35 percent of a small firm’s premiums in 2010 
and is worth up to 50 percent starting in 2014. Firms can claim the credit for 2010 
through 2013 and for any two years thereafter. 
 8. We eliminated four reasons from our analysis. “The firm has (or had) a seriously 
ill worker” was eliminated because only 0.9 percent of firms mentioned that it 
had a large impact on their decision not to offer insurance and, when the reason 
was included in the analysis, it loaded on a separate factor that did not appear to 
be highly correlated with other reasons. “Don’t know where to go for information 
on starting a health insurance plan” was eliminated for the same reason (only 2 
percent of firms mentioned it as having a large impact on their decision). “Firm 
can attract good workers without offering it” was eliminated as it seemed duplica-
tive of “Don’t need to offer health insurance to recruit and retain good workers” 
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and had a slightly larger number of missing values. “Workers are covered under 
another plan” was eliminated because it did not load on any factor using our crite-
ria of 0.5 and had a negative correlation with our factors. This reason seems to be 
supposition and was behaviorally subsumed under the “Don’t need to offer health 
insurance to recruit and retain good workers” reason.
 9. This percentage is higher than the 22 percent of firms in the Small Employer 
Health Benefits Survey (Fronstin and Helman 2003) that said they were somewhat 
likely to offer ESI. That survey was fielded about four years before the CHES to 
firms with 2 to 50 employees.
 10. The percentage is about the same as that shown in the 2002 Small Employer 
Health Benefits Survey (Fronstin and Helman 2003) and is consistent with work-
ers sorting among firms to match their preference for the structure of compensa-
tion (Lehrer and Pereira 2007). 
 11. About 60 percent of low-skilled and 80 percent of high-skilled small firms offered 
ESI, and about 72 percent of very small firms (5 to 19 workers) and 82 percent of 
the larger category of small firms (20 to 50 workers) offered it.
 12. The number of CHES firms not offering ESI at the time of surveying but having 
offered it in the previous five years is far lower than the 27 percent having this 
status in the 2010 EHBS (Claxton et al. 2010).
 13. These numbers contrast with estimates from the 2002 Small Employer Health 
Benefits Survey that 19 percent of small firms (2 to 50 workers) made changes to 
their health plans following cost increases (Fronstin and Helman 2003).
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Health Policy and Firm Behavior
The lack of universal access to high-quality, affordable health care 
that had periodically commanded center stage in public policy dis-
cussions over the past three decades culminated in the passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), as amended by the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. Discussions 
and debate about health care reform may have even intensified after its 
passage, and the heated arguments over the efficiency, consequences, 
and legality of the legislation have kept it in the headlines. Indeed, at 
the time this book went to press, members of the Supreme Court were 
writing majority and dissenting opinions for the Court’s ruling—as yet 
unknown—on the constitutionality of the ACA. The only issue the leg-
islation seems to have removed from discussion is adoption of a pub-
licly structured health care system, for the ACA firmly grounded reform 
in the existing tripartite system of access to health care and did not 
include an option for publicly provided health care.
During the prereform period, individuals in the market for health 
care were faced with the question, “Do I qualify for any of the three 
ways of obtaining health insurance?” They might have gained access to 
health care through the workplace if they were part of the labor market 
and belonged to a firm that offered employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). 
They might have gained coverage through the government if they met 
its requirements for coverage (generally age and income restrictions). 
Finally, they might have gained coverage in the private, nongroup mar-
ket if they were in good health and could afford the premiums. 
Most nonelderly adults considered ESI to be the preferred coverage, 
because of its improved risk pools for insurers and its tax savings for 
both firms and workers. Individuals generally received employment-
based coverage if they met three conditions: 1) had access to employ-
ment in a firm that offered insurance, 2) were eligible to receive the 
offer, and 3) could afford the premiums. While about 60 percent of the 
nonelderly population gained access to health care through employ-
ment, disparities existed in its coverage. Coverage rates stood 27 per-
cent higher for college-educated workers than for school-educated 
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workers in 2007 (Gould 2008) and 47 percent higher for workers earn-
ing more than $15 per hour than for those earning less than $10 per hour 
in 2003 (Collins et al. 2004). 
Health care access through the government provided coverage for 
most of the elderly and low-income populations. These groups gen-
erally qualified for health insurance under federal programs such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, military health care, and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP), and under some state programs. Over 60 
percent of the elderly and about half of the nonelderly below the pov-
erty line received health care through the government (EBRI 2003). 
Only about 19.4 percent of all nonelderly individuals gained access to 
health care through the government (Fronstin 2009). 
Individuals could also gain access to health care by purchasing 
insurance from a private company. However, only about 6 percent of 
the nonelderly used private, nongroup coverage for health care access 
(Fronstin 2009). Experience rating in this market left premiums to fluc-
tuate by factors associated with expected health care costs (e.g., age, 
gender, health status, occupation, and geographic location) and disqual-
ified individuals in poor health from coverage (Fronstin 2009). 
This tripartite system left many without continuously available cov-
erage. In 2009, about 17 percent of the U.S. population was uninsured 
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2010). Although as many as 43 
percent of the uninsured nonelderly adult population might have been 
voluntarily uninsured (O’Neill and O’Neill 2009), others were victims 
of the structural cracks in the system and were unable to obtain insur-
ance. They fell short in three areas: 1) they did not have access to labor 
markets or a firm that offered ESI, 2) they either did not qualify for 
government coverage or were unhealthy and could not obtain private 
insurance, and 3) they could not afford premiums.
Although the ACA kept the general tripartite structure for health 
care access in place, it fundamentally altered each of the three sources 
of coverage in order to accomplish three goals: 1) increase access to 
health care, 2) increase the quality of health care, and 3) contain costs. 
To achieve these goals, the policy modified existing health programs, 
created new structures—most notably the state-run exchanges—and 
integrated revised programs into new structures. I will discuss each of 
these three goals in order.
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Increase Access to Health Care 
The ACA contains several provisions designed to expand access 
to health care coverage in each segment of the tripartite system. In 
the employment segment, the ACA developed incentives for firms to 
offer insurance. It requires large firms, those with at least 50 full-time-
equivalent employees, to offer ESI to employees who work 30 hours 
per week and have at least 90 days’ tenure or face potential penalties 
for not offering it. Firms that meet three conditions—1) fewer than 25 
full-time employees, 2) payroll and average annual wages of no more 
than $50,000, and 3) contributions of at least 50 percent of the total 
premium—become eligible for tax credits of up to 50 percent of the 
employer contribution for purchasing coverage in one of the exchanges. 
In the government segment, the ACA created a uniform minimum 
eligibility threshold for Medicaid that covers all individuals under age 
65 with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level. It allows 
individuals to select coverage through a variety of plans provided by 
private insurers within an exchange.1 Individuals who earn between 133 
and 400 percent of the federal poverty level become eligible for tax 
credits to offset insurance premiums in the exchange.
In the private, nongroup segment, the ACA expanded access 
through provisions that generally prohibit insurers from taking any of 
four actions: 1) rescinding coverage once it is offered, 2) excluding 
individuals (and businesses) from purchasing coverage, 3) charging 
higher premiums based on health status and gender, and 4) denying 
coverage for reasons such as preexisting conditions. 
Increase the Quality of Health Care
The ACA contains several provisions to increase the quality of the 
plans. Plans sold through the exchanges and in small-group markets 
must provide a federally determined essential benefit package that 
includes a whole host of coverages: preventive and primary care, emer-
gency, hospital, physician, outpatient, maternity and newborn care, 
pediatric (including dental and vision), medical/surgical care, prescrip-
tion drugs, lab, and treatment for mental health and substance abuse. 
Coverage in all new plans cannot contain cost-sharing provisions for 
preventive services, which include blood pressure, diabetes, and cho-
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lesterol tests; many cancer screenings; certain types of health coun-
seling; certain routine vaccines; flu and pneumonia shots; pregnancy 
counseling, screening, and vaccines; and well-baby and well-child vis-
its. Policies cannot contain annual or lifetime limits on benefits. In the 
employment segment, provisions standardized ESI quality by expand-
ing the nondiscrimination rule to include firms with third-party insur-
ers and implementing a 40 percent excise tax on high-end (known as 
“Cadillac”) plans. 
Contain Costs
The ACA contains several provisions designed to contain costs. 
States must review premium increases above a threshold and exclude 
plans with unjustified increases from the exchanges. Insurers must offer 
rebates to enrollees if plans spend less than 80 (small-group market) or 
85 (large-group market) percent of the premium on medical care. Provi-
sions are aimed at increasing competition in the exchanges and better-
ing risk pools by including healthy individuals through the individual 
requirement to carry insurance.
Most individuals in the market for health care once the legislation is 
fully implemented will ponder a new question: “Which source of health 
care coverage best meets my needs?” Indeed, they and their dependents 
will be compelled to face this new question, because the ACA requires 
them to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage or pay 
a penalty for noncompliance.2 Minimum essential coverage can be any 
government, individual (private), or employer plan that meets the stan-
dards of the exchange.
As Figure 6.1 illustrates, individuals with the option of selecting 
ESI have the most choice in the post-ACA period. For most, ESI must 
be the most attractive option, as firms heavily subsidize the premium. 
Still, some individuals might find better options in the private market 
outside the exchanges (e.g., individuals under age 30 that want only 
high-deductible insurance), while others might find better options in the 
exchanges (e.g., those receiving premium credits) or in the government 
(e.g., low-wage workers eligible for Medicaid). 
Individuals without access to ESI have the option of purchasing 
coverage in or outside the exchanges. Because insurers are generally 
restricted from disqualifying individuals who wish to purchase insur-
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Figure 6.1  Decision Making for Individuals after the ACA Reform
NOTE: Thicker boxes indicate all-inclusive classifications of individuals. Dashed line indicates a coordination role. Individuals are exempt 
from the individual requirement to pay a penalty for not having essential coverage if they have no affordable insurance option. 
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ance and from differentiating between premiums using experience rat-
ing, the ability to procure coverage depends mainly on the ability to 
make premium payments. Individuals with low income might qualify 
for premium credits in the exchanges or for Medicaid coverage through 
the government. The elderly still qualify for government coverage 
through Medicare. 
Simulations suggest that individuals who are uninsured will most 
likely be composed of five groups (Buettgens and Hall 2011). Some 
would be eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled (about 37 percent). 
Such individuals would mostly likely be singles without dependents and 
relatively young. Some would be undocumented immigrants (about 25 
percent), although about half of these individuals might have incomes 
below 138 percent of the federal poverty level and be eligible for emer-
gency care coverage by Medicaid. Some (about 16 percent) would be 
exempt from the individual mandate because they would not have an 
affordable insurance option. Such individuals would probably be older 
with relatively low incomes. A few (about 8 percent) would choose to 
be uninsured even though they are eligible for affordable subsidized 
coverage in the exchanges. These individuals would mostly be younger 
singles without dependents. And some (about 15 percent) would choose 
to be uninsured despite having an affordable private insurance option. 
Such individuals would most probably have relatively high incomes 
and be in families with dependents.
ANALYZING INCENTIVES FOR FIRMS TO OFFER ESI 
This research used a benefit-cost framework to describe how firms 
structure their ESI offer. I argued that firms having a high proportion 
of workers with relatively high levels of skills will benefit more from 
offering health insurance than firms having a high proportion of work-
ers with relatively low levels of skills. Although most workers have an 
incentive to take compensation in the form of health insurance instead 
of wages because the coverage is often less expensive than what they 
could obtain in the private market and it is not subject to income tax-
ation, the value of ESI is not equivalent for all workers. High-wage 
workers generally gain more from receiving nonwage compensation 
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than low-wage workers. Their generally higher level of income pro-
duces greater tax savings than the savings for low-wage individuals. For 
low-wage workers, the increased probability of eligibility for govern-
ment health coverage and lower marginal tax rates often produce fewer 
benefits from receiving ESI as compensation. Because high (low)-wage 
workers are often high (low)-skilled workers and because firms have 
an incentive to structure their compensation package to attract workers 
with the skills those firms need in production, firms with high-skilled 
workforces have an incentive to offer health insurance, while firms with 
low-skilled workforces have an incentive to offer increased wages in 
lieu of ESI. 
This study explored the relationship between workforce skills and 
ESI and how that relationship affected the disparities in the ESI offer 
in the prereform period. It used that relationship to predict how firms 
might change their ESI offer after the ACA is implemented, and it 
assessed how those changes might affect prereform ESI disparities. It 
predicted how firms might change their offer when the provisions of 
the ACA are implemented in three general areas: 1) wages or employ-
ment, 2) quality of the ESI offer, and 3) other benefits. It used education 
and work experience to measure skills, as opposed to the more typical 
use of wages, which provided a clean separation between skills and 
compensation. 
The study drew heavily from the California Health and Employment 
Surveys (CHES) data of 1,427 firms which were randomly selected 
throughout 27 northern California counties. Information was obtained 
from Fall 2005 through December 2006, a period reflecting a fairly 
stable economy—prior to the Great Recession—and following a period 
of rapidly increasing health care costs. The CHES data are uniquely 
appropriate for studying the correlations between workforce skills and 
health benefits, since they contain detailed information on a firm’s ESI 
offer, the skills of its workforce, its offer of other benefits, its size, and 
a host of other firm characteristics. The CHES also contains a series of 
questions on how firms that offered ESI responded to increased health 
care costs in the past and a series of questions on the reasons firms did 
not offer ESI. 
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FIRMS’ PREREFORM BEHAVIOR
The CHES data suggests that about 78 percent of firms with five 
or more workers offered ESI in 2005–2006. The offer, however, was 
generally structured so that not all workers in the firm could receive 
it. About 90 percent of firms required workers to wait for some period 
of time before they could receive an ESI offer, and about 57 percent 
required an employee to work more than 30 hours a week. Only about 
12 percent offered ESI to temporary or seasonal workers. The ESI offer 
most often required workers to pay a percentage of the premium and 
did not allow workers a choice in the plan in which they could enroll. 
Workers paid 10 percent or less of the premium in only about 60 percent 
of firms and had a choice in the plan offered in about half. Large firms, 
defined as those with at least 51 workers, were more likely than small 
firms to offer ESI, to provide more workers with access to it, to provide 
workers with a choice in plans, and to offer benefits other than ESI, 
although they also had workers pay a larger proportion of the premium. 
THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
INSURANCE IN THE PREREFORM PERIOD
The plethora of information in the CHES about the firm and its ESI 
offer allowed me to draw three key insights about a firm’s behavior with 
regard to ESI in the prereform period. 
1. The ESI offer differed between firms with a majority of low-
skilled workers and those with a majority of high-skilled workers. 
The disaggregated analysis of a firm’s ESI behavior by the skills of 
its workforce allowed me to assess the behavioral differences between 
low-skilled and high-skilled firms. I used these differences to explain 
the ESI disparities between low-wage and high-wage workers and gain 
important insights about prereform behavior which indicate that the 
ACA, once it is fully implemented, is likely to affect disparities in ESI 
and other forms of compensation. 
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The CHES data supported the proposition that the ESI offer dif-
fered between high-skilled and low-skilled firms by showing that firms 
with a majority of their positions filled by low-skilled workers were 
less likely than other firms to offer insurance, placed more restrictions 
on who might receive the offer, and made a lower-quality ESI offer 
(defined as worker cost of coverage and choice in plans). Consider that 
only 67 percent of firms with a majority of low-skilled positions offered 
ESI compared to 83 percent of firms with a majority of high-skilled 
positions. Thus, we conclude that individuals working in low-skilled 
firms, who are likely to be disproportionately low-wage workers, are 
less likely to receive an offer of ESI than workers in high-skilled firms, 
who are likely to be disproportionately high-wage workers. 
Even if a particular low-skilled firm offered ESI, the CHES data 
suggest that workers were less likely to receive an offer than workers 
in a high-skilled firm offering ESI because of more restrictive access to 
the offer. Workers in low-skilled firms had to work, on average, 33.3 
hours per week and wait nearly 3.6 months before they could receive an 
offer, while workers in high-skilled firms only had to work 31.2 hours 
per week and wait 2.9 months before receiving an offer. Workers in 
only 3.5 percent of low-skilled but 18.5 percent of high-skilled firms 
did not have to wait before they could receive an ESI offer. In addi-
tion, a higher percentage of workers in low-skilled firms are part-time 
or temporary, which generally makes them ineligible for an ESI offer.
Workers in low-skilled firms generally received a lower quality 
ESI offer, if they received an offer, than workers in high-skilled firms. 
Workers in low-skilled firms paid, on average, 13.3 percent of the pre-
mium, while workers in high-skilled firms paid, on average, 7.8 per-
cent. Workers in about half of the low-skilled firms and three-quarters 
of the high-skilled firms paid no more than 10 percent of the premium. 
Furthermore, workers in low-skilled firms generally had less choice in 
plans. Only about 44 percent of low-skilled firms but about 58 percent 
of high-skilled firms offered workers a choice in plans. 
Workers in low-skilled firms also were offered fewer benefits, 
other than ESI, than workers in high-skilled firms. A greater percentage 
of high-skilled than low-skilled small firms offered workers the paid 
time benefits (vacation, holidays, and sick leave) that would facilitate 
attending to preventive and sick care visits (for example), and a greater 
percentage of high-skilled than low-skilled large firms offered work-
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ers supplemental health benefits (dental, life insurance, and long-term 
disability) that complement health insurance in fostering overall health 
care. 
2. When health care costs increased, the vast majority of firms 
that offered ESI responded with actions that affected workers’ 
compensation. When firms that offered ESI faced rising health care 
costs in the prereform period, they generally adopted one of three dif-
ferent coping strategies, all of which directly affected their workforce: 
1) decrease wages and access to the offer, 2) decrease the quality of the 
ESI offer, or 3) decrease other benefits. About 71 percent of all firms 
took one of these actions. In addition, about one-fifth increased prod-
uct price or reduced the quality of their service. The typical response 
firms took was to reduce the quality of the ESI offer. Most of the qual-
ity reduction came by passing at least some of the cost on to workers 
through increased premium payments or increased cost-sharing. Nearly 
70 percent of large firms and 40 percent of small firms increased the 
price workers paid for ESI when health care costs increased. About 20 
percent of large firms and 25 percent of small firms reduced wages or 
access to the offer, and about 14 percent of large firms and 22 percent 
of small firms reduced wages or gave fewer wage increases. About 11 
percent of large firms and 14 percent of small firms reduced benefits 
when health care costs increased. 
3. Most small firms that did not offer ESI felt its cost was too 
high for the firm or its workers. Virtually all large firms (97 percent) 
offered ESI in the prereform period, and the ACA requires all of them to 
offer it in the postreform period or potentially pay financial premiums. 
Because large firms are provided with a negative incentive to offer ESI, 
it is small firms that need to be provided with positive incentives to of-
fer it. When the CHES asked firms why they did not offer ESI, small 
firms offered four general categories of reasons: 1) costs (including ad-
ministrative costs), 2) worker preference, 3) workforce characteristics, 
and 4) healthy workers. About 83 percent felt the cost of offering ESI 
was too high, about 60 percent felt the firm was too small or new to 
offer it, and over 50 percent thought their workers could not afford it. 
About 60 percent cited their worker characteristics—short tenure or the 
ability to get good workers without it—as a rationale for not offering 
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ESI, and about 20 percent said they had healthy workers that did not 
need ESI. The CHES data suggest that nearly one-third of small firms 
not offering ESI might be on the bubble about offering it, as about 30 
percent had shopped for it in the past year, which is about the same 
percentage that were at least somewhat likely to offer it in the next two 
years. Still, a sizable proportion might not consider offering workers 
health insurance, as only about 16 percent perceived negative conse-
quences from not offering ESI. 
FIRMS’ BEHAVIOR AFTER THE ACA
Such information provides the backdrop for assessing the changes 
that the ACA might induce in the ESI offer, for it allows us to align the 
information in the CHES data about a firm’s characteristics and its ESI 
offer with the ACA incentives to change behavior. The ACA contains a 
plethora of provisions that might cause a firm’s ESI costs to increase. 
The ACA was designed to increase the number of workers covered by 
ESI in large firms and to expand the services covered in all plans, which 
is likely to increase premium prices. Because I believe that such changes 
are likely to increase ESI costs for firms that offer ESI after the ACA is 
fully implemented, I use the CHES data to address the question, “What 
are the potential consequences of ACA-induced ESI cost increases?” 
Although the CHES data do not contain information that would allow 
us to infer whether firms might drop ESI once the ACA is implemented, 
they do allow us to juxtapose past behavior and the provisions of the 
ACA, thus producing four key insights that are likely to affect health 
outcomes when the ACA is fully implemented.
1. The ACA will influence the behavior of virtually all firms that 
offer ESI. The ACA requires large firms to offer ESI to employees that 
work at least 30 hour a week and have at least three months of tenure or 
face potential penalties. CHES data suggest that about 56.5 percent of 
large firms did not meet these requirements in 2005–2006. Only about 
2.4 percent failed to meet the requirement because they did not offer 
ESI. The remainder failed to meet it because the offer they extended did 
not meet the coverage requirements. Nearly half of all large firms of-
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fered ESI only to employees that worked more than 30 hours per week, 
and about 13 percent made workers wait longer than three months. If 
these firms alter their ESI offer to meet the requirements of the legisla-
tion, the offer of health care will be extended to far more workers. 
The ACA also included provisions that require plans to contain 
specified services and that require all plans offered in the exchanges or 
small group market to contain an essential benefit package. Thus, all 
firms that offer ESI might eventually be forced to change their plans 
to accommodate the new requirements if their prereform plans do not 
meet the ACA requirements for services covered, although the ACA’s 
grandfathering clause may allow some firms to forestall this change. 
The 2010 EHBS data suggest that at least 95 percent of the largest-
enrollment ESI plans did not meet the ACA’s requirement that plans not 
contain cost-sharing arrangements for primary care. Furthermore, about 
88 percent of the most popular ESI plans did not allow dependents to 
remain on the plan until age 26, an ACA requirement that became effec-
tive in January 2011, and about 66 percent had annual limits for single 
coverage, which, starting in 2014, the ACA does not allow. 
2. The ACA is unlikely to incentivize small firms that do not 
offer ESI to offer it. Although the ACA does not require small firms to 
offer ESI, it provides incentives for them to offer ESI. The exchanges 
were designed to provide small firms with the economies-of-scale ad-
vantages held by large firms, and the tax credits for premiums to very 
small firms (fewer than 25 workers) paying low wages were designed 
to incentivize firms least likely to offer ESI to offer it. The hope is that 
these changes will allow small firms that did not offer ESI to offer it and 
will ease the financial and administrative burdens for small firms that 
do offer it. The 30 percent of small firms that responded that they were 
at least somewhat likely to offer ESI in the two years following their 
CHES surveying (before deliberations on the ACA began), and the ex-
plicit concerns of small firms that did not offer ESI about the premium 
and administrative costs, suggest the ACA’s provisions might have the 
potential to alter behavior. 
Despite these incentives, several pieces of the CHES data suggest 
that small firms that did not offer ESI in the prereform period might not 
offer it after the legislation is implemented. First, few small firms might 
meet the criteria for the tax credit. CHES data suggest that only about 8 
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percent of all small firms and 31 percent of small firms that did not offer 
ESI are both very small (between 5 and 19 workers) and low-skilled, 
which we believe are reasonable proxies for the ACA’s requirements 
that firms have fewer than 25 full-time workers and average annual 
wages below $50,000 to be eligible for a partial tax credit or fewer 
than 10 full-time workers and average annual wages below $25,000 to 
be eligible for the full credit. Because only about 17 percent of small 
firms might be able to take advantage of the tax credits, the ACA’s tax 
credit for premiums will incentivize only a relatively small percentage 
of small firms to offer or expand their ESI offer. Second, about 40 per-
cent of the small firms that dropped ESI coverage did so because it was 
too expensive. If the ACA increases ESI premiums, these firms are not 
likely to offer it without extensive and ongoing tax credits. The ACA’s 
tax credit covers only 50 percent of the premium payment and is avail-
able only for two years. Third, only about 16 percent of small firms that 
did not offer ESI perceived negative ramifications to their actions. This 
suggests that it might be difficult for the ACA to provide incentives that 
would change their behavior, since they perceive that they bear few 
costs from it. 
3. The difference in ESI coverage and quality of the offer made 
to low-wage and high-wage workers is likely to converge when the 
ACA is fully implemented. CHES data show that the coverage rates 
and quality of the ESI were lower for workers in low-skilled firms than 
for workers in high-skilled firms. Workers had a greater choice of plans 
in high-skilled than in low-skilled firms (90 vs. 62 percent) and paid 
lower monthly premiums and copayments for the typical plan selected. 
The data also highlight that a greater percentage of low-skilled than 
high-skilled large firms did not meet the ACA requirements for cover-
age (62 vs. 58 percent). Most of the difference was accounted for by 
the larger percentage of low-skilled firms that required workers to wait 
more than three months before these workers could be offered ESI (15 
vs. 5 percent). 
These prereform differences in coverage suggest that low-wage 
workers might benefit from the expanded coverage required of large 
firms by the ACA. Not only are low-skilled firms less likely to have 
coverage requirements that are consistent with the ACA, they make up 
a disproportionate share of large firms. CHES data suggest that these 
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differences might cause about 12 percent of all low-skilled firms and 
7 percent of all high-skilled firms to expand coverage or face poten-
tial penalties. This greater expansion of coverage in low- than in high-
skilled firms suggests that a greater proportion of low-wage workers 
will gain access to ESI because of the ACA requirements. 
Low-wage workers might also benefit from the ACA incentives 
provided to small firms to offer ESI. Low-skilled firms that did not 
offer ESI before the ACA were more likely than high-skilled firms to 
say they suffered negative consequences from not offering it and to 
express an interest in offering ESI in the future. Nearly 18 percent of 
low-skilled firms that did not offer ESI said that not offering it had a 
large or very large negative impact on some part of their business opera-
tions (compared to 1 percent of high-skilled small firms). Perhaps as a 
result, over 27 percent of low-skilled small firms that did not offer ESI 
said they were at least somewhat likely to offer it next year (compared 
to 20 percent of high-skilled small firms). If low-skilled firms are more 
likely to feel negative consequences from not offering ESI and have 
a greater interest in offering it, they might be more willing to offer it 
with the ACA-provided incentives of tax breaks, the economies of scale 
with the exchanges, and the requirement that individuals have insur-
ance (increased worker demand). 
In contrast, high-wage workers might be the casualties of the ACA’s 
attempt to standardize quality. For one thing, the ACA invokes a 40 
percent excise tax on “Cadillac” plans with premiums above a certain 
threshold (and typically containing low deductibles and expansive ser-
vice coverage). The excise tax might force firms to decrease the plan’s 
quality to avoid the tax or increase the premium price workers pay to 
include the tax. In either case, the quality of the offer from the work-
ers’ vantage point would decrease and, if Cadillac plans are offered 
more in high-skilled than in low-skilled firms, the quality decline would 
affect high-wage workers more than low-wage workers. Furthermore, 
high-skilled large firms were more likely than other large firms to lower 
the quality of their ESI offer when health care costs increased. This 
suggests that, if the ACA increases the ESI costs, high-skilled firms 
might respond by lowering the quality of their offer, which would bring 
it closer to the existent or improved coverage of low-skilled firms by 
reducing the quality of the offer for high-wage workers. 
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4. Disparities in the offer of benefits other than ESI might in-
crease between low-wage and high-wage workers. CHES data sug-
gest that convergence in the coverage and quality of the ESI offer be-
tween low-skilled and high-skilled firms after the ACA is implemented 
might be accompanied by a divergence in the offer of other benefits. 
During the prereform period, workers in low-skilled firms of all sizes 
received fewer benefits than workers in high-skilled firms, particularly 
in the area of paid time (vacation, holidays, and sick leave), supple-
mental health (dental, life, long-term disability, and vision insurance), 
and pensions. When health care costs increased in the past, high-skilled 
firms of all sizes were less likely than other firms to respond in a man-
ner that would decrease their offer of benefits. Given disparities in ben-
efits between low-skilled and high-skilled firms prior to the ACA, and 
the reluctance of high-skilled firms to reduce non-health benefits when 
health care costs increase, any ACA-induced change that increases ESI 
costs might initiate a trajectory of divergence in benefits other than ESI 
between low-skilled and high-skilled firms. As a result, disparities in 
benefits offered to low-wage and high-wage workers would increase. 
CHES data also suggest that large high-skilled firms were less likely 
than other firms to reduce wages and employment, meaning high-wage 
workers might be more sheltered than low-wage workers in these areas 
as well if health care costs increase. 
BEYOND CHES: POSTREFORM CONSIDERATIONS
The CHES data afforded a unique opportunity to assess how the 
ACA might alter a firm’s offer of health insurance, the nature of com-
pensation that it provides workers, and prereform disparities in ESI and 
other benefits. Our analysis of firms’ behavior prior to deliberations at 
the federal level about the ACA and our juxtaposition of past behaviors 
with provisions of the ACA provide thought-provoking insights into the 
potential consequences—both anticipated and unanticipated—that the 
ACA might impart.
The CHES, like all data sets, contains limitations in its ability 
to predict and, like all data sets constructed before enactment of the 
ACA, contains limitations in its ability to assess the ACA’s potential for 
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change. These limitations alone leave several potential consequences of 
the legislation unaddressed or underaddressed. Perhaps the most impor-
tant ESI-related outcome that was not explored in this research is the 
potential for firms that offer ESI to drop it. The CHES data cannot be 
used to examine whether firms will drop ESI, and surveys and reports 
published after the ACA’s passage reach vastly different conclusions 
about its potential impact on firms’ decisions to maintain ESI coverage. 
Indeed, post-ACA predictions about offers are so disparate that almost 
any preconceived opinion of the legislation could be justified using one 
of the studies. Some studies predict dire consequences from the ACA by 
highlighting the potential for vast numbers of firms to drop coverage.
The popular press was quick to publicize the possibility of firms 
dropping ESI when the ACA was enacted (Alonso-Zaldivar 2010). 
Some surveys have shown that about 30 percent of employers will 
definitely or probably drop ESI after 2014 (Singhal, Stueland, and 
Ungerman 2011), when the major provisions are implemented. Other 
surveys have shown that about 29 percent of firms are unsure about 
continued sponsorship of ESI (Towers Watson 2011). Yet other surveys 
have suggested less dire consequences: between a 6 percent (for firms 
with 500 or more workers) and 20 percent (for firms with 10 to 499 
workers) drop in offers (Mercer 2010). Microsimulations have pro-
duced the least dramatic change in offers, ranging from a 2.5 percent 
drop in coverage (Gruber 2010) to a 2 percent increase (Garrett and 
Buettgens 2011) for firms with more than 1,000 workers. More mixed-
method approaches suggest targeted declines in ESI offers in which 
low-wage workers would face the steepest declines, irrespective of firm 
size (Avalere Health 2011).
Predictions about increasing premium prices coming as a result of 
the ACA are as disparate as the predictions about coverage. Urban Insti-
tute simulations (Garrett and Buettgens 2011) suggest that employer 
spending on premiums would be 8.7 percent lower for small firms (100 
or fewer workers) because of SHOP, 11.8 percent higher for firms with 
101 to 1,000 workers, and unchanged for firms with more than 1,000 
workers. Prior to the passage of the ACA, the CBO’s analysis of its 
potential impact suggested that premiums might increase 10 to 13 per-
cent in the nongroup market, 1 to 2 percent in the small-group market, 
and decrease in the large-group market (CBO 2009), although it sur-
mised that the full 40 percent excise tax might be passed on as a pre-
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mium increase for the 60 percent of firms that could potentially reach 
its current thresholds (Towers Watson 2011). All estimates are net of 
cost increases that might come if more workers take the firm’s ESI offer 
with the individual requirement to carry insurance or that might stem 
from increased worker coverage (under the 30 hours a week and three 
months of tenure requirement) or the potential financial penalties. 
Two items should perhaps be noted in the discussion of premium 
increases. First, changes in premium costs might vary from firm to firm 
and depend on employee demographics, current plan design, and the 
health care market in which the firm operates. Firms with plans or cov-
erages that are far from the ACA requirements might see large increases 
in premium payments and health care costs, while those with plans and 
coverages that exceeded the requirements in the prereform period might 
see little change, assuming they do not fall into the Cadillac category. 
Second, the primary restraint on costs lies with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS), in collaboration with state 
insurance departments. The HHS and states are charged with conduct-
ing the annual reviews of “unreasonable increases in premiums” for 
nongrandfathered health plans. States differ in their ability to conduct 
such a review, however. Not all states have the prior approval authority 
to undertake such reviews, and a great deal of variety exists in the prac-
tices for conducting such reviews (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010a). 
Thus, part of ensuring that the review process is effective might be to 
give explicit authority to states to review rates, to provide the regulatory 
resources needed to conduct reviews, and to build a culture of active 
review within all states. 
Arguably, one of the biggest concerns about the success of the ACA 
lies in the sustainability of the centerpiece of the reform, the exchanges. 
The exchanges make sense conceptually. By banding together members 
of the small-group market, they have the potential to emulate the large-
group market in the following ways: create sizable and stable risk pools, 
minimize adverse selection, provide strength in bargaining with insur-
ers, and utilize economies of scale in administration. Yet past efforts 
at creating exchanges have often failed, as they became the victim of 
adverse selection (Jost 2010 provides discussion). Because the ACA 
allows both individual and group markets to function outside its bound-
aries, it did not eliminate the potential for adverse selection within the 
exchanges: low-risk individuals can purchase coverage outside their 
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boundaries, perhaps at a lower price. The case for healthy individuals 
under 30 who want catastrophic coverage outside the exchanges exem-
plifies the worry that exchanges might suffer from adverse selection 
and thus fall victim to the same fate as past exchanges. Still, the leg-
islation contains some provisions that might avert adverse selection in 
the exchanges. Most prominent are the individual requirement to have 
minimal essential coverage, the premium-assistance and tax credits for 
small firms that exist only for exchange plans, the applicability of many 
of the reforms to plans both inside and outside the exchanges, and the 
essential health benefit requirements for all individual and small-group 
plans that are equivalent to a typical employer’s plans. If effective, such 
requirements are likely to create solid risk pools in the exchanges and 
reduce adverse selection in their operation. 
Finally, every policy ever implemented has produced unantici-
pated consequences, and reforms as large as health care reform under 
the ACA are bound to have consequences that are as yet unknown. 
This research hinted at two potential unanticipated (and even undis-
cussed) consequences of the ACA. First, it demonstrated a potential 
for price increases by showing that over 20 percent of CHES firms 
increased their product prices or decreased their service quality with 
past health care cost increases. Second, it highlighted the potential for 
an increased divergence between low-wage and high-wage workers in 
the offer of benefits other than ESI. Because I make no claim of pos-
sessing Nostradamus-like powers, I leave it to future researchers to 
verify these possibilities and to explore the process of identifying other 
consequences. 
Of course, because my study focuses only on ESI, it cannot address 
the plethora of other problems that plagued the prereform tripartite sys-
tem of health care in the United States. Nor can it address the potential of 
the ACA to increase access, quality of the insurance plan or health care, 
and affordability of health insurance through other venues, or to contain 
rising health care costs. All I can do is provide evidence of how the 
incentives placed before firms in the prereform era might have affected 
low-skilled workers and highlight how those incentives might change 
with the passage of the ACA. The debates on health care reform that 
led to the ACA frequently focused on a lack of access to employment-
based insurance among low-wage workers, for such lack of access has 
implications not only for health care but also for economic insecurity. 
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I hope the results of this study can help focus debate on the incentives 
that firms face in offering insurance and the potential consequences of 
these incentives for low-wage workers. Given the public health ramifi-
cations of not ensuring universal health care access and the human capi-
tal potential available from maintaining a healthy workforce, a broader 
perspective must be addressed for the health and wealth of our nation. 
Notes
 1.  Undocumented immigrants are explicitly barred from purchasing coverage in the 
exchanges.
 2.  Exemptions from the requirement exist for individuals who do not earn enough to 
pay income tax or who would spend more than 8 percent of their annual income 
on coverage, recipients of hardship waivers, members of Native American tribes, 
undocumented immigrants, religious objectors, and incarcerated populations.
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Survey Number___________ 
 SC-1
 Health and Employment Survey 
Hello.  My name is <____________> and I am calling from the HIRE Center at Cal State, East Bay.  The 
Upjohn Institute has funded us to conduct academic research on benefits offered to workers in California firms. 
I have just a few questions I would like to ask you. Are you the person with knowledge about benefits and jobs in 
your firm?  (If not, could I talk with someone like the Business Manager or Human Resources Officer that could 
answer these questions?) The questions will only take about 10 to 15 minutes and all information will be strictly 
confidential. Do you have some time now to help us out with our research? Your participation is strictly 
voluntary and you can terminate the survey process at any point. Neither you nor your firm will be identified in 
any reporting of data. Any responses given will be aggregated for reporting purposes only. 
 
TIME: 
(military) 
Began: Ended: Date: 
Surveyor:  
 
County:      
First, I’d like to verify your contact information so we can thank you for participating in our survey. 
Phone 
number: 
 NAICS code (if blank ask what firm does): 
Firm name: 
 
 
Address: 
 
Street: City, state, and zip code: 
Respondent: 
 
 
Position: 
 
 
 
Screening questions:  I’d like to ask you a couple questions to see if you fit into our sampling frame.   
Sc1: Are you a for-profit or nonprofit 
company?  
(Check which.) 
 For profit 
 
 Nonprofit [501(c)(3)] 
 Government
(federal, state, 
city, county)  
END SURVEY 
 Other: 
(verify eligibility before proceeding) 
Sc2: How many workers are there at 
THIS location?  
 1–4 (END SURVEY) 
 5–9 
 10–19 
 20–50 
 51–99 
 100–299 
 300–499 
 500–999 
 1,000+ 
Sc3: Does your firm operate at more than one location?  Yes  No (Start survey) 
Sc3A: Are the locations . . . ? 
 Multinational 
 National 
 Regional 
(western U.S.) 
 California 
 Local 
(northern CA) 
 Other: 
 
Sc3B: Are benefits set at the central  
location or at your location? 
 Central 
location 
 Respondent 
location 
 Respondent 
location  is 
central 
 Other 
(specify): 
Sc3C: How many workers are at 
ALL locations? (Count all workers 
including part-time/full-time, temporary/ 
permanent, that are paid by the firm.) 
 1–4 (END SURVEY) 
 5–9 
 10–19 
 20–50 
 51–99 
 100–299 
 300–499 
 500–999 
 1000–1999 
 2000–4999 
 5000–9999 
 10,000+ 
     
Verify need before proceeding 
Type firm:  (base on who sets benefits) 
 Small 
(5–50) 
 Large 
(51+) 
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Survey Number___________ 
 SC-2
 
Call Log 
Date and time: Notes (e.g., reason not surveyed, when to call back) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
SURVEYOR NOTES: 
 
 
  
 
After survey has been disposed of: 
Circle disposition code 
1. Survey complete 
2. Refusal 
3. Left 15 or more messages 
4. Quota met 
5. Other, specify: 
 
 
Complete Information about the Respondent and Survey 
About the: Gender: Perceived accuracy of survey responses: 
respondent  Male  Female   Accurate  Some inaccuracies (explain) 
About the 
survey: 
Attempts before 
surveyed: 
Minutes: Comments: 
Sign-off 
initials: 
Surveyor: Lead surveyor: Field check: Occupational coding: Data entry: 
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Survey Number___________
1
Section A: Benefits. We would like to ask you some questions about the benefits you offer workers beyond 
those mandated by the government. Please answer yes if your firm offers the benefit or no if it does not.
Does your firm offer workers . . . ?
1. Paid vacation  Yes  No  DK
2. Paid holidays  Yes  No  DK
3. Paid sick leave  Yes  No  DK
4. Flexible hours  Yes  No  DK
5. Shift differentials or premium pay (include dangerous, dirty, and hazardous pay)  Yes  No  DK
6. Nonproduction bonuses (e.g., lump-sum payments, referral bonuses)  Yes  No  DK
7. Severance pay (where needed)  Yes  No  DK
8. Supplemental unemployment plans  Yes  No  DK
9. Life insurance  Yes  No  DK
10. Long-term disability insurance  Yes  No  DK
11. Defined benefit retirement  Yes  No  DK
12. Defined contribution retirement  Yes  No  DK
13. Retiree health coverage (including Supplemental Health Insurance)  Yes  No  DK
13a. (If yes) Does the plan cover workers under age 65?  Yes  No  DK
14. Formal job training (e.g., classes)  Yes  No  DK
15. Financial assistance for education  Yes  No  DK
16. Financial assistance for child care  Yes  No  DK
17. Cafeteria plans in benefit selection (aka Section 125 plans)  Yes  No  DK
17a. (If yes) Is health insurance an option under your cafeteria plan?  Yes  No  DK
18. Does your firm offer health benefits?  Yes  No  DK
18a. (If yes) Are seasonal/temporary workers eligible for health benefits?  Yes  No  DK
18b. (If DK) Can I talk to someone that knows about health benefits? 
(Continue only with a person knowledgeable about health benefits.)
 Yes  No
(END SURVEY)
19. Vision insurance (apart from the health insurance plan)  Yes  No  DK
20. Dental insurance (apart from the health insurance plan)  Yes  No  DK
21. Mental health/substance abuse (outpatient or inpatient, include EAP—Employee Assistance Plans)
(apart from the health insurance plan)
 Yes  No  DK
22. Long-term health care (e.g., nursing home care) (apart from the health insurance plan)  Yes  No  DK
23. Are all workers offered the same benefits?  Yes  No  DK
23a. (If no) What are the differences (e.g., skilled craftsman have long-term disability, professional staff have flexible hours)?
24. Have benefits other than the health plan changed in the last year?  Yes  No  DK
24a. (If yes) How they have changed (e.g., decreased overtime, increased employer payment for pension)?
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Section B: No Health Benefits. Ask only if firms do not offer health benefits (Q18 is No). 
25. Has your firm offered health insurance in the past five years? 
 Yes 
(Go to 
Q25B) 
 No (Go 
to Q25A) 
 DK 
(Go to 
Q25A) 
25a. (If no or DK) Firms not offering health insurance to workers may be affected by rising health 
care costs. How do you think your firm might have been affected by rising health care costs?  
(Go to Q26) 
 
 
 No 
effect 
25b. (If yes) Why did your firm drop its coverage? (READ and check ALL that apply.) 
o Coverage too expensive/ 
cost too much o Too few workers signed 
up/did not want 
o Workers had other 
coverage o Could no longer 
afford coverage 
o No need for 
company to offer it 
o Business not 
doing well o Economy 
o Other: 
26. How likely is it that you will offer health insurance in the next two years?  Very 
likely 
 Somewhat
likely 
 Not 
likely 
27. Has your firm shopped for health insurance in the past year?  Yes  No  DK 
We are interested in knowing why your firm does not offer health insurance. On a scale where 1 is “Not at all 
important” and 5 is “Very important,” please say why your firm does NOT offer health insurance to its workers. 
28. Premiums were too high 
Not at all              Very 
important                  important
    1    2    3    4    5  DK 
29. Worker turnover is too high     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
30. Workers are generally covered under another plan (e.g., by a spouse or parent)     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
31. The firm can attract good workers without offering health insurance     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
32. The firm is too small or new     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
33. The firm has (or had) a seriously ill worker      1    2    3    4    5   DK 
34. Setting up a plan is too complicated and time-consuming     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
35. Revenue is too uncertain to commit to a plan     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
36. Business cannot afford it     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
37. Workers cannot afford it     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
38. Workers are healthy and do not need it     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
39. Workers prefer wages and/or other benefits     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
40. Don’t need to offer a health insurance plan to recruit and retain good workers     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
41. Workers are temporary, part-time, or worker turnover is high     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
42. Don’t know where to go for information on starting a health insurance plan     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
43. What are other reasons for your not offering health insurance: 
 
 
 
 none 
   
Now I’d like to ask you some questions on the impact NOT offering health insurance has on your workforce. On a 
scale where 1 is “Virtually no impact” and 5 is a “Very large impact,” please rate the following: 
44. Worker recruitment 
Virtually no             Very large
   impact               impact 
    1    2    3    4    5   DK 
45. Worker retention (turnover)     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
46. Worker attitude and performance     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
47. The health of your workers     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
48. Absenteeism     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
49. The overall success of your business     1    2    3    4    5   DK 
 
Go to Q82, Section E, Page 5
152   Maxwell
 
 3
 
Section C: Health Care Costs. Ask only if firms offer health benefits (Q18 is Yes). 
 
Because health care costs have risen in the past few years, we are interested in getting your impressions of what 
your firm has done in the past 3–5 years about escalating health care costs. We would like you to answer “Yes” to 
our question if you think the action we mention is one your firm has taken and “No” if it has not. 
 
In response to rising health care costs, did your firm decrease or eliminate . . . ?    
50. Nonhealth benefits (e.g., pensions, vacations)  Yes  No  DK 
51. Health insurance coverage (e.g., services covered like pharmaceuticals)   Yes  No  DK 
52. Vision insurance  Yes  No  DK 
53. Dental insurance  Yes  No  DK 
54. Other health-related coverage (e.g., substance abuse, mental health)  Yes  No  DK 
55. Number of health plans offered to workers  Yes  No  DK 
56. Types of health plans offered to workers (e.g., PPO to HMO)  Yes  No  DK 
In response to rising health care costs, did your firm . . . ?    
57. Change health insurance carriers (e.g., from Blue Shield to Health Net)  Yes  No  DK 
58. Start a health reimbursement arrangement (i.e., HRA)  Yes  No  DK 
59. Start a flexible spending account for workers’ health care expenses (i.e., FSA)  Yes  No  DK 
60. Move to a high-deductible health insurance plan (catastrophic coverage only, a.k.a. 
HDHP) 
 Yes  No  DK 
61. Contribute to a worker’s health savings account (i.e., HSA, medical savings account, MSA)  Yes  No  DK 
In response to rising health care costs, did your firm increase the . . . ?    
62. Amount or percentage of the premium the worker pays for his or her own health 
coverage (i.e., premium paid by worker) 
 Yes  No  DK 
63. Amount or percentage of the premium the worker pays for health coverage for 
other family members 
 Yes  No  DK 
64. Copayment or coinsurance under health coverage (e.g., pharmaceuticals, office visit)  Yes  No  DK 
Health care costs can impact different things other than health benefits. In response to rising health care 
costs, did your firm . . . ? 
65. Increase its prices (or reduce its services)  Yes  No  DK 
66. Give fewer raises or reduce wages  Yes  No  DK 
67. Reduce its workforce (i.e., the number of workers)  Yes  No  DK 
68. Increase the hours a week a worker must work to receive health benefits  Yes  No  DK 
69. Increase the length of time a worker is with the firm before receiving benefits  Yes  No  DK 
70. Use more workers not eligible for health benefits—for example, use more  
part-time, temporary, or outsourced workers or increase the hours or number  
of workers. 
 Yes  No  DK 
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Section D: Health Insurance. Ask only if firms offer health benefits (Q18 is Yes). 
 
We would now like to ask some specific questions about the health insurance you offer to your workers.  
71. Does your firm purchase insurance from a private insurer, are you self-insured, or do you use an MEWA?   
(Check which. If none, ask how to you purchase your health benefits.) 
o Self-insured  o Private market (broker)  o Multiple Employer Welfare Association (MEWA) (e.g., cooperative or alliance, business coalition, employer/welfare 
association, trade or professional association)
o Other: 
 
72. How many different health care plans do you offer workers? #  DK 
73. We would like to know what kinds of plan(s) you offer workers. Do you offer . . . ? (If yes, ask how many.)  
o Conventional  
(includes indemnity) 
#________ 
o Health maintenance 
organization (HMO) 
#_____________ 
o Preferred provider 
organization (PPO) 
#_____________ 
o Point-of-service  
(POS) or hybrid plan 
#_____________ 
o Other: 
______________ 
Surveyor Note: Numbers in Q72 MUST EQUAL all numbers added together in Q73. 
74. We are interested in knowing about the health care plan most workers select. What is the name of the carrier? 
 Kaiser  Aetna  Blue 
Cross 
 Blue 
Shield 
 Catholic 
Health Care 
 Health 
Net 
 United 
Health Care 
 Other: 
75. Is the plan a... ?  Conventional  HMO  PPO  POS/hybrid  Other: 
75a. (If more than one plan) Is this the low cost (to worker) health care plan?  Yes  No  DK  NA 
 
How has it changed in 
past year? 
If it 
changed, 
what was the 
percentage 
change in 
past year?
76. How many months must new workers wait before they can enroll in 
health benefits? months 
 No change 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased %
76a. Comments: 
77. How many hours a week must workers work before they can 
enroll in health benefits? hours 
 No change 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased % 
77a. Comments: 
78. What is the premium the firm pays <TYPICAL PLAN> for the 
single worker? (Surveyor: Note time period: month, year, etc.) 
$ 
per 
 No change 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased % 
78a. Comments: 
79. What is the amount the worker contributes to health insurance 
premiums for coverage for the single worker?  % or $
 No change 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased % 
79a. Comments: 
80. What is the copayment or coinsurance workers pay for a physician 
office visit in <TYPICAL PLAN>?  % or $
 No change 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased % 
80a. Comments: 
81. What is the copayment or coinsurance workers pay for 
pharmaceuticals in <TYPICAL PLAN>?  % or $
 No change 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased % 
       81a. Comments: 
 . . ?
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Section E: Firm characteristics: Ask of everyone. Let’s switch gears for a minute. We would like to 
know a bit more about your firm. 
 
82. In the past year, has your firm’s workforce (at location) . . . ?  Increased  Decreased  Stayed same 
83. In next five years, will your workforce (at location) . . . ? 
(i.e., what are your expectations about future growth?) 
 Increase  Decrease  Stay same 
84. About how many years has your firm been in business? 
(NOT just at this location) 
 Less than 3 
years 
 3–5 years 
 6–10 years 
 11–20 years 
 > 20 years 
 
Ask Q85 to Q91 if firm is “small” (50 or fewer workers). 
85. Do you purchase your health insurance through Pac 
Advantage? 
 Yes  No  DK 
 
We would like to know a little bit about the demographics of your workforce. Can you please tell me what 
percentage of your workforce is . . .  
86. Female?  0–33%  34–66%  67–100%  DK 
87. 25 or under?  0–33%  34–66%  67–100%  DK 
88. 55–64?  0–33%  34–66%  67–100%  DK 
89. Married?  0–33%  34–66%  67–100%  DK 
90. How many dependents, on average, does a worker have, including his or her spouse?                                    #   
91. In the past year, how has the demographic composition of workers changed (age, dependents, and gender)? 
 
  No change 
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We are almost done . . . To help us find out about more specific information about the types of workers in positions at different 
levels, we would like to ask a few questions about one specific job at each level. For this, we would like you to think about the typical 
job that someone holds at each level. By “typical job,” we mean the one that most workers hold.  
 
 Entry-level position  No positions 
Mid-level position 
 No positions 
High-level position 
 No positions 
For coder: occupational coding  
   
97. What is the job title of the typical job in <entry-, mid-, 
or high-level> position for workers employed by 
this firm (at this location)?  N/A   N/A   N/A 
 
98. Describe the duties of someone in <JOB TITLE>. 
(if job title doesn’t describe duties) 
 
  N/A   N/A   N/A 
99. What percentage of <entry-, mid-, or high-level> 
workers are <JOB TITLE>?  
 0–
33% 
 34–
66% 
 67–100% 
 DK 
 0–
33% 
 34–
66% 
 67–100% 
 DK 
 0–33% 
 34–66% 
 67–100% 
 DK 
100. How easy is it for you to attract workers with skills 
needed in <JOB TITLE>? 
 Very easy 
 A little 
easy 
 A little hard 
 Very hard 
 Very easy 
 A little 
easy 
 A little hard 
 Very hard 
 Very easy 
 A little 
easy 
 A little 
hard 
 Very hard 
101. How easy is it for you to keep workers in <JOB 
TITLE>? 
 Very easy 
 A little 
easy 
 A little hard 
 Very hard 
 Very easy 
 A little 
easy 
 A little hard 
 Very hard 
 Very easy 
 A little 
easy 
 A little 
hard 
 Very hard 
102. What is the average wage in <JOB TITLE>?                 
Refused to answer___    
 
$______________per________ 
(e.g., $9.85 per hour) 
 
$_____________per_________ 
(e.g., $9.85 per hour) 
 
$______________per_______ 
(e.g., $9.85 per hour) 
103. Are wages in <JOB TITLE> covered by collective 
bargaining?  Yes  No  DK  Yes  No  DK  Yes  No  DK 
104. Can workers in <JOB TITLE> get things like 
commissions or tips to augment their wage?  Yes  No  DK  Yes  No  DK  Yes  No  DK 
105. In the past year, how have wages in <JOB TITLE> 
changed? 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
105a. (if increase or decrease) By what percentage did 
wages change in the past year? %  DK %  DK %  DK 
Thank you very much for completing this survey. Surveyor Note: Add any comments here and continue on back. 
 
 6 
 
Section F: Workforce Composition. Ask of everyone. Finally, we would like to ask a few questions about the different 
types of positions you have. We are particularly interested in learning about positions requiring different levels of education and 
work experience. In answering these questions, we would like you to think about ALL the positions in this firm at this location and to 
classify them by the education and training level required of workers when they start the job.  
 Entry-level position Mid-level position High-level position 
 (no more than a high 
school education and 
no more than one year 
of work experience) 
(some college and/or 
some work experience 
[maybe 1–3 years]) 
(at least a college 
degree and/or 
extensive work 
experience) 
92. What percentage of ALL workers are in <entry-, mid-, or 
high-level> positions? Please include anyone working 
on-site, such as temp help and contract workers.  
(If 0%, do not ask Q about that position.) 
 
% 
 0  
 
%
 0  
 
%
 0  
93. If Q92 < 100%, does the firm have another category of 
position with a large number of workers? 
 
 Yes  
 
 No   
   93a. What are the education and work experience requirements for this position? 
 
   
94. In the past year, how has the percentage of workers in 
<entry-, mid-, or high-level> positions changed?    Increased  Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
95. Of ALL workers in <entry-, mid-, or high-level>, what 
percentage are part-time, temporary, paid interns, 
consultants, outsourced, or contract workers? (Part-time are 
those not eligible for health benefits.) 
 0% 
 1–33% 
 34–66% 
 67–100% 
 DK 
 0% 
 1–33% 
 34–66% 
 67–100% 
 DK 
 0% 
 1–33% 
 34–66% 
 67–
100% 
 DK 
96. In the past year, how has the percentage of part-time, 
temporary, consultants, outsourced, or contract workers 
in <entry-, mid-, or high-level> positions changed?  Increased  Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
 Increased 
 Decreased 
 Same 
 DK 
96a. (If increased or decreased) Which areas changed? 
(Surveyor note: “outs” are consultants, outsourced, or contract workers.)  Part-time  Temps 
 “Outs” 
 DK 
 Part time 
 Temps 
 “Outs” 
 DK 
 Part-time 
 Temps 
 “Outs” 
 DK 
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Appendix B
Factor Analysis
I used four factor analyses to distill the large volume of information in the 
CHES into a few patterns that can be used to describe the behavior of firms. 
One factor analysis grouped into strategies the responses large firms took in 
the face of increasing health care costs. A second examined how large firms 
grouped the benefits they offered to workers. A third examined the motivations 
small firms gave for not offering ESI. The fourth grouped into strategies the 
responses small firms took when faced with increasing health care costs.
Factor analysis does not use a priori conceptualizations about how firms 
behave to categorize information. Rather, it produces categorizations that 
reflect the self-reported behavior of firms, which allows us to verify any a pri-
ori conceptualizations (e.g., our categories of how firms respond to increased 
ESI expenditures) and to identify patterns in which we have no a priori con-
ceptualization (e.g., grouping of benefits). 
Factor analysis assumes that a system of constructs (that is, patterns) exists 
in the CHES measures of firm behavior and that the constructs underlie actual 
behavior. The empirical measures of the constructs that are estimated from 
the factor analysis, called factors, account for the correlations in the CHES 
measures of how a firm responded to rising health care costs (for example).1 In 
other words, factor analysis identifies the latent dimensions of behaviors that 
explain why the CHES measures would be correlated, and we interpret the fac-
tors as a grouping of behaviors that can be categorized. 
Factors are identified using the factor structure matrix, also known as the 
factor loading. This matrix of n (number of measures of firm behavior) by m 
(number of retained factors) shows the correlations between the measures of 
firm behavior and the estimated factors.2 The factor score computed from the 
factor analysis measures, in relative terms, the importance of a firm’s indi-
vidual behavior in the factor analysis–determined grouping (i.e., the particular 
factor).3 The factor score is computed as a linear combination of the individ-
ual variables times a weight derived from the factor loading; it measures how 
many of the behaviors in the grouping the firm undertook. A relatively high and 
positive factor score indicates that the firm undertook most of the behaviors 
in the factor-identified grouping. A relatively large negative score indicates 
that the behaviors identified in the grouping generally were not ones the firm 
undertook. I used the variables with a factor score of at least 0.5 to categorize 
groups.4 If the grouping corresponds to our a priori grouping, we would con-
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sider it support for our categorization. Should we have no a priori conceptual-
ization, the factor-identified grouping provides structure for a categorization. 
I used the information on the variance explained by each factor as a mea-
sure of the goodness-of-fit of the factor-determined grouping and of the over-
all categorization to the data. Specifically, I used the ratio of the sum of the 
variance explained by each factor to the number of variables as an overall 
goodness-of-fit measure, and the ratio of the individual factor variance to the 
overall variance as a relative measure of its contribution to the analysis. 
LARGE FIRMS’ GROUPING OF BENEFITS
My factor analysis of the 10 benefits that firms offered (1 = offered, 0 = did 
not) produced three factors that explained about 56 percent of the variance in 
the benefits offered (Table B.1). We describe each of these factors in declining 
order of their ability to explain the behavior of large firms in offering benefits. 
The first factor, which I call supplemental health benefits, suggests that a 
group of firms bundles a group of health-related benefits other than ESI. Ben-
efits in this bundle include vision, dental, life, and long-term disability insur-
ance. This grouping accounts for about 22 percent of the variation in firms’ 
offering of benefits. 
The second factor, which I call paid  time  benefits, suggests that firms 
group paid time off as a package. Benefits in this bundle (i.e., those loading at 
0.5 or higher) include paid vacation, paid holidays, paid sick leave, and pen-
sions. This grouping accounts for about 20 percent of the variation in firms’ 
offering of benefits. 
The third factor, which I call long-term health benefits, suggests that firms 
group health benefits for workers that these workers would use over the lon-
ger term. Benefits in this bundle include those that allow individuals to insure 
against needing long-term health care (e.g., nursing home) and aging (retiree 
health). This grouping accounts for 13.7 percent of the variation in firms’ offer-
ing of benefits.
The pension variable loaded fairly equally on each of these three factors. 
LARGE FIRMS’ STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO INCREASED 
HEALTH CARE COSTS
My factor analysis of the 16 actions large firms said they took when health 
care costs rose (1 = took the action, 0 = did not) produced five factors that 
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explained about 56 percent of the variance in the actions they took (Table B.2). 
I describe each of these factors in declining order of their ability to explain the 
behavior of firms. 
The first factor, which I call benefits, suggests that a group of firms 
decreased benefits when health care costs increased. Actions that clustered 
together (i.e., loaded high) in this response strategy include decreasing dental 
insurance, vision insurance, non-health benefits, health insurance, and other 
health-related coverage. This strategy accounts for 15.6 percent of the varia-
tion in firms’ actions when health care costs increased.
The second factor, which I call worker price of ESI, suggests that a group 
of firms increased the cost to workers of ESI when health care costs increased. 
The factor-identified actions in this response strategy include increasing the 
amount the worker pays for the premium for other family members, the amount 
paid for single worker insurance, and the amount paid for copayments or coin-
surance. This strategy accounts for about 11 percent of the variation explained 
in firms’ actions when health care costs increased.
The third factor, which I call ESI choice, suggests that a group of firms 
decreased the choice of plans when health care costs increased. The factor-
identified actions in this response strategy include decreasing the types of 
health plans offered, decreasing the number of health plans offered, and chang-
ing health insurance carriers. This strategy accounts for 10.7 percent of the 
variation explained in firms’ actions when health care costs increased.
The fourth factor, which I call workforce costs, suggests that a group of 
firms traded ESI for wages and employment when health care costs increased. 
The factor-identified actions in this response strategy include giving fewer 
raises or reducing wages, increasing the proportion of workers not eligible for 
benefits, and reducing the workforce. This strategy accounts for about 10 per-
cent of the variation in firms’ actions when health care costs increased.
The fifth factor, which I call access to benefits, suggests that a group of 
firms reduced worker access to ESI when health insurance costs increased. The 
factor-identified actions in this response strategy include increasing the months 
of tenure needed to receive ESI and the minimum hours per week worked. This 
strategy accounts for 8.7 percent of the explained variation in firms’ actions 
when health care costs increased.
SMALL FIRMS’ MOTIVATIONS FOR NOT OFFERING ESI 
My factor analysis of the 11 reasons (using a 1-to-5 rating of importance, 
with “5” being “very important”) why firms did not offer ESI generated four 
factor-identified motivations for not offering it. These four factors accounted 
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for 68.9 percent of the variation in the reasons why small firms do not offer ESI 
(Table B.3). I describe each of these factors in declining order of their ability to 
explain the behavior of large firms in offering benefits.
The first factor, which I call costs too high, suggests that one group of firms 
does not offer insurance because these firms are concerned about finances. The 
factor-identified reasons for not offering insurance that fall into this area of 
concern include the following: the business cannot afford it, premiums are too 
high, and revenue is uncertain. This motivation accounts for 20.5 percent of the 
variation in the reasons for not offering insurance. 
The second factor, which I call workforce characteristics, suggests that 
one group of firms does not offer insurance because the firms in this group 
do not have a stable workforce. The factor-identified reasons for not offer-
ing insurance that fall into this area of concern include the following: worker 
turnover is too high, workers are temporary or part-time, and firms don’t need 
to offer insurance to recruit and retain good workers. This motivation accounts 
for 18.4 percent of the variation in the reasons for not offering insurance. 
The third factor, which I call administrative costs and worker preference, 
suggests that one group of firms does not offer insurance because they believe 
that either the firm lacks the capacity to offer insurance or its workers lack the 
capacity to accept it. The factor-identified reasons for not offering insurance 
that fall into this area of concern include these: the firm is too small or too new, 
workers prefer other forms of compensation, the setup is too complicated and 
too time-consuming, and workers cannot afford health insurance. This motiva-
tion accounts for 17.9 percent of the variation in the reasons for not offering 
insurance. 
The fourth factor, which I call healthy workers, suggests that one group of 
firms does not offer insurance because these firms do not believe their workers 
need the insurance. The factor-identified reasons for not offering in this area of 
concern include the belief that workers are healthy and do not need it and that 
firms can attract good workers without offering health insurance. This motiva-
tion accounts for 12.1 percent of the variation in the reasons for not offering 
insurance.
SMALL FIRMS’ STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO INCREASED 
HEALTH CARE COSTS 
My factor analysis of the 16 actions small firms said they took when health 
care costs rose (1 = took the action, 0 = did not) produced five factors that 
explained about 60 percent of the variance in the actions they took (Table B.4). 
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These same five factors arose in the factor analysis described above for large 
firms. 
The first factor, which I call benefits, suggests that a group of firms 
decrease benefits when health insurance costs increase. Actions that clustered 
together include decreasing vision insurance, dental insurance, non-health ben-
efits, health insurance, and other health-related coverage. This response strat-
egy accounts for about 16.4 percent of the variation explained in small firms’ 
actions taken when health insurance costs increase.
The second factor, which I call worker price of ESI, suggests that a group 
of small firms increase the cost to workers of taking their health insurance offer 
when health care costs increase. The factor-identified actions in this strategy 
include increasing the amount the worker pays for the premium for other fam-
ily members, the amount paid for single worker insurance, and the amount paid 
for copayments or coinsurance. This strategy accounts for 12.3 percent of the 
variation explained in small firms’ response to increasing health care costs. 
The third factor, which I call workforce  costs, suggests that a group of 
firms trade insurance for wages and employment or increase revenue when 
health insurance costs increase. The factor-identified actions in this response 
strategy include giving fewer raises or reducing wages, reducing the work-
force, and increasing the proportion of workers not eligible for benefits. This 
strategy accounts for 12.0 percent of the variation explained in small firms’ 
response to increasing health care costs. 
The fourth factor, which I call ESI choice, suggests that a group of small 
firms decreases the choice in the ESI plans when health insurance costs increase. 
The factor-identified actions in this response strategy include decreasing the 
number of health plans offered, decreasing the types of health plans offered, 
and changing health insurance carriers. This strategy accounts for 10.8 percent 
of the variation explained by our factor analysis in small firms’ response to 
increasing health care costs.
The fifth factor, which I call access, suggests that a group of small firms 
reduces worker access to health insurance when health insurance costs increase. 
The factor-identified actions in this response strategy include increasing the 
minimum hours per week worked and the months of tenure needed to receive 
employment-based health insurance. This strategy accounts for 8.9 percent of 
the explained variance in small firms’ response to increasing health care costs. 
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Notes
 1. During the factor extraction, the shared variance of a variable is partitioned from 
its unique variance and error variance to identify the underlying factor structure. 
Only the shared variance appears in the solution. This process contrasts with 
principal components analysis, which does not discriminate between shared and 
unique variance and, as a result, can produce inflated values of variance that are 
accounted for by the components. Costello and Osborne (2005) and Kim and 
Mueller (1978) provide a straightforward discussion of principal component and 
factor analysis. 
 2. We allowed the factor analysis to determine the number of factors that accounted 
for the observed covariation. We specified a variance-maximizing (varimax) rota-
tion factor solution, which produces orthogonal (uncorrelated) extracted factors. 
We identified only factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1.0.
 3. Factor scores are standardized with a mean of 0.0. About two-thirds of the values 
lie between 1.0 and –1.0 (and have a range of approximately 3.0 to –3.0).
 4. Using 0.5 as a criterion for a significant loading is more stringent than the 0.3 rule 
of thumb and enables us to cleanly identify unique factors.
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Table B.1  Large-Firm Benefit Bundles
Supplemental 
health benefits
Paid time 
benefits
Long-term
health Communality
Supplemental health benefits
Vision 0.760** –0.009 –0.047 0.579
Dental 0.730** 0.198 –0.122 0.586
Life insurance 0.660** 0.271 0.239 0.567
Long-term disability (wage replacement) 0.585** 0.242 0.302 0.492
Paid time benefits     
Paid vacation 0.076 0.795** 0.005 0.639
Paid holidays 0.113 0.773** 0.025 0.612
Paid sick leave 0.290 0.660** 0.022 0.521
Long-term health benefits     
Retiree health –0.102 0.097 0.806** 0.670
Long-term health care (e.g., nursing home) 0.202 –0.056 0.706** 0.542
Pension 0.403 0.387 0.243 0.371
Factor characteristics     
Overall variance explained 2.204 2.000 1.374 5.579
Percentage variance explained 22.0 20.0 13.7 55.8
N (unweighted) 659
NOTE: “Benefits” are defined as binaries that capture whether a benefit is offered. “Pension” is captured as whether a firm offered either a 
defined contribution or a defined benefit plan. Item-specific nonresponse lowered the number of large firms available for analysis. Num-
bers in the factor loading columns show the factor score vectors from a varimax-rotated factor analysis. The “Overall variance explained” 
row shows the amount of variance the factor explains. “Percentage variance explained” represents the percentage of the variance each 
factor explains. “Communality” numbers show the amount of variance an original variable shares with the other variables. Observations 
were weighted so that the distribution of the sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and 
industry. ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Table B.2  Large-Firm Strategies for Rising Health Care Costs
Benefits
Worker 
price of ESI
ESI 
choice
Workforce 
costs 
Access to 
benefits Communality
Benefits
Decrease dental insurance 0.815** –0.016 0.036 0.037 0.172 0.697
Decrease vision insurance 0.753** –0.087 0.090 –0.078 0.150 0.611
Decrease non-health benefits 0.641** 0.054 0.003 0.116 –0.107 0.439
Decrease health insurance coverage 0.625** 0.133 0.139 0.251 0.216 0.537
Decrease other health-related coverage 0.590** 0.025 0.136 0.024 –0.063 0.371
Worker price of ESI      
Increase worker payment, family coverage 0.076 0.901** 0.058 0.022 0.048 0.824
Increase worker payment, single coverage –0.013 0.897** 0.092 –0.021 –0.001 0.814
Increase copayment or coinsurance –0.003 0.302 0.296 0.334 –0.072 0.295
ESI choice 
Decrease variety of health plans offered 0.122 0.042 0.808** 0.014 0.052 0.672
Decrease number of health plans offered 0.048 0.045 0.772** 0.093 0.098 0.619
Change health insurance carriers 0.119 0.070 0.514** –0.027 –0.115 0.298
Workforce costs      
Give fewer raises or reduce wages 0.081 0.033 0.025 0.789** 0.050 0.633
Reduce workforce 0.003 0.016 0.191 0.549** 0.416 0.511
Increase workers not eligible for ESI 0.117 –0.045 –0.073 0.682** –0.077 0.492
Access to benefits
Increase months to receive ESI –0.036 –0.040 –0.095 –0.008 0.763** 0.594
Increase hours to receive ESI 0.237 0.066 0.049 0.036 0.690** 0.540
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Factor characteristics
Overall variance explained 2.496 1.755 1.714 1.597 1.388 8.950
Percentage variance explained 15.6 11.0 10.7 10.0 8.7 55.9
N (unweighted) 627
NOTE: Item-specific nonresponse lowered the number of large firms available for analysis. The question was posed to firms offering health 
insurance: “In the past 3 to 5 years, in response to rising health care costs, did your firm . . . ?” Numbers in the factor loading columns 
show the factor score vectors from a varimax-rotated factor analysis. The “Overall variance explained” row shows the amount of vari-
ance the factor explains. “Percentage variance explained” represents the percentage of the variance each factor explains. “Communality” 
numbers show the amount of variance an original variable shares with the other variables. Observations have been weighted so that the 
distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. ** significant at the 
0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Table B.3  Small Firms’ Motivations for Not Offering ESI 
Costs too 
high
Worker 
characteristics
Administrative 
costs and worker 
preference
Healthy 
workers Communality
Costs too high
Business cannot afford it 0.886** –0.001 0.261 –0.021 0.853
Premiums too high 0.763** 0.144 0.284 0.045 0.685
Revenue too uncertain to commit to a plan 0.643** 0.316 –0.075 0.455 0.726
Worker characteristics
Worker turnover too high 0.188 0.849** 0.038 –0.030 0.759
Workers temporary or part-time 0.203 0.826** 0.053 –0.115 0.740
Can recruit and retain good workers without it –0.178 0.620** 0.320 0.269 0.591
Administrative costs and worker preference
Firm is too small or new 0.233 0.057 0.669** –0.307 0.599
Workers prefer wages or other benefits –0.044 0.301 0.678** 0.403 0.714
Setup too complicated and time-consuming 0.208 0.011 0.637** 0.164 0.476
Workers cannot afford it 0.504** 0.131 0.622** 0.034 0.655
Healthy workers
Workers healthy and do not need it 0.116 –0.073 0.103 0.865** 0.777
Factor characteristics
Overall variance explained 2.252 2.024 1.972 1.329 7.576
Percentage variance explained 20.5 18.4 17.9 12.1 68.9
N (unweighted) 150
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NOTE: Firms not offering health insurance were asked to use a scale from 1 to 5 (“5” being “Very important”) to rate how important each 
item was in their decision not to offer it. Numbers in the factor loading columns show the factor score vectors from a varimax-rotated 
factor analysis. The “Overall variance explained” row shows the amount of variance the factor explains. “Percentage variance explained” 
represents the percentage of the variance each factor explains. “Communality” numbers show the amount of variance an original variable 
shares with the other variables. Observations have been weighted so that the distribution of sample firms reflects the proportion of firms 
in the United States with respect to size and industry. ** significant at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Table B.4  Small-Firm Strategies for Rising Health Care Costs
Benefits
Worker 
price of ESI
Workforce 
costs ESI choice
Access to 
benefits Communality
Benefits
Decrease vision insurance 0.817** 0.060 –0.044 0.026 0.004 0.674
Decrease dental insurance 0.784** 0.057 0.001 0.021 0.146 0.640
Decrease non-health benefits 0.669** 0.125 0.141 0.219 0.054 0.534
Decrease health insurance coverage 0.594** 0.206 0.412 0.208 –0.153 0.632
Decrease other health-related coverage 0.569** 0.006 0.004 0.161 0.419 0.525
Worker price of ESI       
Increase amount worker pays for other 
family members
0.065 0.823** 0.133 –0.008 0.083 0.706
Increase amount worker pays for single 
worker health coverage
0.090 0.808** 0.041 0.171 0.162 0.717
Increase copayment or coinsurance 0.159 0.606** 0.248 0.176 –0.082 0.492
Workforce costs       
Give fewer raises or reduce wages 0.035 0.085 0.782** 0.121 0.091 0.487
Reduce workforce –0.019 0.047 0.724** 0.021 0.011 0.594
Increase workers not eligible for benefits 0.162 0.268 0.667** –0.025 0.224 0.642
ESI choice       
Decrease number of health plans offered 0.193 0.016 0.053 0.782** 0.109 0.570
Decrease variety of health plans offered 0.267 0.052 0.206 0.737** –0.041 0.661
Change health insurance carriers –0.069 0.323 –0.079 0.609** 0.000 0.585
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Access to benefits       
Increase hours to receive health benefits –0.005 0.082 0.079 –0.052 0.745** 0.664
Increase months to receive benefits 0.173 0.051 0.120 0.092 0.728** 0.527
Factor characteristics
Overall variance explained 2.616 1.960 1.925 1.731 1.419 9.650
Percentage variance explained 16.4 12.3 12.0 10.8 8.9 60.3
N (unweighted) 477
NOTE: The question was posed to firms offering health insurance: “In the past 3 to 5 years, in response to rising health care costs, did your 
firm . . . ?” Numbers in the factor loading columns show the factor score vectors from a varimax-rotated factor analysis. The “Overall 
variance explained” row shows the amount of variance the factor explains. “Percentage variance explained” represents the percentage 
of the variance each factor explains. “Communality” numbers show the amount of variance an original variable shares with the other 
variables. Boldface indicates factor loadings that are greater than 0.5. Observations have been weighted so that the distribution of sample 
firms reflects the proportion of firms in the United States with respect to size and industry. ** significant at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: CHES (Maxwell 2007). 
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Appendix C
Defining Empirical Constructs
This appendix provides a detailed description of the empirical constructs 
used as dependent variables in the multivariate analysis in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
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C.1  Description of the Empirical Constructs Used as Dependent Variables in the Multivariate Analysis
Offer
ESI A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm offers health benefits to its workers. 
Access
More than 30 hours required A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm requires an employee to work more 
than 30 hours a week before receiving an offer of health insurance.
No wait time A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that a worker is eligible for health insurance as 
soon as employment begins (or at the beginning of the first month following employment). 
More than 3 months’ wait A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that a worker must wait more than three months 
before receiving an offer of health insurance. 
Quality 
90%+ firm-paid premium A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm pays at least 90 percent of the 
health insurance premium. 
At least 2 plans offered A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm offers at least two health plans. 
At least 2 types offered A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm offers at least two different types of 
health plans (conventional, HMO, PPO, POS, and other). 
Strategies for rising health care costs
Wages and access The number of the following actions the firm took in response to rising health care costs: 
gave fewer raises or reduced wages, reduced workforce, increased workers not eligible for 
ESI, increased months to receive ESI, or increased hours to receive ESI. 
ESI choice The number of the following actions the firm took in response to rising health care costs: 
increased amount worker pays for family coverage, increased amount worker pays for 
single coverage, increased copayment or coinsurance, decreased variety of health plans 
offered, decreased number of health plans offered, or changed health insurance carriers. 
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Benefits The number of the following actions the firm took in response to rising health care costs: 
dental insurance, vision insurance, non-health benefits, health insurance, or other health-
related insurance. 
Motivations for not offering ESI
Costs too high The number of the following reasons that a firm found to be important for not offering 
ESI: premiums too high, business cannot afford it, or revenue too uncertain to commit to a 
plan.
Worker characteristics The number of the following reasons that a firm found to be important for not offering 
ESI: can recruit and retain good workers without it, workers temporary or part-time, or 
worker turnover too high. 
Administrative costs and 
worker preferences
The number of the following reasons that a firm found to be important for not offering 
ESI: firm is too small or new, workers cannot afford it, workers prefer wages or other 
benefits, or setup too complicated and time-consuming. 
Healthy workers A 0,1 binary variable, with 1 indicating that the firm said that workers were healthy and 
did not need ESI as an important reason for not offering it. 
Workforce skills
Low-skilled A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm had a majority of positions filled 
by low-skilled workers (those with no more than a high-school education and one year of 
work experience when starting the position). 
High-skilled A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm had a majority of positions filled by 
high-skilled workers (those with at least a bachelor’s degree or five years of work experi-
ence when starting the position). 
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Firm sizea
5–19 workers A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm had between 5 and 19 workers at 
all locations. 
20–50 workers A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm had between 20 and 50 workers at 
all locations. 
51+ workers A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm had at least 51 workers at all loca-
tions. 
Firm characteristics (control factors)—Industryb
Service A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the service sector (1987 SIC of 70–72, 
74–79, 81, 83–86, 88–89).
Retail trade A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the retail sector (1987 SIC of 52–60).
Business services A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the business service sector (1987 SIC 
of 73 or 87, which includes engineering, accounting, research, management, and related 
services as business services).
FIRE A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the finance, insurance, or real estate 
sector (1987 SIC of 60–68).
Construction A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the construction sector (1987 SIC of 
15–17).
Education and medical A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the education or medical sector (1987 
SIC of 80 or 82).
Manufacturing A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the manufacturing sector (1987 SIC of 
20–39).
Wholesale trade A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the wholesale trade sector (1987 SIC of 
50–51).
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TCPU A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the transportation, communications, 
electric, gas and sanitary services sector (1987 SIC of 40–49).
Agriculture and mining A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating a firm in the agriculture or mining sector (1987 
SIC of 10–14).
Other firm characteristics
For-profit A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm is a for-profit organization. 
Rural A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that the firm is located in a nonmetropolitan 
area.
Union representation A 0,1 binary variable, with “1” indicating that a union was present in the firm. Constructed 
according to whether workers in the typical low-skilled, mid-skilled, or high-skilled job 
were represented by a union. 
a  Omitted category in multivariate estimations is firms with 300+ workers.
b  Based on 1987 SIC classification (OSHA 2010). Omitted categories in multivariate estimations are agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, 
and construction.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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